构建和谐社会的法治思考

和谐社会是一个秩序井然、公平正义、权利保障的社会。和谐社会不能没有法治；法律相对于其他实现社会管理的方式．如道德、宗教等具有强制性、规范性、全面性、程序性等优越性．这就决定了法治是社会管理方式的主导。由此，构建社会主义和谐社会必须充分发挥法治在促进、实现、保障社会和谐方面的重要作用。     

孔孟儒家的德治学说与为己之学

认为孔孟儒家的德治学说并不是一种独立的治国理论,而是孔孟儒家为己修身的一种落实。德治虽然具有为己修身层面上的价值,但却不乏治理层面上的弊端,不具有国家治理层面上的价值。     

国外法治文明成果和教训

中国共产党实施的依法治国方略 ,是对人类近代社会以来资本主义和社会主义两种制度治国经验的科学总结。积极吸收资产阶级创造的优秀政治文明成果 ,特别是法治文明成果 ,吸取苏东剧变的惨痛教训 ,对于推进我国依法治国的进程有着重大的现实意义。     

构建和谐社会的法治基础分析

和谐社会的法治基础研究是近年来重大的理论和实践课题。法治作为和谐社会的基础应当表现为其不可或缺性、不可替代性和必须依赖性；法治是构建和谐社会的理念基础、制度基础、规范基础和基础性保障。     

Intertemporal Equity and Efficient Allocation of Resources

Competitive paths which are efficient are shown to satisfy a terminal cost minimization condition, thereby providing a continuous-time counterpart to the discrete-time result due to Malinvaud. Using this result, competitive paths which are equitable and efficient are shown to satisfy Hartwick's investment rule, which states that the value of net investment is zero at each date. Our result indicates that Hartwick's rule can help to signal inefficiency of competitive equitable paths. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C61, D90, O41.     

会计准则结构及其构成要素研究--对我国会计概念框架构建的思考

传统的会计准则制定模式中都特别强调了会计概念、会计原则和会计规则的突出地位,因而有了原则导向(或基础)的会计准则制定模式、规则导向(或基础)的会计准则制定模式以及安然等财务欺诈案件后美国目标(实际是概念)导向的会计准则制定模式的说法。通过对现有会计准则制定模式的反思,我们认为会计概念、会计原则和会计规则不应是会计准则制定的导向或基础,而是会计准则结构体系的构成要素。在本文中,我们对其各自的含义界定和功能定位进行初步探讨,旨在为建立我国的会计概念框架,完善会计准则体系提供理论参考。     

On the evolutionary edge of altruism: a game-theoretic proof of Hamilton’s rule for a simple case of siblings

We offer a game-theoretic proof of Hamiltons rule for the spread of altruism. For a simple case of siblings, we show that the rule can be derived as the outcome of a one-shot prisoners dilemma game between siblings.JEL Classification: A13, C70, D64Correspondence to: Oded Stark, ZEF, University of Bonn, Walter-Flex-Strasse 3, 53113 Bonn, GermanyWe are indebted to an anonymous referee and to Uwe Cantner for helpful comments and suggestions. Partial financial support from the National Institute on Aging (grant RO1-AG13037) and from the Humboldt Foundation is gratefully acknowledged.     

The politics of redistributive social insurance

This paper analyses the political support for a social insurance that includes elements of redistribution when there exists an imperfect private insurance alternative. Individuals differ both in their income and risk. The social insurance is compulsory and charges an income-related contribution with pooling of risks. The private insurance is voluntary and charges a contribution based on individual risks. However due to the adverse selection problem, private insurance companies provide only partial insurance. Adopting a non-expected utility model, we show that there is a general majority support for social insurance and that this support is increasing with risk aversion. We also show that a mixed insurance is politically impossible, regardless of the degree of redistribution of social insurance and the joint distribution of risk and income in the population. Lastly, we analyse how the political support for social insurance is affected by any change in its redistributive component and the possibility of using genetic tests.     

The Monetary Policy of the European Central Bank

The first six years of ECB monetary policy are examined using a general framework that allows central bankers to weight differently positive and negative deviations of inflation, output and the interest rate from their reference values. The empirical analysis on synthetic euro‐area data suggests that the objective of price stability is symmetric, whereas the objectives of real activity and interest‐rate stabilizations are not. Output contractions imply larger policy responses than output expansions of the same size, while movements in the interest rate are larger when the level of the interest rate is relatively high. The hypothesis of M3 growth‐rate targeting is rejected.     

The Borda rule,Condorcet consistency and Condorcet stability

Summary. The Borda rule is known to be the least vulnerable scoring rule to Condorcet inconsistency, Saari (2000). Such inconsistency occurs when the Condorcet winner (the alternative which is preferred to any other alternative by a simple majority) is not selected by the Borda rule. This note exposes the relationship between the Borda rule and the Condorcet q-majority principle as well as the Condorcet q-majority voting rule. The main result establishes that the Borda rule is Condorcet q-majority consistent when where k is the number of alternatives. The second result establishes that is the minimal degree of majority decisiveness corresponding to the Borda rule under sincere voting. The same majority is required to ensure decisiveness under the Borda rule and to ensure that a q-rule (the generalized q-majority Condorcet rule) is a voting rule. Received: April 8, 2002; revised version: July 17, 2002 Correspondence to:S. Nitzan