Interventions in Markets with Adverse Selection: Implications for Discount Window Stigma

I study the implications for central bank discount window stigma of a workhorse model of adverse selection in financial markets. In the model, firms (banks) need to borrow to finance a productive project. There is limited liability and firms have private information about their ability to repay their debts, which gives rise to the possibility of adverse selection. The central bank can ameliorate the impact of adverse selection by lending to firms. Discount window borrowing is observable and it may be taken as a signal of firms' credit worthiness. Under some conditions, firms borrowing from the discount window may pay higher interest rates to borrow in the market, a phenomenon often associated with the presence of stigma. I discuss these and other outcomes in detail and what they suggest about the relevance of stigma as an empirical phenomenon.     

Is the Optimal Labor Income Tax Progressive in a Unionized Economy?*

This paper concerns optimal nonlinear labor income taxation in an economy with union wage setting and endogenous hours of work. The purpose is to study the determinants of tax progression. We show that the optimal degree of progression of the labor income tax depends on the extent to which the government can influence the wage rate via tax policy as well as on its ability to redistribute income across individuals. In addition, the argument for progressive labor income taxation depends on whether hours of work are chosen by the employed themselves or the union.     

Programme Evaluation with Unobserved Heterogeneity and Selective Implementation: The Mexican PROGRESA Impact on Child Nutrition

This paper considers the impact of Programa de Educación, Salud y Alimentación ( PROGRESA ), a large Mexican rural anti-poverty programme that had an evaluation sample in which overall treatment was randomly assigned to some communities but not others, on child nutrition. When we examine the impact of PROGRESA based on the presumption of randomized allocations, we find that PROGRESA had no or even a negative impact on child nutrition. However, not all children designated to receive nutritional supplements actually did so. Our preferred estimates – child fixed-effects estimates that control for unobserved heterogeneity that is correlated with access to the supplement – indicate a significantly positive and fairly substantial programme effect of the nutritional supplements on children 12–36 months. They imply an increase of about a sixth in mean growth per year for these children and a lower probability of stunting. Effects are somewhat larger for children from poorer communities but whose mothers are functionally literate. The long-term consequences of these improvements are non-trivial; its impact working through adult height alone could result in a 2.9% increase in lifetime earnings.     

Risk preferences in multi-period consumption models, the equity premium puzzle, and habit formation utility

The relationship between the relative risk aversion measure for the utility function for consumption and that for the value function for wealth is a derived relationship whose properties depend on how consumption and wealth are defined and measured. This fact together with information concerning estimates for these two relative risk aversion measures is used to give another perspective on the equity premium puzzle, and to explain why it is that the habit formation utility function is effective in eliminating that puzzle. A time separable utility function that can serve as an alternative to the assumption of habit formation is also presented.     

Competitive equilibria with limited enforcement

We show how to decentralize constrained efficient allocations that arise from enforcement constraints between sovereign nations. In a pure exchange economy these allocations can be decentralized with private agents acting competitively and taking as given government default decisions on foreign debt. In an economy with capital these allocations can be decentralized if the government can tax capital income as well as default on foreign debt. The tax on capital income is needed to make private agents internalize a subtle externality. The decisions of the government can arise as an equilibrium of a dynamic game between governments.     

Economic Implications of Alternative Allocation Schemes for Emission Allowances*

For reasons of political feasibility, emission trading systems may have to rely on free initial allocation of emission allowances in order to ameliorate adverse production and employment effects in dirty industries. Against the background of an emerging European‐wide emission trading system, we examine the trade‐off between such compensation and economic efficiency under output‐based and emissions‐based allocation rules. We show that the emissions‐based allocation rule is more costly than the output‐based rule in terms of maintaining output and employment in energy‐intensive industries. When the international allowance price increases, the inferiority of emissions‐based allocation vis‐à‐vis output‐based allocation becomes more pronounced, as emission subsidies drastically restrict efficiency gains from international trade in emission allowances.     

Choice of Distribution System in the New Zealand Life Insurance Industry

Using 1988–93 panel data drawn from the New Zealand life insurance industry, this paper examines empirically the notion that the choice of distribution system is an efficient contracting solution to incentive conflicts between owners, managers and sales agents in life insurance firms. Consistent with what was hypothesised, the empirical results suggest that choice of distribution system is distinguished by organisational form, firm size, and sales commission. However, contrary to expectations, the variables representing product diversity and asset specificity were found not to be statistically significant. The empirical results thus lend mixed support for prior predictions.     

Construct measurement in strategic management research: illusion or reality?

Strategic management research has been characterized as placing less emphasis on construct measurement than other management subfields. In this work, we document the state of the art of measurement in strategic management research, and discuss the implications for interpreting the results of research in this field. To assess the breadth of measurement issues in the discipline, we conducted a content analysis of empirical strategic management articles published in leading journals in the period of 1998–2000. We found that few studies discuss reliability and validity issues, and empirical research in the field commonly relies on single‐indicator measures. Additionally, studies rarely address the problems of attenuation due to measurement error. We close with a discussion of the implications for future research and for interpreting prior work in strategic management. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Syndicated Loan Announcements and Borrower Value

Announcements of syndication loans increase borrowers' shareholder wealth if they are revolving credit agreements but not if they are term loans. Share price responses to revolving credit announcements are positive and significant, whereas the wealth effect for term loans is negative and significant. The results show that announcements from both the financial press and commercial information providers can affect borrower share price reaction. Overall, single syndication announcements appear to be more newsworthy than multiple announcements reported in the financial press, and we find evidence of information leakage, post‐announcement drift, or both.     

The Hazard Rate of Foreign Direct Investment: A Structural Estimation of a Real‐option Model*

The hazard rate of investment is derived within a real‐option model, and its properties are analysed so as to directly study the relation between uncertainty and investment. Maximum likelihood estimates of the hazard are calculated using a sample of multinational enterprises (MNEs) that invested in Central and Eastern Europe over the period 1990–98. Employing a standard, non‐parametric specification of the hazard, our measure of uncertainty has a negative effect on investment, but the reduced‐form model is unable to control for nonlinearities in the relationship. The structural estimation of the option‐based hazard is instead able to account for the nonlinearities and exhibits a significant value of waiting, although the latter is independent of our measure of uncertainty. This finding supports the existence of alternative channels through which uncertainty can affect investment.