Public or Private Sector Wage Leadership? An International Perspective*

Whether a government acts as a wage leader, placing pressure on private‐sector wages (more open to competition), or whether it plays a passive role and merely follows wage negotiations in the private sector, there are important implications for macroeconomic development, particularly in small open economies and/or countries that are members of a monetary union, such as those of the European Monetary Union. With the notable exception of the case of Sweden, opinion on this issue is still divided. In this paper, we look at public‐ and private‐sector wage interactions from an international perspective (18 OECD countries). We focus on the causal two‐way relationship between public and private wage setting, confirming that the private sector, on the whole, appears to have a stronger influence on the public sector, rather than vice versa. However, we also find evidence of feedback effects from public wage setting, which affect private‐sector wages in a number of countries. When the private sector takes the lead on wages, there are few feedback effects from the public sector, while public wage leadership is typically accompanied by private‐sector feedback effects.     

Social Preferences,Sorting, and Competition*

In this paper, I investigate how an increase in competition for workers influences the impact of social preferences on labor‐market outcomes. By sorting themselves into firms with homogeneous work forces, workers can ensure that they suffer less from social comparisons. Competition promotes choice and thus facilitates sorting. However, competition also boosts rent differences in the labor market, because firms cannot curb internal inequity among its employees without losing workers to competitors. To reduce their exposure to social comparisons, workers might engage in inefficient sorting into unemployment. Consequently, social preferences can have strong effects (i.e., unemployment) in a competitive labor market, whereas they only have a slight impact on labor‐market outcomes in a monopsony.     

Flexibility at the Margin and Labor Market Volatility in OECD Countries*

We study the business‐cycle behavior of segmented labor markets with flexibility at the margin (e.g., just affecting fixed‐term contracts). We present a matching model with temporary and permanent jobs (i) where there is a gap in the firing costs associated with these types of jobs and (ii) where there are restrictions in the creation and duration of fixed‐term contracts. We show that a labor market with ``flexibility at the margin'' increases the unemployment volatility with respect to one that is fully regulated. This analysis yields new insights into the interpretation of the recent volatility changes witnessed in the OECD area.     

Labour Supply,Life Satisfaction,and the (Dis)Utility of Work*

In economic theory, it is typically assumed that there is a “disutility of labour”. However, empirical research on subjective well‐being has consistently shown that unemployed people are less happy than employed people, even after taking income differences into account. In this paper, we attempt to reconcile both findings. We show that happiness and work hours exhibit an inverse U‐shaped relation – working longer raises the level of happiness, as long as the total working time is not too long. Hence, working can be beneficial for happiness and, at the same time, it can exert a disutility at the margin.     

Do Immigrants Affect Firm‐Specific Wages?*

We propose and test a novel effect of immigration on wages. Existing studies have focused on the wage effects that result from changes in the aggregate labour supply in a competitive labour market. We argue that if labour markets are not fully competitive, immigrants might also affect wage formation at the most disaggregate level – the workplace. Using linked employer?employee data, we find that an increased use of low‐skilled immigrant workers has a significantly negative effect on the wages of native workers at the workplace – also when controlling for potential endogeneity of the immigrant share using both fixed effects and instrumental variables.     

Incentives and the Sorting of Altruistic Agents into Street‐Level Bureaucracies*

Many street‐level bureaucrats have the dual task of helping some clients, while sanctioning others. We develop a model of a street‐level bureaucracy, and we study the implications of its personnel policy on the self‐selection and allocation decisions of agents who differ in altruism towards clients. When bureaucrats are paid flat wages, they do not sanction, and the most altruistic types sort into bureaucracy. Pay‐for‐performance induces some bureaucrats to sanction, but it necessitates an increase in compensation, which can result in sorting from the top and bottom of the altruism distribution. We also explain why street‐level bureaucrats often experience an overload of clients.     

Law and credit constraints in transition economies1

Using a survey of over 4,000 firms in 21 transition economies, this paper investigates how legal extensiveness (law on the books) and legal effectiveness (law in practice) affect availability of bank finance. Our findings suggest that both law on the books and law in practice are important, but that they impact firms of different sizes differently. Small firms appear to be the most credit constrained in countries with weak creditor rights and with weak contract enforcement, while large firms are the most credit constrained in countries with weak courts and unclear and inconsistent laws pertaining to firms’ business operations.     

Ethnic Discrimination in Germany's Labour Market: A Field Experiment

Abstract. This paper studies ethnic discrimination in Germany's labour market with a correspondence test. We send two similar applications to each of 528 advertisements for student internships, one with a Turkish‐sounding and one with a German‐sounding name. A German name raises the average probability of a callback by about 14%. Differential treatment is particularly strong and significant in smaller firms at which the applicant with the German name receives 24% more callbacks. Discrimination disappears when we restrict our sample to applications including reference letters which contain favourable information about the candidate's personality. We interpret this finding as evidence for statistical discrimination.     

OUTPUT,OUTCOME, AND QUALITY ADJUSTMENT IN MEASURING HEALTH AND EDUCATION SERVICES

This paper provides an overview of measuring price and volume changes of the output of health and education providers. In the national accounts, outputs should reflect the results of production and these cannot normally be captured by outcome, the state of health or education of the population. However, we show that outcome information is required when it comes to quality adjustment of output measures. The paper clarifies terminology, and discusses output measurement and quality adjustment methods with a focus on health and education services.     

Children’s environmental health,education, and economic development

Abstract This article aims at investigating the interplay between environmental quality, health, and economic development in a unified OLG framework. Human capital accumulation depends on the environment through its impact on children’s health and workers’ productivity. In turn, environmental quality dynamics rely upon human capital that determines maintenance efforts. This two‐way relationship generates a co‐evolution of human capital and environmental quality in the long run. Along the transition path, the dynamic interactions between economic and environmental spheres allow for replicating two different trajectories: some economies experiment an Environmental Kuznets Curve while some others are caught into the environmental poverty trap.