Imperfect competition in two-sided matching markets

This paper considers a simple equilibrium model of an imperfectly competitive two-sided matching market. Firms and workers may have heterogeneous preferences over matches on the other side, and the model allows for both uniform and personalized wages or contracts. To make the model tractable, I use the Azevedo and Leshno (2013) framework, in which a finite number of firms is matched to a continuum of workers.In equilibrium, even if wages are exogenous and fixed, firms have incentives to strategically reduce their capacity, to increase the quality of their worker pool. The intensity of incentives to reduce capacity is given by a simple formula, analogous to the classic Cournot model, but depends on different moments of the distribution of preferences. I compare markets with uniform and personalized wages. For fixed quantities, markets with personalized wages always yield higher efficiency than markets with uniform wages, but may be less efficient if firms reduce capacity to avoid bidding too much for star workers.     

Communication strategy in partnership selection

This paper explores the communication and choice strategies of economic agents deciding on a partnership, where agents are uncertain about their payoffs, and payoffs of each agent depend on and are partly known to the potential partner. Business examples of such decisions include mergers, acquisitions, distribution channel partners, as well as manufacturing and brand alliances. Dating and marriage partner selection are also natural examples of this game. The paper shows that (a) when communication is informative, the communication strategy as a function of the expected payoff of the partnership involves pretending fit when expected payoff is high, pretending misfit when expected payoff is low, and telling the truth in the intermediate range, and (b) the condition for informativeness of communication is that the distribution of payoffs has thin tails. Furthermore, the paper shows that the possibility of communication, even when this communication is not restricted to be truthful, can decrease the expected payoff for both the sender and the receiver; in particular, it can decrease the expected social welfare.

转移支付优化审计策略研究——以事权和支出责任相适应改革为背景

中央与地方财权与事权的不对称使转移支付制度成为实现地方政府财力与事权匹配的基本手段,以弥补政府间纵向财政失衡和横向财政失衡。但目前我国财政转移支付因体制的诱致性变迁、设计理念缺陷、事权与支出责任分离等原因,存在效能不彰、运行效率漏损、结构不合理、规范性水平低、程序规制失范等问题。在全面深化财税体制改革下,国家审计机关可以发挥＆quot;免疫系统＆quot;功能和国家治理作用,对转移支付从审计内容、审计导向、资金流向等方面提升审计层次,把问效、问绩、问责贯穿转移支付审计过程始终,关注转移支付资金的安全性、效率性、经济性,实现政府支出责任随事权转移、各级政府财力与事权相匹配,优化转移支付,完善政府治理。     

政策契合、资源整合与创业能力

当前,我国经济发展进入新常态,高层次科技人才成为区域经济发展中科技创新创业的生力军。高层次科技人才创业能力高低成为决定其创业成功与否的关键因素。运用扎根理论对3位高层次科技人才创业案例进行研究,最终构建了高层次科技人才创业能力提升路径理论模型。高层次科技人才创业可通过契合区级政府人才政策获取政策支持,将自身创业资源与政策资源有效整合,从而大幅提升自身创业能力。     

流动性约束下机构投资者的资产配置——以保险公司为例

流动性是机构投资者资产配置必须考虑的问题之一。本文以保险公司为例,研究流动性不足对保险公司最优资产配置策略和交易策略的影响。使用遗传算法的模拟结果表明,面对流动性不足,保险公司应采取现金流匹配的交易策略以最优化其资产,即首先采用现金支付索赔;当现金资产耗尽时,在变现股票资产以尽量减少大规模销售导致的股票价格临时性和永久性波动的同时,保险公司还应多样化其资产组合,保证能够实现完全交易以减少流动性不足的影响。     

经济技术开发区在中西部地区产业结构升级中的作用——基于马氏距离配对的倍差法分析

本文以第二产业增加值占GDP比重度量产业结构优化程度,以西部大开发战略提出之后建立的16个中西部地区国家级经济技术开发区为分析对象,在马氏距离配对的基础上运用倍差法发现:平均来看中西部地区经济技术开发区的建立对母城产业结构升级的作用并不显著;城市化水平和引资程度的提高能够对城市产业结构升级产生持续时间较长的促进作用,且这种促进作用在制造业占比中表现得更为明显.因此,中西部地区经济技术开发区应积极承接东部地区经济技术开发区的制造业产业转移,提高自身的工业发展水平.     

Corrigendum to “Stable matchings and preferences of couples” [J. Econ. Theory 121 (1) (2005) 75–106]

We correct an omission in the definition of the domain of weakly responsive preferences introduced in [B. Klaus, F. Klijn, Stable matchings and preferences of couples, J. Econ. Theory 121 (2005) 75–106] or KK05 for short. The proof of the existence of stable matchings [KK05, Theorem 3.3] and a maximal domain result [KK05, Theorem 3.5] are adjusted accordingly.     

Group incentive compatibility for matching with contracts

Hatfield and Milgrom [Hatfield, John William, Milgrom, Paul R., 2005. Matching with contracts. Amer. Econ. Rev. 95, 913–935] present a unified model of matching with contracts, which includes the standard two-sided matching and some package auction models as special cases. They show that the doctor-optimal stable mechanism is strategy-proof for doctors if hospitals' preferences satisfy substitutes and the law of aggregate demand. We show that the doctor-optimal stable mechanism is group strategy-proof for doctors under these same conditions. That is, no group of doctors can make each of its members strictly better off by jointly misreporting their preferences. We derive as a corollary of this result that no individually rational allocation is preferred by all the doctors to the doctor-optimal stable allocation.     

资本匹配、创新力培育与区域协调发展：理论机制与经验证据

区域协调发展不仅受到资本积累数量的影响,更受到资本匹配质量的制约。在拓展MRW模型的基础上,理论分析“实物资本-人力资本-社会资本”最优匹配存在性与高效经济增长的关系,进一步构建资本匹配程度与匹配质量通过创新力培育实现落后地区经济赶超,进而影响区域协调发展能力的传导路径,并利用中国省级面板数据进行实证检验。结果表明,实物资本、人力资本与社会资本存量之间存在最优比例关系,且资本匹配质量主要通过创新力培育影响区域协调发展水平;资本匹配整体上有利于区域协调发展,东部地区资本匹配度对区域协调发展的促进作用高于中部地区、西部地区;机制检验发现,资本匹配通过组织创新效应实现区域协调发展的解释程度最大,其次为技术创新效应,最后是产业创新效应。     

数据交易市场双边匹配模型与决策方法研究

针对平台视角下的数据交易供需双边匹配问题,基于双边匹配理论,提出了考虑模糊语言评价信息、区间数评价信息和0-1评价信息的混合型多属性匹配决策方法并定义了属性匹配满意度函数。以供需主体最大匹配满意度为目标,构建了数据交易供需双边匹配的多目标优化模型,并设计模型求解算法,将多目标化模型转化为单目标线性规划模型进行求解,以获取匹配结果。结果表明,通过对供需双方需求信息的详细分析,双边匹配结果能在最大程度上满足双方需求,同时,优化模型具有合理性及有效性。