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61.
We offer a new algorithm for analyzing innovation timing games. Its main advantage over the traditional approach is that it applies to problems that had previously been intractable. We use the algorithm to examine two classical innovation problems. We find that the competition takes the form of a waiting game with a second-mover advantage either for any level of R&D costs (process innovation) or for high R&D costs (product innovation). Moreover, both models predict that the second-mover advantage is monotonically increasing in the costs of R&D. 相似文献
62.
Summary In this paper we consider a class of time discrete intertemporal optimization models in one dimension. We present a technique to construct intertemporal optimization models with nonconcave objective functions, such that the optimal policy function coincides with any pre-specifiedC
2 function. Our result is a variant of the approach presented in a seminal paper by Boldrin and Montrucchio (1986). Whereas they solved the inverse problem for the reduced form models, we address the different question of how to construct both reduced and primitive form models. Using our technique one can guarantee required qualitative properties not only in reduced, but also in primitive form. The fact that our constructed model has a single valued and continuous optimal policy is very important as, in general, nonconcave problems yield set valued optimal policy correspondences which are typically hard to analyze. To illustrate our constructive approach we apply it to a simple nonconcave model.We are grateful for the helpful comments of L. Montrucchio, K. Nishimura, T. Mitra and an anonymous referee. Financial support of the Austrian Science Foundation under contract No. P7783-PHY and No. J01003-SOZ is gratefully acknowledged. This paper was written while M. Kopel was visiting the Department of Economics, Cornell University. 相似文献
63.
For a balanced two-way mixed model, the maximum likelihood (ML) and restricted ML (REML) estimators of the variance components were obtained and compared under the non-negativity requirements of the variance components by L ee and K apadia (1984). In this note, for a mixed (random blocks) incomplete block model, explicit forms for the REML estimators of variance components are obtained. They are always non-negative and have smaller mean squared error (MSE) than the analysis of variance (AOV) estimators. The asymptotic sampling variances of the maximum likelihood (ML) estimators and the REML estimators are compared and the balanced incomplete block design (BIBD) is considered as a special case. The ML estimators are shown to have smaller asymptotic variances than the REML estimators, but a numerical result in the randomized complete block design (RCBD) demonstrated that the performances of the REML and ML estimators are not much different in the MSE sense. 相似文献
64.
In this paper I propose an alternative to calibration of linearized singular dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models. Given an a-theoretical econometric model as a representative of the data generating process, I will construct an information measure which compares the conditional distribution of the econometric model variables with the corresponding singular conditional distribution of the theoretical model variables. The singularity problem will be solved by using convolutions of both distributions with a non-singular distribution. This information measure will then be maximized to the deep parameters of the theoretical model, which links these parameters to the parameters of the econometric model and provides an alternative to calibration. This approach will be illustrated by an application to a linearized version of the stochastic growth model of King, Plosser and Rebelo. 相似文献
65.
We formalize the link between optimal cost-sharing contracts and the production technology in the presence of moral hazard by appealing to several well-known results from duality theory. Building on intuitions from the interlinkage literature, we show that optimal contractual structure is determined by the (i) substitution possibilities that exist between different observable factor inputs, as well as (ii) between these inputs and unobservable effort. We endogenize contractual choice using landlord characteristics as instruments, exploiting the fact that, in our dataset, landlords interact with several tenants and vice versa. The approach is applied to an unbalanced plot-level panel of cost-sharing contracts in a Tunisian village, using a translog representation of the restricted profit function. Contractual terms are found to be a significant determinant of input use and therefore lead to Marshallian inefficiency, while the optimality of the underlying contractual structure is rejected. 相似文献
66.
The comparative static predictions of the Baron and Ferejohn [Baron, D.P., and Ferejohn, J.A., (1989). Bargaining in legislatures, American Political Science Review 83 (4), 1181-1206] model better organize behavior in legislative bargaining experiments than Gamson's Law. Regressions similar to those employed in field data produce results seemingly in support of Gamson's Law (even when using data generated by simulating agents who behave according to the Baron-Ferejohn model), but this is determined by the selection protocol which recognizes voting blocks in proportion to the number of votes controlled. Proposer power is not nearly as strong as predicted in the closed rule Baron and Ferejohn model, as coalition partners refuse to take the small shares given by the continuation value of the game. Discounting pushes behavior in the direction predicted by Baron and Ferejohn but has a much smaller effect than predicted. 相似文献
67.
We document the substantial process of structural transformation—the reallocation of labor between agriculture, manufacturing,
and services—and aggregate productivity growth undergone by Portugal between 1956 and 1995. We assess the quantitative role
of sectoral labor productivity in accounting for these processes. We calibrate a model of the structural transformation to
data for the United States and use the model to gain insight into the factors driving the structural transformation and aggregate
productivity growth in Portugal. The model implies that Portugal features low and roughly constant relative productivity in
agriculture and services (around 22%) and a modest but growing relative productivity in manufacturing (from 44 to 110%). We
find that productivity growth in manufacturing accounts for most of the reduction of the aggregate productivity gap with the
United States and that a further closing of this gap can only be accomplished via improvements in the relative productivity
of services.
This paper was written while the authors were affiliated with the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond. We would like to thank
the editor, two anonymous referees, and participants at the Third Conference on Portuguese Economic Development in the European
Context organized by the Bank of Portugal for their comments. All errors are our own. 相似文献
68.
Public goods in networks 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Yann Bramoullé 《Journal of Economic Theory》2007,135(1):478-494
This paper considers incentives to provide goods that are non-excludable along social or geographic links. We find, first, that networks can lead to specialization in public good provision. In every social network there is an equilibrium where some individuals contribute and others free ride. In many networks, this extreme is the only outcome. Second, specialization can benefit society as a whole. This outcome arises when contributors are linked, collectively, to many agents. Finally, a new link increases access to public goods, but reduces individual incentives to contribute. Hence, overall welfare can be higher when there are holes in a network. 相似文献
69.
Oscar Alfranca 《International Advances in Economic Research》2005,11(2):201-213
The objective of this paper is to present econometric evidence of the effects of economic incentives, public policies, and institutions on national aggregate private agricultural R&D investments. The main hypothesis we will test in this paper is whether agricultural R&D spillovers represent a disincentive for national private R&D. More specifically, we will test if the spillovers function, which is a determinant of private R&D, follows a quadratic form and if private R&D is determined by the role of incentives and institutions.A previous draft of this paper was presented at the 57th International Atlantic Economic Conference, Lisbon, Portugal, 10–14 March 2004. Comments from participants have been very useful to improve the paper. 相似文献
70.
Steinar Holden 《European Economic Review》2005,49(4):833-843
A recent literature argues that a strict monetary regime may reduce equilibrium unemployment by disciplining wage setters, as wage setters abstain from raising wages to avoid a monetary contraction. However, in this literature the wage setters are assumed not to co-ordinate their wage setting. The present paper argues that precisely because a strict monetary regime may discipline the unco-ordinated wage setting, thus lowering unemployment in the unco-ordinated outcome, it also reduces wage setters’ incentives to co-ordinate. It is shown that an accommodating monetary regime may reduce equilibrium unemployment, via the strengthening of the wage setters’ incentives to co-ordinate. 相似文献