试论北京奥运会后中国竞技体育的发展

目前,我国竞技体育举国体制存在着不足,竞技体育职业化不足,借鉴日、美等国的经验,我国竞技体育应调整体制,使之与社会体育均衡发展,并积极推进其产业化、商业化、职业化。     

青年奥林匹克运动会的发展前景探析

运用文献资料法和逻辑分析法对现代奥林匹克运动面临的问题和青年奥运会的发展前景进行了研究,认为青年奥林匹克运动会在对青年的教育和人才的培养以及促进奥林匹克运动的可持续发展方面将发挥重要的作用。     

Network structure,games, and agent dynamics

Consider a group of agents embedded in a network, repeatedly playing a game with their neighbors. Each agent acts locally but through the links of the network local decisions percolate to the entire population. Past research shows that such a system converges either to an absorbing state (a fixed distribution of actions that once attained does not change) or to an absorbing set (a set of action distributions that may cycle in finite populations or behave chaotically in unbounded populations). In many network games, however, it is uncertain which situation emerges. In this paper I identify two fundamental network characteristics, boundary consistency and neighborhood overlap, that determine the outcome of all symmetric, binary-choice, network games. In quasi-consistent networks these games converge to an absorbing state regardless of the initial distribution of actions, and the degree to which neighborhoods overlap impacts the number and composition of those absorbing states.     

奥运会投资风险问题的理性思考

采用文献资料、比较分析、逻辑分析等方法,重点对奥运会投入模式、结构、预算与风险问题进行了分析,结果显示:结合型投入模式更有利于奥运会的产出效益,降低直接投入与间接投入的比值、建立科学的预算体系是规避奥运会投资风险的重要保证.     

有限理性地方政府之间的引资博弈分析

引进外贵促进本地经济发展一直是我国各级地方政府的工作重点之一.外资始终是稀缺的,为获得更多的外资流入本地区,各地方政府之间不可避免地展开了有形或无形的招商引资博弈.在我国现行的地方政府政绩考核指标体系下,地方政府官员的经济人行为导致了地方政府的有限理性,进而导致其引资博弈动机与行为的扭曲,以外资优惠政策为主导的引资博弈策略往往造成地区社会福利的净损失.基于对有限理性地方政府目标函教的创新与分析,本文采用博弈模型详细演绎了有限理性地方政府引资博弈的动机、行为与后果,从中得出问题的症结及改进思路.     

The control of game form recognition in experiments: understanding dominant strategy failures in a simple two person “guessing” game

This paper focuses on instructions and procedures as the reasons that subjects fail to behave according to the predictions of game theory in two-person “guessing game” (beauty contest game) experiments. In this game, two individuals simultaneously choose a number between 0 and 100. The winner is the person whose chosen number is the closest to 2/3 of the average of the two numbers. The weakly dominant strategy is zero. Because of the simplicity of the game, the widespread failure of subjects to choose the weakly dominant strategy has been interpreted as evidence of some fundamental inability to behave strategically. By contrast, we find that subjects’ behavior reflects a lack of understanding of the game form, which we define as the relationships between possible choices, outcomes and payoffs. To a surprising degree, subjects seem to have little understanding of the experimental environment in which they are participating. If subjects do not understand the game form, the experimental control needed for testing game theory is lost. The experiments reported here demonstrate that the failure to act strategically is related to how the game is presented. We test how well subjects are able to recognize the game under a variety of different presentations of the game. Some subjects fail to recognize the game form when it is presented abstractly. When the game is transformed into a simple isomorphic game and presented in a familiar context, subjects do choose weakly dominant strategies. While our results confirm the ability of subjects to make strategic decisions, they also emphasize the need to understand the limitations of experimental subjects’ ability to grasp the game as the experimenter intends. Given these limitations, we provide suggestions for better experimental control.     

Anonymous yes–no voting with abstention and multiple levels of approval

Symmetric (3,2) simple games serve as models for anonymous voting systems in which each voter may vote “yes,” abstain, or vote “no,” the outcome is “yes” or “no,” and all voters play interchangeable roles. The extension to symmetric (j,2) simple games, in which each voter chooses from among j ordered levels of approval, also models some natural decision rules, such as pass–fail grading systems. Each such game is determined by the set of (anonymous) minimal winning profiles. This makes it possible to count the possible systems, and the counts suggest some interesting patterns. In the (3,2) case, the approach yields a version of May's Theorem, classifying all possible anonymous voting rules with abstention in terms of quota functions. In contrast to the situation for ordinary simple games these results reveal that the class of simple games with 3 or more levels of approval remains large and varied, even after the imposition of symmetry.     

奥运经济影响评价指标研究

从经济学角度研究奥运会的经济影响,无论是对奥运会举办城市的发展,还是对以后大型体育赛事的申办都有着重要意义。首先对国内外相关研究进行了回顾,认为这些研究过于重视短期经济影响研究,忽略中长期影响研究,缺少奥运会间的对比分析。为此,该文在总结以往研究成果的基础上,试图全面分析奥运经济影响,据此构建奥运经济影响的评价指标。该指标不仅可以全面评估特定奥运会的经济影响,还可用于各届奥运会间经济影响的对比分析。     

全球化与北京城市发展的深层转型——对2008北京奥运会的新解读

分析了奥运会对北京城市影响的历史性意义,指出奥运会这一历史性的事件促使全球化与全球城市的逻辑转变为现实的动因并深层渗透到北京的城市发展之中,之后从新城市社会学的视角出发,对这一论题从空间的生产、集体消费的场所、人文精神的发现等三个视角出发加以剖析.     

Ambiguity in Electoral Competition

The paper proposes an explanation to why electoral competition induces parties to state ambiguous platforms even if voters dislike ambiguity. A platform is ambiguous if different voters may interpret it as different policy proposals. An ambiguous platform puts more or less emphasis on alternative policies so that it is more or less easily interpreted as one policy or the other. I suppose that a party can monitor exactly this platform design but cannot target its communications to individuals one by one. Each individual votes according to her understanding of the parties’ platforms but dislikes ambiguity. It is shown that this electoral competition has no Nash equilibrium. Nevertheless its max–min strategies are the optimal strategies of the Downsian game in mixed strategies. Furthermore, if parties behave prudently enough and if the voters aversion to ambiguity is small enough, these strategies do form an equilibrium.