浅谈奥运物流

对奥运物流进行了定义和分类．并在此基础上总结了奥运物流运作模式及北京奥运物流需求量，指出了现代物流技术在北京奥运物流中的作用：     

现代奥运保险运营机制及我国保险业发展对策研究

采用文献资料研究法、归纳推理研究法、逻辑分析研究法等研究方法,对现代奥运会保险运营机制进行研究,对我国体育保险的现状进行系统分析,指出我国保险业参与2008年奥运会面临的主要问题以及应对奥运保险挑战的策略。希望通过本研究能够为中国体育保险业争夺北京奥运会保险市场提供一定的理论借鉴和帮助。     

2008年北京奥运会与北京租赁业发展前景研究

筹办北京奥运会的巨额资金需求为政府造成了直接的财政压力,借鉴国际经验必须采用"政府统筹、市场化运作"的操作模式.本文提出在筹办奥运会的过程中引入租赁这一新兴的投融资方式,使之通过相关行业,为奥运经济的三个阶段服务;并提出规范北京市租赁行业的对策建议.     

The endogenous formation of scientific research coalitions

The paper develops a formal model of coalition-building ("network" formation) among research units that seek competitive funding from a supra-regional program, while also drawing support from their respective regional funding agencies. This analysis is motivated by the absence of frameworks of analysis applicable to problems of design of public R&D funding arrangements in the European Union, and in other regional systems were independent programs of "federal and state" support for research co-exists. The model assumes a fixed finite population of research units and an associated distribution of reputed quality, or scientific reputation, which may be modified as a consequence of research results. Non-cooperative games of coalition formation developed by Bloch (1995), and Ray and Vohra (1999), provides a useful single-period framework for this part of the analysis. Collaborations are formed in the expectation of attracting incremental research funding, given the selection criteria of the agency that offers funding for "networks". Invitations to join proposals for networks are initiated and acted upon following a specific ordering procedure. This gives rise to a repeated non-cooperative game of coalition (or collaboration) formation, in which the distribution of payoffs within the collaboration is governed by a fixed rule. Following Keely (2002), this type of game is applied to a multi-period setting in which a distribution of coalitions is tracked, along with the levels of funding received. The latter are determined according to a rule comparing the distribution of reputations within proposed collaborations, and the effects upon the distribution of reputations in the entire population are analysed. Alternative possible external funding rules are evaluated with the help of a numerical example, to determine how their impacts upon collaboration formation, and the resulting evolution of the reputation distribution (as that will be affected by the allocation of funding).     

The future of the Olympic Winter Games in an era of climate change

The Olympic Winter Games (OWG) stands as a symbol of international cross-cultural exchange through elite-level sport. As a mega-event with a significant reliance on a specific range of weather conditions for outdoor competitions, the OWG have developed several technologies and strategies to manage weather risk. Can these climatic adaptations cope with future climate change? Based on an analysis of two key climate indicators (probability of a minimum temperature of ≤0°C, and probability of a snow depth of ≥30 centimetres with advanced snowmaking capacity), this paper examines how projected changes to climate will impact the ability of the 19 previous host cities/regions to provide suitable conditions for outdoor competitions in the future. The results indicate that while the 19 former OWG hosts all have a suitable climate in the 1981–2010 period, only 11 or 10 (low–high-emission scenarios) remain climatically suitable in the 2050s, with as few as 6 in the high-emission scenario of the 2080s. The analysis reveals that climate change has important implications for the future geography of OWG host cities/regions as well as broader implications for participation in winter sport.     

A Social Network Analysis of Overseas Tourist Movement Patterns in Beijing: the Impact of the Olympic Games

The 2008 Beijing Olympic Games had a great impact on the tourism industry in Beijing, especially on tourism flows and movements. This study used content analysis and social network analysis methods to examine 500 online trip diaries and analyze overseas tourist movement patterns in Beijing during the Olympics. The result revealed that overseas tourists were most interested in famous traditional attractions, and their movements were focused in the central city area of Beijing. The study identified the diversity of tourist attractions and the expansion of main visiting areas as the two main changes during the Olympics. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

有限理性地方政府之间的引资博弈分析

引进外贵促进本地经济发展一直是我国各级地方政府的工作重点之一.外资始终是稀缺的,为获得更多的外资流入本地区,各地方政府之间不可避免地展开了有形或无形的招商引资博弈.在我国现行的地方政府政绩考核指标体系下,地方政府官员的经济人行为导致了地方政府的有限理性,进而导致其引资博弈动机与行为的扭曲,以外资优惠政策为主导的引资博弈策略往往造成地区社会福利的净损失.基于对有限理性地方政府目标函教的创新与分析,本文采用博弈模型详细演绎了有限理性地方政府引资博弈的动机、行为与后果,从中得出问题的症结及改进思路.     

Anonymous yes–no voting with abstention and multiple levels of approval

Symmetric (3,2) simple games serve as models for anonymous voting systems in which each voter may vote “yes,” abstain, or vote “no,” the outcome is “yes” or “no,” and all voters play interchangeable roles. The extension to symmetric (j,2) simple games, in which each voter chooses from among j ordered levels of approval, also models some natural decision rules, such as pass–fail grading systems. Each such game is determined by the set of (anonymous) minimal winning profiles. This makes it possible to count the possible systems, and the counts suggest some interesting patterns. In the (3,2) case, the approach yields a version of May's Theorem, classifying all possible anonymous voting rules with abstention in terms of quota functions. In contrast to the situation for ordinary simple games these results reveal that the class of simple games with 3 or more levels of approval remains large and varied, even after the imposition of symmetry.     

北京奥运会生活垃圾物流管理对广州亚运会的启示

介绍了北京奥运会期间对生活垃圾管理的政策和措施,包括对垃圾的分类、回收管理以及对生活垃圾的最后的处理措施。总结了北京奥运会在生活垃圾处理方面的成功之处,提出可供广州亚运会借鉴的经验。     

The control of game form recognition in experiments: understanding dominant strategy failures in a simple two person “guessing” game

This paper focuses on instructions and procedures as the reasons that subjects fail to behave according to the predictions of game theory in two-person “guessing game” (beauty contest game) experiments. In this game, two individuals simultaneously choose a number between 0 and 100. The winner is the person whose chosen number is the closest to 2/3 of the average of the two numbers. The weakly dominant strategy is zero. Because of the simplicity of the game, the widespread failure of subjects to choose the weakly dominant strategy has been interpreted as evidence of some fundamental inability to behave strategically. By contrast, we find that subjects’ behavior reflects a lack of understanding of the game form, which we define as the relationships between possible choices, outcomes and payoffs. To a surprising degree, subjects seem to have little understanding of the experimental environment in which they are participating. If subjects do not understand the game form, the experimental control needed for testing game theory is lost. The experiments reported here demonstrate that the failure to act strategically is related to how the game is presented. We test how well subjects are able to recognize the game under a variety of different presentations of the game. Some subjects fail to recognize the game form when it is presented abstractly. When the game is transformed into a simple isomorphic game and presented in a familiar context, subjects do choose weakly dominant strategies. While our results confirm the ability of subjects to make strategic decisions, they also emphasize the need to understand the limitations of experimental subjects’ ability to grasp the game as the experimenter intends. Given these limitations, we provide suggestions for better experimental control.