The impact of economic downturns on marketing

The Great Recession of 2008–2010 affected the global and U.S. economies and its companies more universally than any economic downturn since the Great Depression. This study explores how the Great Recession influenced the marketing decisions of firms and the resulting long-term effects on marketing within business-to-business companies. Empirical evidence from previous recessions suggests that companies should focus on their customers and increase their marketing efforts during a recession. However, many companies typically slash their marketing budgets during economic downturns. Authors found that during the Great Recession, companies reacted differently than in previous recessions with their marketing responses. Authors conclude their analysis by proposing that the Great Recession will have three long-term effects on marketing in business-to-business companies.     

Are consumers more rational and informed purchasers during recession periods? The role of Private Labels and retailing strategies

This paper aims to investigate how economic crisis changes consumer behaviour and mass retailers’ strategies, the interrelationship of these changes, and how Private Labels (PLs) can influence and be used in this process. The authors analysed data collected from 535 consumers and carried out statistical processing (ANOVA, cluster, etc.) to detect changes in the selection of the retailer, potential variations in the selected brand for various categories of food and non-food products, changes in preparation activities and behaviours prior to and during the purchase (leaflets, internet, promotions, coupons, etc.). Results indicate that consumers have noticeably moved to discount and ELP-based retailers, to PL products, increased the use of Internet to prepare and make purchases and, furthermore, they feel good with the decisions they’ve taken even after the recession, and want to continue doing so. The rising sales of discounters and PLs confirm that economic crisis boosts changes both in consumer behaviour and the retailing sector. Findings highlight the importance of some retailers’ strategies to face adverse economic situations and how PLs can be used as game-breakers, as they are preferred by consumers in these situations.     

The impact of the Great Recession on TFP convergence among EU countries

This article provides evidence on the effect of the Great Recession on productivity convergence among European Union (EU) economies. We use firm data, aggregated at the country-year level, to analyse the evolution of beta-convergence on total factor productivity (TFP) for 2003–2014. We obtain a positive impact of the recession on TFP (unconditional and conditional) beta-convergence across EU economies. These results support the existence of a catching-up process within the EU during the recent financial crisis. Other macroeconomic and institutional characteristics are important in fostering TFP growth, namely R&D intensity and quality of governance.     

Cyclical Multiplier and Zero Low Bound Effects of Government Expenditure on Economic Growth: Evidence for Greece

This study explores the impact of government expenditure multipliers on economic growth utilising an Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) approach. We provide evidence on the short‐term dynamics as well as the long‐run expenditure multiplier effects on economic growth for the Greek economy over the period 1960–2014. We find that the size of the multiplier does not differ substantially over the phases of the business cycle. Our results also indicate that irrespective of the scale of inflation, government expenditure positively affects economic growth, whilst inconclusive evidence is obtained in the case of exceptionally low interest rates.     

The credit crunch and fall in employment during the Great Recession

We study how a bank credit crunch—a dramatic worsening of firm and consumer access to bank credit, such as the one observed over the Great Recession—translates into job losses in U.S. manufacturing industries. To identify the impact of the recent credit crunch, we rely on differences in the degree of dependence on external finance and of tangibility of assets across manufacturing industries and in the sensitivity of these industries׳ output to changes in the supply of consumer credit. We find that, for employment, household access to bank loans matters more than firm access to bank loans. In addition, we show that, over the recent financial crisis, tightening access to commercial and industrial loans and, in particular, consumer installment loans may have contributed significantly to the drop in employment in the manufacturing sector.     

In Praise of Expansionary Fiscal Contraction

Textbook orthodoxy maintains that increases in the cyclically adjusted budget balance (i.e. reductions in the deficit) withdraw demand from an economy. Those Keynesian economists who believe that fiscal policy is the most powerful single influence on changes in demand expect ‘fiscal contraction’ to be accompanied by below‐trend growth or even declines in output. This article, a response to Martin Wolf's 2013 Wincott Memorial Lecture, considers this Keynesian view. Using a database prepared by the International Monetary Fund, it shows that since the 1980s ‘expansionary fiscal contractions’ have been the norm and not the exception in the USA and the UK. Keynesian support for fiscal activism is unsupported by a large body of recent evidence.     

On the rationality and efficiency of inflation forecasts: Evidence from advanced and emerging market economies

This paper provides a full characterization of inflation rate forecasts using the mean values from Consensus Economics for a sample of 78 advanced and emerging economies between 1989 and 2014. It also assesses the performance of inflation rate forecasts around business cycles’ turning points. As expected, that inflation forecasts start to mirror the actual data as the forecast horizon draws to a close, particularly in advanced economies. The mean forecast error is positive and larger than one point when we pool all countries, but this masks inter-group differences. Moreover, we find evidence for biasedness, inefficiency or information rigidities, with a clear tendency for “forecast smoothing”. Accounting for cross-country informational linkages is important: forecasters fail to adjust their inflation forecasts quick enough in response to domestic news and news from abroad. Finally, during recession episodes forecasts generally appear to be inefficient. The same holds true for recoveries.     

Stress testing the EU fiscal framework

This study evaluates the efficiency of the cyclically-adjusted budget balance (CABB) as the central gauge in the reinforced European fiscal framework for evaluating fiscal discipline. We do this by means of a simulation experiment. We use an estimated DSGE model to simulate all the macroeconomic data needed to assess the CABB according to the official EC methodology. Additionally, the model contains an expenditure fiscal rule that accounts for non-automatic variation in the budget, which allows us to observe the true discretionary measures of fiscal policy. Our results indicate that the EC methodology frequently fails to identify the true fiscal policy stance and also frequently fails to correctly signal potential violations of the SGP limit on structural deficit. In the latter case triggering corrective fiscal contractions to comply with the SGP results in increased macroeconomic instability. In addition, we show that allowing for a bigger role for stability-oriented discretionary policy and thus relaxing the SGP limit on structural deficit could enhance the stabilization efficiency of fiscal policy without reducing the degree of compliance with the Maastricht Treaty. These conclusions apply to small countries in a monetary union as well as large countries with independent monetary policy.     

DID INEQUALITY CAUSE THE U.S. FINANCIAL CRISIS?

In his widely discussed book ‘Fault Lines’ (2010), Raghuram Rajan argues that many low and middle income consumers have reduced their saving and increased debt since income inequality started to soar in the United States in the early 1980s. This has temporarily kept private consumption and employment high, but it also contributed to the creation of a credit bubble. This surge in household indebtedness turned out to be unsustainable in the financial crisis starting in 2007. Although Rajan and others emphasize the role of government in promoting credit to those households with declining relative (permanent) incomes, other strands of the literature have focused more explicitly on the implications of rising inequality for aggregate demand and households’ demand for credit. These differences in emphasis may explain why the literature on the inequality‐crisis nexus appears somewhat disparate, even though the various strands are far from mutually exclusive but rather complement each other. We therefore place the ‘Rajan hypothesis’ in the context of competing theories of consumption, and survey the empirical literature on the effects of inequality on household behaviour. We conclude that the empirical evidence calls for a renaissance of the relative income hypothesis of consumption.     

The pre-Great Recession slowdown in productivity

In the years since the Great Recession, many observers have highlighted the slow pace of productivity growth around the world. For the United States and Europe, we highlight that this slow pace began prior to the Great Recession. The timing thus suggests that it is important to consider factors other than just the deep crisis itself or policy changes since the crisis. For the United States, at the frontier of knowledge, there was a burst of innovation and reallocation related to the production and use of information technology in the second half of the 1990s and the early 2000s. That burst ran its course prior to the Great Recession. Continental European economies were falling back relative to that frontier at varying rates since the mid-1990s. We provide VAR and panel-data evidence that changes in real interest rates have influenced productivity dynamics in this period. In particular, the sharp decline in real interest rates that took place in Italy and Spain seem to have triggered unfavorable resource reallocations that were large enough to reduce the level of total factor productivity, consistent with recent theories and firm-level evidence.