Capital Structure,Management Ownership and Large External Shareholders: A UK Analysis

This paper examines empirically the effects of management ownership and ownership by large external shareholders on the capital structure of the firm from an agency theory perspective. The paper extends the US literature on the topic by examining the effect of interactions between management ownership and ownership by large external shareholders on the capital structure of UK firms. For a sample of UK firms, the paper provides empirical evidence that suggests the debt ratio is positively related to management ownership and negatively related to ownership by large external shareholders. Furthermore, the presence of a large external shareholder acts to negate the positive relationship between debt ratios and management ownership; in the presence of a large external shareholder, no significant relationship between debt ratios and management ownership exists. These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that the presence of large external shareholders affects the agency costs of debt and equity.     

混合所有制背景下多个大股东与风险承担研究

基于混合所有制改革的背景,从风险承担视角考察多个大股东的股权结构下国企混合所有制改革效果.研究发现,国企混合所有制改革中引入多个大股东有利于加强对内部人的监督和制衡,促进企业提高风险承担水平;且其他大股东的监督能力越强,对风险承担的促进作用越显著.国企混改中引入国有、民营和外资性质的其他大股东,都能够优化公司治理机制;非国有大股东的相对持股比例越高,越能够促进国有上市公司提高风险承担水平.在不同类别、层级以及处于不同市场化进程的国企中,多个大股东的治理结构都提升了风险承担水平.研究丰富了混合所有制改革及多个大股东股权治理领域文献,对党的“十九大”提出的深化国有企业改革有一定借鉴意义.     

关系股东与融资约束——基于系族集团的经验证据

已有研究指出,控股股东的关系股东加剧了控股股东与中小股东间的利益冲突.关系股东是否具有积极的一面,研究中尚缺乏关注.本文以2003-2017年间附属于系族集团的A股上市公司作为研究样本,实证检验了系族成员关系股东是否以及如何影响融资约束.研究发现,相对于没有关系股东的系族成员,有关系股东的成员企业面临的融资约束更低,在考虑内生性问题后结论依然稳健.进一步研究表明,关系股东通过降低实际控制人与成员企业的信息不对称、促进内部资本市场资源优化配置,以及降低管理层代理成本从而缓解所在成员企业的融资约束.本文揭示了关系股东对融资约束的影响及作用机理,丰富了关系股东与内部资本市场经济后果方面的研究.     

Budgeting, the individual and the capital market: A case of fiscal stress

Budgetary control is a major aspect of management control. It has undergone major shifts of emphasis in both the literature and practice in the later part of the 20th century. A significant influence on the changing practices of this aspect of control has been the growth of and increased influence of the capital market. This paper draws on a detailed field study focusing on the problematic nature of budgetary control in a changing operational environment that acknowledges both the importance, internally, of the organisation members and their contribution to continued growth—and externally the growing influence of shareholders on business operations. The focus of the paper is on the effects of the constant pressure of the share price on the case unit of analysis and how that changed the use of the budgetary control system. This change is illustrated both at a macro level of organisational accountability for predicted results and also as it is driven down the organisation to the level of the individual.     

控制权与激励的冲突——兼对股权激励有效性的实证分析

控制权配置与激励安排是组织治理中的两个重要工具,本文首先从组织中委托人私人收益角度分析委托人控制权与代理人激励之间可能的冲突,进而通过上市公司数据对这一冲突关系进行经验检验。我们的研究发现,中国上市公司大股东控制权与管理层股权激励之间存在显著的冲突,而且这种冲突与股权性质、公司成长速度相关。民营控股公司中的冲突程度显著弱于其他类型公司,国资委控股公司中的冲突显著强于其他类型公司;而公司成长速度越快,大股东控制权与管理层激励之间的冲突越强。本文的研究结果能够很好地解释中国上市国有企业中股权激励效果不显著、甚至出现负效应的经验现象,并由此提出相应的政策建议。     

上市公司审计师聘任权安排:机理与改进

审计师聘任制度作为独立审计合约缔结的游戏规则,其要解决的核心问题是如何选择合格的审计师.审计师聘任权应该归股东所有.股东大会决议是控股股东的意识表示,可能损害非控股股东的权益,独立审计是应股东之聘对经营者执行股东大会与董事会决议的效果的鉴证活动,在国有股比重过大和独立审计的信誉机制、民事赔偿机制不能正常发挥作用的情况下,应将上市公司审计师聘任权安排给非控股股东而不是控股股东.     

自利抑或协同：非国有股权参与如何影响国有企业绿色技术创新

基于外部性理论与制度理论，以2013-2019年A股国有上市公司为研究样本，利用面板Tobit模型考察非国有股权参与对国有企业绿色技术创新的影响。结果发现，非国有股权参与显著促进国有企业绿色技术创新，股权融合程度越高，绿色技术创新水平越高，外资股东参与有利于国有企业绿色技术创新，但机构投资者未表现出明显作用；分层分类检验结果表明，非国有股权参与更有利于中央国有企业、公益类国有企业绿色技术创新。外部治理环境调节效应检验结果表明，环保补贴可以增强非国有股权的环境研发激励作用，分析师关注有利于抑制私有股权短视化自利行为，二者均正向调节非国有股权参与对国有企业绿色技术创新的促进作用。