论邓小平创新精神的来源

邓小平能够敢想敢做,在于他鲜明的创新精神。邓小平的创新精神来源于他对党和人民事业的无限忠 诚;实事求是的思想方法和求真务实的工作态度;非凡的勇气和胆略;密切联系群众的优良作风;以及高瞻远瞩的战 略眼光和敏锐的时代洞察力。     

国际战略联盟及其相关理论研究

就国际战略联盟的定义规范、与其他合作形式的区别及其相关的理论进行分析 ,指出多角度、跨学科地研究国际战略联盟是非常必要的。     

企业战略管理理论演进的内在逻辑与实现路径分析

企业为什么能够盈利以及怎么获得超过行业平均利润的经济租金是战略管理领域研究的基本永恒问题,企业所拥有资源和能力如何与其所处环境相匹配成为其解决思路。通过回顾相关理论,概况总结了企业战略管理的三个发展阶段：古典战略理论、新古典战略理论与产业创新战略理论。在此基础上,以企业是否动态权变适应环境,划分企业战略管理为静态战略管理和动态战略管理阶段,进而总结出企业动态战略的运作模式,认为战略管理的最终目的就是为了向顾客传递价值并吸引那些有需要和有购买力的顾客。     

区域战略性新兴产业核心竞争力的识别与培育——以天津市新能源产业为例

对区域战略性新兴产业核心竞争力的正确识别和培育,直接关系到该产业未来发展的战略地位,关系到区域经济的走势。从新兴产业形成和发展的视角,揭示出区域战略性新兴产业核心竞争力的关键影响因素,勾画出其识别模式,并以天津市新能源产业为例进行了实例剖析,提出了相应培育措施。     

The relationship between principals’ configuration of a bundle of HR practices for new teachers and teachers’ person–organisation fit

Abstract

Based on studies in the private sector showing the positive effects of strategic human resources management (SHRM) on performance, many stress the value of adopting SHRM in the public sector. However, until now, the argument for applying SHRM in the public sector remains largely theoretical. Especially in educational contexts, it is unclear through which mechanisms SHRM affects performance. Therefore, this paper zooms in on the relationship between the configuration of a bundle of human resources (HR) practices and person–organisation (P–O) fit. A mixed methods design was used to collect both qualitative and quantitative data from principals and teachers in 56 Flemish primary schools. The qualitative data, which provides insight into principals’ configuration of HR practices, were converted into numerical scores and analysed, together with the quantitative teacher data, using multilevel analysis. The results show that both principals’ strategic and HR orientation are associated with teachers’ P–O fit. This study contributes to the research field of SHRM in education by studying a bundle of HR practices and how this relates to the fit of teachers’ own values with the school culture. The practical implications for schools are discussed.     

Strategic behavior in financial markets

We describe a financial market as a noncooperative game in strategic form. Agents may borrow or deposit money at a central bank and use the cash available to them in order to purchase a commodity for immediate consumption. They derive positive utility from consumption and from having cash reserves at the end of the day, whereas being bankrupt entails negative utility. The bank fixes interest rates. The existence of Nash equilibria (both mixed and pure) of the ensuing game is proved under various assumptions. In particular, no agent is bankrupt at equilibrium. Asymptotic behavior of replica markets is discussed, and it is shown that given appropriate assumptions, the difference between a strategic player and a price taker is negligible in a large economy.     

Changes in risk and strategic interaction

In this paper we study the comparative statics of Nth degree stochastic dominance shifts in a large class of non-cooperative games. We consider symmetric equilibria as well as asymmetric equilibria in which the risk changes are idiosyncratic and not necessarily of the same stochastic order. Furthermore, we establish conditions for risk changes to produce multiplier effects on equilibrium strategies. Finally, we evaluate the comparative statics of stochastic dominance shifts in supermodular games, which may feature multiple equilibria and non-convex strategy sets.     

北京建设世界城市战略定位与发展模式研究

新的世界政治经济形势下,北京提出建设世界城市的战略目标,对北京的城市发展与中国的和平崛起具有重要的现实意义与历史意义.本研究针对北京建设世界城市这一主题展开研究,从世界城市的特色研究入手,分析了纽约、伦敦、东京发展层面上的各自特征,并通过发展指标将北京与现有世界城市进行比较研究,认为当前北京与世界城市的标准尚有差距,但...     

基于价值评价的外包决策模型研究

业务外包已经成为企业适应复杂的竞争环境的必然选择,基于价值评价的外包决策模型通过经济增加值和战略价值评价形成四种可能的结果,根据不同的评价结果企业可以进行是否外包的战略决策。     

Strategic complementarities and nested potential games

This paper reports that every finite game of strategic complementarities is a nested pseudo-potential game defined by Uno [Uno, H., 2007. Nested potential games. Economics Bulletin 3(17), 1–8] if the action set of each player is one-dimensional, except possibly for one player.