浅议混合所有制企业的内部审计

本文对多种经济成份构成的经济组织,混合所有制企业内部审计的重要性作了论述,提出了混合所有制企业内部审计组织机构的设置原则,独立性原则和权威性原则。介绍了目前常见的混合所有制企业内审组织机构的设置模式:总经理领导的组织模式、监事会领导的组织模式和董事会领导的组织模式及其利弊。提出了混合所有制企业内部审计的主要内容,对混合所有制企业内部审计的规范化和内审人员的素质也提出了要求。     

产品寿命周期理论与标准化工作的探讨

根据实现带全局意义的两个根本性转变的要求，阐述了应用产品寿命周期理论对企业标准化工作的作用和意义。     

关于会计理论体系逻辑起点问题的研究

本文在回顾我国关于会计理论体系逻辑起点研究成果的基础上,分析了以会计假设、会计本质、会计环境、会计目标作为逻辑起点的缺陷及新的研究趋向--双起点论的不足,认为应将会计对象作为会计理论体系的逻辑起点。对于同样以会计对象作为逻辑起点的观点,由于各学者对会计对象内涵定义的不同,其构建的理论体系是存在偏差的。笔者认为以价值增值运动为会计对象是合理的选择,并以此作为逻辑起点构建了会计理论体系的粗略框架。     

公众期望与会计信息真实性的关联分析

公众对会计的期望与对会计行为的认识之间存在期望差距,基于不同期望水平对会计信息失真现象所作的分类揭示了会计信息真实性的内涵。通过公众期望与会计信息真实性的关联分析可以发现,加强公众与会计界的沟通理解以及强化会计信息失真的治理,是解决会计信息真实性问题的有效途径。     

Strategic spin-offs of input divisions

When a downstream producer enters backward into the input market, a “helping the rivals effect” exists: Such entry hurts the firm's downstream business as it increases upstream competition and thus benefits its rival downstream firms. This negative externality prevents the newly-created upstream unit from expanding. A spin-off enables the firm to credibly expand in the input market, thereby forcing its upstream competitors to behave less aggressively. Spin-offs occur in equilibrium if and only if the number of downstream firms exceeds a threshold level. When there is more than one integrated firm, a spin-off by a firm can trigger spin-offs by others that would not occur otherwise.     

Moral hazard and Marshallian inefficiency: Evidence from Tunisia

We formalize the link between optimal cost-sharing contracts and the production technology in the presence of moral hazard by appealing to several well-known results from duality theory. Building on intuitions from the interlinkage literature, we show that optimal contractual structure is determined by the (i) substitution possibilities that exist between different observable factor inputs, as well as (ii) between these inputs and unobservable effort. We endogenize contractual choice using landlord characteristics as instruments, exploiting the fact that, in our dataset, landlords interact with several tenants and vice versa. The approach is applied to an unbalanced plot-level panel of cost-sharing contracts in a Tunisian village, using a translog representation of the restricted profit function. Contractual terms are found to be a significant determinant of input use and therefore lead to Marshallian inefficiency, while the optimality of the underlying contractual structure is rejected.     

代际可持续发展:基于艾奇沃斯方框图的分析

文章从可持续发展的内涵与条件入手,借助于微观经济学的艾奇沃思方框图,分析了人类社会代际可持续发展资源配置的两种情形:无效的帕累托最优和有效的帕累托最优。得出了可持续发展是经济增长可持续、社会发展可持续、生态环境可持续和人力资源可持续的统一,代际可持续发展是人力资源可持续性与科学技术可持续性统一的基本结论。     

Representative consumer's risk aversion and efficient risk-sharing rules

We study the representative consumer's risk attitude and efficient risk-sharing rules in a single-period, single-good economy in which consumers have homogeneous probabilistic beliefs but heterogeneous risk attitudes. We prove that if all consumers have convex absolute risk tolerance, so must the representative consumer. We also identify a relationship between the curvature of an individual consumer's individual risk sharing rule and his absolute cautiousness, the first derivative of absolute risk-tolerance. Furthermore, we discuss some consequences of these results and refinements of these results for the class of HARA utility functions.     

Intertemporal market division:: A case of alternating monopoly

In this paper, we report on an equilibrium with market dominance that exists in a simple two-firm model that features neither entry barriers nor sophisticated punishment strategies. This equilibrium induces an intertemporal market division in which the two firms alternate as monopolists - despite the fact that the model also sustains a Cournot duopoly. Even when initially both firms are active in the market, the alternating monopoly reveals itself rather quickly. Moreover, it Pareto dominates the Cournot equilibrium - as it is close to the cartel outcome. Several examples of what well may be such alternating monopolies are presented.     

美国财政分权的效率分析

美国作为一个高度发达的市场经济国家,不但在经济发展领域里取得了令人瞩目的成就,而且在制度的设计、创新和发展等方面也有许多值得借鉴之处,美国财政分权体制就是其中之一.本文在分析财政分权效率的含义及要求的基础上,从美国政府问事权和财权划分明确且相互匹配、科学合理的转移支付制度、分权与制衡并存的预算机制、地方政府自治以及整个财政分权体制的法律依据等方面分析了美国财政分权高效的原因.