Selecting Sites for New Facilities Using Data Envelopment Analysis

This paper develops a mathematical programming model for obtaining a best set of sites for planned facilities. The model is concerned with those situations where resource constraints are present. The specific setting for the paper involves the selection of sites for a set of retail outlets, wherein the ratio of aggregate outputs to inputs for the selected set is maximal among all possible sets that could be chosen. At the same time, the model guarantees that the only sets of stores allowable are those for which the available resources are used to the maximum extent possible.     

Forecasting economic time series using flexible versus fixed specification and linear versus nonlinear econometric models

Nine macroeconomic variables are forecast in a real-time scenario using a variety of flexible specification, fixed specification, linear, and nonlinear econometric models. All models are allowed to evolve through time, and our analysis focuses on model selection and performance. In the context of real-time forecasts, flexible specification models (including linear autoregressive models with exogenous variables and nonlinear artificial neural networks) appear to offer a useful and viable alternative to less flexible fixed specification linear models for a subset of the economic variables which we examine, particularly at forecast horizons greater than 1-step ahead. We speculate that one reason for this result is that the economy is evolving (rather slowly) over time. This feature cannot easily be captured by fixed specification linear models, however, and manifests itself in the form of evolving coefficient estimates. We also provide additional evidence supporting the claim that models which ‘win’ based on one model selection criterion (say a squared error measure) do not necessarily win when an alternative selection criterion is used (say a confusion rate measure), thus highlighting the importance of the particular cost function which is used by forecasters and ‘end-users’ to evaluate their models. A wide variety of different model selection criteria and statistical tests are used to illustrate our findings.     

Risky allocations from a risk-neutral informed principal

We study a model of informed principal with private values where the principal is risk neutral and the agent is risk averse. We show that the principal, regardless of her type, gains by not revealing her type to the agent through the contract offer. The equilibrium allocation transfers some ex-ante risk from one type of agent to the other. Despite the increase in the principal's surplus, allocative efficiency does not necessarily improve. Received: 26 January 2004, Accepted: 5 May 2005 JEL Classification: C72, D23, D82 I would like to thank my supervisor Leonardo Felli for suggestions and Leo Ferraris for helpful discussions. All remainig errors are my own.     

中小私营企业融资中"逆向选择"失灵现象新探

对某些地域中小私营企业融资行为的实证分析表明与常规的设想相反,同国有企业极高的融资热情相比,一般被人们认为风险较大的私营中小企业在融资中存在“逆向选择”失灵的现象。本建立了一个模型对导致此现象的原因进行了探讨。     

品牌之死——基于品牌经济学视角的分析

基于品牌经济学视角对品牌之死的研究表明：品牌之死有自然死亡、突然死亡和长寿品牌3种基本类型；品牌之死即为需求之死；品牌的品类、品类度和品牌策略决定了品牌生命；因而延长品牌生命也应从这3方面制定相应的策略。     

中日中小企业技术创新之比较

中小企业是我国技术创新体系的重要组成部分，其创新能力和水平如何，直接影响到建设创新型国家的速度与质量。近年来，我国中小企业在技术创新领域取得了丰硕成果，但是同发达国家相比还存在着一定的差距。日本中小企业技术创新所取得的成就处于世界领先地位，研究日本中小企业技术创新的做法，借鉴其成功经验，对于加快我国的中小企业创新体系建设，提高自主创新能力具有积极意义。     

是银行规模还是信息不对称?--中小企业贷款难的原因分析

中小企业从银行获得的融资十分有限.以Elod Takáts模型为基础的银行规模分析解释了银行规模与中小企业贷款的无关性,以Akerlof模型为基础的信息不对称分析解释了中小企业在贷款中的逆向选择问题.可以通过多种方式消除逆向选择问题,从根本上解决中小企业贷款难题.     

创业投资机构对其支持企业IPO抑价度的影响

本文介绍了国外关于创业投资机构如何影响企业IPO抑价度的主要理论,在此基础上以我国的中小企业板上市公司为研究对象,通过比较分析发现与非创投支持企业相比创投支持企业有着更高的抑价度,进一步地研究表明该现象可用Am it et.al.[1]提出的逆向选择理论来解释。     

Regulating an Externality-Generating Utility Environmental Taxes Under Limited Information

Global warming is currently an important item on most nationalenvironmental agendas. In many countries, coal-fired electricity generatingstations represent an important source of greenhouse gases. We examinehow regulations to curb emissions affect public utility pricing regulationwhen regulators act non-cooperatively. We show that, when there is limitedinformation on fixed abatement costs, an environmental regulator prefersan emission tax over an output tax or a lump sum environmental tax. Thepublic utility regulator prefers the lump sum tax regime.     

Characterization of a class of moral-hazard, adverse selection games

Studying a principal-agent game in which the agent alone observes the state of the world and reports it, but the moral hazard is not reducible, shows that, if the principal uses all signals, then no solution exists, i.e. there is no contract that elicits truth-telling and motivates the agent to exert effort. When the principal does not use signals on the state of the world that seem irrelevant, a solution exists in which some of the ex post signals on outcome are not used, even though they obey the informativeness condition of Holmstrom (Bell Journal of Economics, 1979, 10, 74–91).