Emission taxes for genuine altruistic firms

This article develops a theoretical model that explores firms' abatement choices. The main results are: First, in a market comprised of a not sufficiently large number of heterogeneous firms always there exists a subset of firms that are willing to undertake abatement activities, if their marginal altruistic cost of emissions is positive. Second, a low emission tax induces abatement when a firm is egoistic or if its altruistic cost of emissions has a concave structure. In contrast, if the firms’ altruistic cost of emissions has a convex structure, then intermediate emission taxes are required. Third, the effect of firms’ altruistic cost of emissions on the emission tax that induce the socially optimum abatement is also conditional on the genuine altruistic preferences and finally, the social planner has an incentive to impose a Pigouvian emission tax when firms are profit maximizers. Otherwise, a lower tax suffices.     

家族企业代际间双向利他行为交互效应的探索

以血缘、亲缘为纽带的情感维系以及由此引发的一系列利他行为是家族企业治理的显著特征之一。文章以利他行为发出者的不同将家族企业利他行为分为垂施利他和反哺利他，一方面分析垂施利他的影响因素和行为呈现，另一方面将研究重点置于由反哺利他主体角色身份的不同、子代经理人品行特征的迥异所带来的利他行为水平的波动和利他效应的差异，再通过双向利他行为博弈模型的构建和交互效应的分析，探索利他行为对家族企业治理带来的影响。