长春市中心区人口疏散规模估算评析与调控策略工程

分析了长春市中心区人居环境现状特征,以此为基础,从三个不同的角度,估算了人口疏散的规模,探讨了人口疏散的时空阶段及相应的调控对策。     

论我国企业合并的反垄断控制

过度的企业合并会限制甚至消灭市场竞争,因此,保持市场的有效竞争需要反垄断立法。反垄断法合并控制应关注整 体经济效率;合并控制的实质性标准是产生或加强市场支配地位;而符合反垄断禁止标准同时又存在法定豁免事由的的合并有 可能会被批准     

海洋环境管制的供需矛盾分析

本文从我国海洋环境问题的现实出发，重点分析了海洋环境管制的供求现状和矛盾，指出我国海洋环境管制的必要性和紧迫性。同时，结合我国海洋环境管制的现实，探讨了我国海洋环境管制的发展，提出我国在加强海洋环境管制的同时应拓宽思路，促进海洋环境管制的有效供给。     

Property rights protection and access to bank loans

Poor protection of private property has limited the access to bank loans by private enterprises in developing and transition economies. Under those circumstances, private entrepreneurs have resorted to various ways of enhancing the de facto protection of private property. Using a dataset of 3,073 private enterprises in China, this paper empirically investigates the impact of political participation and philanthropic activities – informal substitutes for the lack of formal protection of private property – on the access to bank loans.     

Technology-forcing through environmental regulation

This paper analyzes the demand characteristics of innovation in pollution abatement and the interaction between a regulator and a polluter under a technology-forcing policy. Important demand-driven determinants of innovation in pollution control are examined, such as uncertainties surrounding unexplored technologies, the length of the compliance period and the maximum abatement costs the regulator is willing to accept. We derive the formal condition that the regulator balances the marginal utility of emissions reduction against the marginal disutilities of a longer compliance time and the increased uncertainty about the feasibility of a more stringent standard.     

Deposit insurance and bank regulation in a monetary economy: a general equilibrium exposition

Summary. It is commonly argued that poorly designed banking system safety nets are largely to blame for the frequency and severity of modern banking crises. For example, underpriced deposit insurance and/or low reserve requirements are often viewed as factors that encourage risk-taking by banks. In this paper, we study the effects of three policy variables: deposit insurance premia, reserve requirements and the way in which the costs of bank bailouts are financed. We show that when deposit insurance premia are low, the monetization of bank bailout costs may not be more inflationary than financing these costs out of general revenue. This is because, while monetizing the costs increases the inflation tax rate, higher levels of general taxation reduce savings, deposits, bank reserves, and the inflation tax base. Increasing the inflation tax rate obviously raises inflation, but so does an erosion of the inflation tax base. We also find that low deposit insurance premia or low reserve requirements may not be associated with a high rate of bank failure.Received: 2 January 2002, Revised: 1 March 2003JEL Classification Numbers: D5, E5, G1.B. D. Smith: Sadly, our co-author, colleague and dear friend, Bruce D. Smith, died on July 9, 2002.     

Risk and Capital Structure in the Regulated Firm

This paper studies the role of capital structure in a regulated firm. We show that it affects the prices set by the regulator, the expected price being lower the higher the proportion of debt finance. However, when debt is increased beyond a certain level, the benefit of lower expected prices is offset by their increased variability. We also study the socially preferred capital structure. This is such that consumers carry some risk, in the form of higher prices in adverse economic conditions.     

Pricing access in network competition

We compare various access pricing rules in the two-way access model. We show that the Generalized Efficient Component Pricing Rule (TECPR) leads to a lower equilibrium price than does the Efficient Component Pricing Rule, (ECPR) marginal cost pricing, (MCP) and any non-negative fixed access charges.      

Job Creation and Job Destruction in a Regulated Labor Market: The Case of Austria

We study Austrian job reallocation in the period of 1978 to 1998, using a large administrative dataset where we correct for spurious entries and exits of firms. We find that on average 9 out of 100 randomly selected jobs were created within the last year, and that about 9 out of randomly selected 100 jobs were destroyed within the next year. Hence, the magnitude of Austrian job flows seems to be comparable to other countries, similar to the well-known results of Davis et al. (1996) for the United States. Job reallocation appears to be driven primarily by idiosyncratic shocks. However, job creation increases significantly during cyclical upswings whereas job destruction rises in downturns. We also find substantial persistence of job creation and destruction. The pronounced pattern of job reallocation rates falling with firm size and age continues to hold when we use a set of controls. Finally, we show that – controlling for sector and firm size composition – Austrian job reallocation rates are only half the rates for the U.S. This result is not surprising given the impact of tighter regulation and labor law in Austria.     

信息约束下的金融监管与银行声誉

如何在信息不对称的约束条件下降低金融风险、提高监管绩效,是金融监管中的一项重要课题.本文分析了信息结构对于监管的重要性,认为声誉机制的建立可以降低银行与监管部门之间信息不对称的程度和风险发生的概率,并运用KMFW模型,分析了不对称信息下银行声誉机制减少违规动机的过程,指出应该注重激励相容的制度安排,将外部监管与自律有机结合起来,促使银行自发选择接受监管且减少进行高风险投资的动机,这是信息不对称条件下提高监管效率的重要策略.结合我国实情,本文提出可通过银行风险评级、建立可置信的惩罚机制、完善银行内部治理机构、改进监管人员激励约束机制、构建和完善金融监管信息系统等措施,建立健全银行声誉机制,以进一步改善监管绩效.