WICKEDNESS IN SOCIAL CHOICE

In an article from 1973, Rittel and Webber distinguished between ‘tame’ or ‘benign’ problems on the one hand and ‘wicked’ problems on the other. The authors argued that wicked problems occur in nearly all public policy issues. Since different groups adhere to different value-sets, solutions can only be expressed as better or worse. By no means can they be viewed as definitive or objective. In this paper we consider, from this very angle, the theory of social choice which is about the aggregation of individual preferences with the aim to derive a consistent social preference. We show that collective choice offers wicked problems of various types which differ in their degree of severity. We hereby concentrate on welfare functions and voting schemes of different kinds and discuss these in the light of various criteria such as Arrow's independence condition, Condorcet consistency, monotonicity, manipulability, and other properties.     

Does offering an organic food menu help restaurants excel in competition? An examination of diners’ decision-making

This study aims to examine whether the presence of an organic food menu can positively influence diners’ decision-making. A 3 (restaurant segment: quick service vs. casual dining vs. fine dining) by 2 (price discrepancy between competing restaurants: small vs. large) scenario-based experiment was conducted with 405 U.S. consumers. MANCOVA results indicate that using organic ingredients offers a greater advantage for the quick-service segment regarding perceived food quality, attitudes towards the restaurant, and willingness to select, compared to casual and fine dining segments. The magnitude of a premium price of organic ingredients negatively influences such advantage in the process of consumers’ decision-making. When a large (vs. small) premium price is charged for using organic ingredients, customers’ preferences for the restaurant (over its rival) significantly drops to such an extent that customers are more willing to choose the competitor (i.e., rival restaurant with a conventional menu). Discussions and implications are further elaborated.     

Equivalence of optimal noisy-ranking contests and Tullock contests

We analyze a noisy-ranking contest in which participants compete in several dimensions. The organizer randomly samples a number of dimensions and awards a prize to the most productive agent. When the contest is optimally designed, we establish a structural equivalence between this family of noisy-ranking contests and contests built upon Tullock contest success functions. Our result also shows that in this class of noisy-contests, the profit-maximization problem of the planner can be turned into a stochastic choice problem for a planner who has some deterministic preferences over the contestants’ win probabilities.     

Risk aversion in a model of endogenous growth

Despite the evidence on incomplete financial markets and substantial risk being borne by innovators, current models of growth through creative destruction predominantly model innovators’ as risk neutral. Risk aversion is expected to reduce the incentive to innovate and we might fear that without insurance innovation completely disappears in the long run. The present paper introduces risk averse agents into an occupational choice model of endogenous growth in which insurance against failure to innovate is not available. We derive a clear negative relationship between the level of risk aversion and long run growth. Surprisingly, we show that in an equilibrium there exists a cut-off value of risk aversion below which the growth rate of the mass of innovators tends to a strictly positive constant. In this case, innovation persists on the long run and consumption per capita grows at a strictly positive rate. On the other hand, for levels of risk aversion above the cut-off value, the economy eventually stagnates.     

Retail career attractiveness to college students: Connecting individual characteristics to the trade-off of job attributes

This study examines how U.S. business college students evaluate the attractiveness of potential job opportunities by making trade-offs among important job attributes. Using a conjoint approach, we examine the relative importance of industry type, starting salary, five-year salary, training, benefits, and work-life balance in job choice decisions. We also examine the effects of job applicants' career expectations and core competencies on their job choice determinants. An analysis of 162 business students' evaluations of 27 job profiles indicates that five-year-salary outweighs all other attributes. Their career expectations and core competencies have a substantial influence on their ensuing job choice. We suggest recruitment strategies to target recent college graduates with consideration of individuals' different career expectations and core competencies.     

Shipping route choice across geographies: Coastal vs. landlocked countries

This paper investigates how geography and transportation costs influence the decisions by shippers of which port of export to use. Using a large sample of disaggregated shipments originating from several countries in Europe, we show that European logistics networks exhibit a low level of international integration that affects shipping route choice. Furthermore, we find significant differences in shipping behaviors across landlocked and coastal countries, with shippers in landlocked countries avoiding long land transportation, crossing borders readily, and placing more value on transportation infrastructure. These findings have implications in designing port competitiveness strategies and economic development policies in landlocked countries.     

Stochastic seat allocation models for passenger rail transportation under customer choice

We study the seat allocation problem for passenger rail revenue management, in which a rail operator attempts to determine the optimal quantity of seats to be allocated to each cabin class for each train service. We formulate the problem with single-stage and multi-stage decisions as two stochastic programming models that incorporate passengers’ choice behavior. We transform the stochastic models into equivalent deterministic mathematical programs that are easy to solve. Then, we form a variety of seat allocation polices from the optimal solutions to the seat allocation models. A number of simulation tests are offered to test the policies.     

Credit market frictions and political failure

We study how an excessively favorable regulatory environment for banks could arise even with a perfectly competitive credit market in a median voter world. In our occupational choice model with heterogeneous wealth endowments, market failure due to unobservability of entrepreneurial talent endogenously creates a misalignment between surplus maximizing reforms and reforms that are preferred by the median voter, who is a worker. This is in contrast to the world without market failure where the electorate unanimously vote in favor of surplus maximizing institutional reforms. This paper illustrates how market failure could lead to political failure even in the benchmark political system that is free from capture by interest groups.