"非典"与流动人口管理模式改革路径的选择

从人口迁移规律入手,分析了"非典"流行期间,北京流动人口管理中存在的种种问题,认为这是执行流动人口和户籍人口"分立并行"管理体制的结果;提出了以"居住地人口管理"模式取代"户籍属地管理"模式的改革设想.     

The Theory of Socially Embedded Games: Applications and Extensions to Open and Closed Games

An earlier article, drawing on the mathematical theory of rules and rule complexes, extends and generalizes game theory (GGT). The theory has been used to conceptualize and analyze diverse social relationships, roles, and games as particular types of rule complexes.For instance, a social role, as a major basis of a parent's action in a game, consists of at least four key components – which are mathematical objects – in the determination of action: value complex, model of reality (including beliefs and knowledge bases), a repertoire of acts, routines, programs, and strategies, and modality, a role-specific algorithm for determining or generating action in game settings. This article applies and extends GGT in analyses of a market bargaining game (a type of open game) and of the classical game of prisoners' dilemma (a type of closed game). The applications show the concrete effects of social embeddedness on game structuring, game interaction patterns and outcomes, and social equilibria.     

企业契约形式、财权安排与财务治理演进

本文认为,企业契约形式与财权安排及财务治理具有非常密切的内在联系。对我国不同时期企业契约形式的考察,发现财权安排具有内在逻辑,企业财务治理在不同历史时期具有不同的演进特征。     

Trade intensity,country size and corruption

Abstract. Several authors claim to provide evidence that governmental corruption is less severe in countries where trade intensity is higher or populations are smaller. We argue that theory is highly ambiguous on these questions, and demonstrate that empirical links between corruption and trade intensity – or country size, strongly related to trade intensity – are sensitive to sample selection bias. Most available corruption indicators provide ratings only for those countries in which multinational investors have the greatest interest: these tend to include almost all large nations, but among small nations only those that are well-governed. We find that the relationship between corruption and trade intensity disappears, using newer corruption indicators with substantially increased country coverage. Similarly, the relationship between corruption and country size weakens or disappears using samples less subject to selection bias. Received: July 2001 / accepted: April 2002 We thank Anand Swamy and two anonymous referees for helpful comments and suggestions, Paul Schorosch for able research assistance, and Ray Fisman, Roberta Gatti, Aart Kraay, and Shang-jin Wei for kindly providing data. The conclusions of this paper are not intended to represent the views of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the countries they represent.     

The effect of interfirm dependence structures on governance mechanisms

Despite recent developments regarding the study of interdependence structures, previous research has rarely investigated the simultaneous effect of both interdependence magnitude and interdependence asymmetry on governance mechanisms among exchange parties. A survey of manufacturing companies has been used to test a theory about the interactive effect of buyer dependence and supplier dependence on inter-firm governance. The analysis of the survey supported the proposition that both buyers and suppliers that are highly dependent on each other (high interdependence magnitude and low interdependence asymmetry) may choose to rely on monitoring and the norm of information sharing. However, when a buyer's dependence is low regardless of the supplier's dependence level, the buyer does not rely on the norm of information sharing (buyer's relative interdependence advantage, buyer's relative interdependence disadvantage, and low interdependence magnitude). On the other hand, when the supplier's dependence on the buyer is low, the buyer relies on monitoring regardless of its dependence level (buyer's relative interdependence disadvantage and low interdependence magnitude). However, this study did not empirically measure performance. Further research should be done on the effect of congruence between the governance mechanism and its antecedents on buying performance.     

机构投资者与公司治理

随着机构投资者的发展壮大,人们越来越关注其对公司治理方面的作用。由于机构投资者巨大的股票持有量,他们存在参与公司治理的愿望。但因为经济往来关系、法律法规规定、信息处理障碍导致机构投资者并不能有效地参与公司治理。     

Organizational Culture: A Framework and Strategies for Facilitating Employee Whistleblowing

Seven dimensions of organizational culture that influence the employee reflection process that ultimately leads to whistleblowing behavior are presented. These include 1) vigilance, 2) engagement, 3) credibility, 4) accountability, 5) empowerment, 6) courage, and 7) options. Key considerations within each dimension are discussed and a compliance framework is used to identify strategies for encouraging a culture that supports employee communication, questioning, and reporting of illegal, unethical, and illegitimate practices within organizations.     

基于共同治理模式下的公司业绩评价指标体系探索

现代企业理论认为,企业是一系列合约的组合,其中最重要的是企业所有权合约,提高企业所有权安排效率的出路是资本所有者拥有剩余索取权与剩余控制权。在这种理论的基础上产生了“股东至上”理论,公司治理采用“股东至上模式”,与此相适应产生了相关的业绩评价体系。但是这种治理模式和业绩评价体系都存在着缺陷,为适应现代公司经营环境的变化,笔者认为,应该采用“共同治理模式”代替“股东至上模式”,并建立与之相适应的业绩评价体系。     

资本结构在我国上市公司治理中作用的实证分析

本文以1994～2002年间沪市上市公司为对象，研究了样本公司的资本结构特征，考察了总负债比、长期负债比和流动负债比与总资产收益率以及净资产收益率之间的关系，对资本结构在我国上市公司治理中的作用进行了实证分析。研究结果发现我国上市公司资本结构无法发挥在公司治理中的作用。本文分析了原因并提出了相应的对策。     

Director expertise and co-option in industry superannuation funds?

This study examines whether independent directors who possess financial expertise and are independent from the CEO (i.e., non-co-opted) are associated with improved outcomes for industry superannuation funds. Our results highlight that independence alone is insufficient to improve fund outcomes. Instead, we find that only non-co-opted independent directors benefit fund members in terms of higher performance and lower fees. Moreover, we find that independent directors' financial expertise is not associated with fund performance and fees. Our study has implications for regulators and superannuation funds who are currently debating the need for one-third independent directors on the board of Australian superannuation funds.