External corporate governance and financial fraud: cognitive evaluation theory insights on agency theory prescriptions

R esearch summary : Agency theory suggests that external governance mechanisms (e.g., activist owners, the market for corporate control, securities analysts) can deter managers from acting opportunistically. Using cognitive evaluation theory, we argue that powerful expectations imposed by external governance can impinge on top managers' feelings of autonomy and crowd out their intrinsic motivation, potentially leading to financial fraud. Our findings indicate that external pressure from activist owners, the market for corporate control, and securities analysts increases managers' likelihood of financial fraud. Our study considers external governance from a top manager's perspective and questions one of agency theory's foundational tenets: that external pressure imposed on managers reduces the potential for moral hazard. M anagerial summary : Many of us are familiar with stories about top managers “cooking the books” in one way or another. As a result, companies and regulatory bodies often implement strict controls to try to prevent financial fraud. However, cognitive evaluation theory describes how those external controls could actually have the opposite of their intended effect because they rob managers of their intrinsic motivation for behaving appropriately. We find this to be the case. When top managers face more stringent external control mechanisms, in the form of activist shareholders, the threat of a takeover, or zealous securities analysts, they are actually more likely to engage in financial misbehavior. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Which institutional investors matter for firm survival and performance?

Using data that spans three decades, we assess the diverse roles of institutional investors in impacting survival and performance of chronically underperforming firms and contrast the results for consistently overperforming firms. We find material differences in investor roles and investment returns between these samples. Differentiating among institutional types, controlling for prior performance and attrition bias provides insights unattainable by examining aggregated holdings. For underperformers, results are negative for activist pension funds and long-term institutions, positive for activist hedge funds and short-term institutions, and mixed for institutional blockholders.     

(De)Politicization Dynamics in Public–Private Partnerships (PPPs): Lessons from a comparison between UK and Flemish PPP policy

This article analyses the (de)politicization dynamics in complex and technical matters like public–private partnerships, which is necessary given its social impact and budgetary consequences for the years and generations to come. The global financial crisis provides an excellent window of opportunity to present this argument, because PPP policy needs to reinvent itself. We argue that PPP policy needs to be (re)politicized at the broader societal and discursive levels, which means that their public nature is recognized and that policy alternatives are debated in the public forums. The ‘Private Finance Initiative’ reassessment process in the UK may serve as an example.     

Opportunities and Challenges in Engaging Citizens in the Co-Production of Infrastructure-Based Public Services in Australia

Research and practice have observed a shift towards service-oriented approaches that depend on input from citizens as co-producers of services. Yet in the delivery of public infrastructure the focus is still on managing assets rather than services. Using a Policy Delphi approach, we found that although experts advocate service-centric approaches guidelines and policies lack a service-centric perspective. Findings revealed a range of impediments to effective stakeholder involvement. The paper contributes to co-production and new public governance literature and offers directions for public infrastructure decision-makers to support and reconnect disengaged government–citizen relations, and determine ways of understanding optimal service outcomes.     

夯扩桩在软土地基中的应用

由于夯扩桩成桩方法成本低,具有桩径小,承载力大等优点,已逐渐成为软土地基中的一种新的理想桩基形式,近年来被广泛用于湖南衡阳的建筑工程中,文章对夯扩桩应用于衡阳黄白路商住楼进行了细致的描述和分析。     

Trade intensity,country size and corruption

Abstract. Several authors claim to provide evidence that governmental corruption is less severe in countries where trade intensity is higher or populations are smaller. We argue that theory is highly ambiguous on these questions, and demonstrate that empirical links between corruption and trade intensity – or country size, strongly related to trade intensity – are sensitive to sample selection bias. Most available corruption indicators provide ratings only for those countries in which multinational investors have the greatest interest: these tend to include almost all large nations, but among small nations only those that are well-governed. We find that the relationship between corruption and trade intensity disappears, using newer corruption indicators with substantially increased country coverage. Similarly, the relationship between corruption and country size weakens or disappears using samples less subject to selection bias. Received: July 2001 / accepted: April 2002 We thank Anand Swamy and two anonymous referees for helpful comments and suggestions, Paul Schorosch for able research assistance, and Ray Fisman, Roberta Gatti, Aart Kraay, and Shang-jin Wei for kindly providing data. The conclusions of this paper are not intended to represent the views of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the countries they represent.     

Do ‘Good Governance’ Codes Enhance Financial Accountability? Evidence from Managerial Pay in Dutch Charities

This paper examines the initial impact of a ‘good governance’ code for charitable organisations that was promulgated in the Netherlands in 2005. Data are gathered from publicly available annual reports of 138 charities in the post‐implementation phase of the code (2005–2008). We first examine whether the code altered charities’ governance structures. Next, we investigate managerial pay as a key aspect of discharging financial accountability because prior literature focused on ‘excessive’ compensation. The findings indicate that a strengthened governance structure positively affects the likelihood of disclosing information concerning managerial pay, as well as mitigating managerial pay level.     

Does Say‐on‐Pay Matter? Evidence from Say‐on‐Pay Proposals in the United States

We investigate the effect of say‐on‐pay (SOP) proposals on changes in executive and director compensation. Relative to non‐SOP firms, SOP firms’ total compensation to CEOs does not significantly change after the proposal. However, the mix of compensation does change—companies move away from using cash compensation toward more incentive compensation, offsetting the reduction in bonus. Further, the mix of compensation of non‐CEO executives changes similarly to that of CEOs. Compensation to directors of SOP firms increases less than non‐SOP firms. Firms whose CEOs are well compensated, especially with cash‐based compensation, are most likely to receive a proposal.     

行业协会的国际比较与借鉴

随着我国市场经济的不断完善和经济全球化趋势的日益加强,规范行业协会行为和协调行业管理的需求也日渐迫切。从已经运作成熟的发达国家的行业协会的发展历程中借鉴和思考可以为我所用的成功要素,构建我国行业协会变革的合理路径,是有效进行行业治理、减少交易成本的必然选择。