Union games: technological unemployment

Summary. Given a production economy, we define union games by considering strategic behavior of the suppliers of factors. We refer to the Nash equilibria of this game as union equilibria. We analyze situations where the unemployment of factors is supported as a union equilibrium. The degree of unemployment depends on technological conditions. This allows us to model a source of unemployment which differs from the usual sources provided in the literature. We state a limit result that demonstrates that, as the market power of unions decreases, the corresponding sequence of union equilibria converges to the Walrasian equilibrium, that is, to full employment of factors. We also provide some examples that illustrate the main results.Received: 21 October 2004, Revised: 14 December 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: D51, C72. Correspondence to: Emma Moreno-GarcíaE. Moreno acknowledges financial support from the Research Grant BEC2000-1388-C04-01 (Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología and FEDER). G. Fernández de Córdoba and E. Moreno acknowledge financial support from the Research Grant SA091/02 from Junta de Castilla y León. We are indebted to C. Alós-Ferrer, C. Pita, D. Anisi, J. A. Ortega, F. Jimeno, J. P. Torres-Martínez, M. Steinert and C. Hervés for helpful comments and insights. We are particularly grateful to T. Kehoe and an anonymous referee for suggestions that improved this paper.     

Competitive equilibrium when preferences change over time

Summary. We show the existence of a competitive equilibrium in an economy with many consumers whose preferences may change over time. The demand correspondence of an individual consumer is determined by the set of subgame-perfect equilibrium outcomes in his intrapersonal game. For additively separable preferences with concave period utility functions that are unbounded above, this demand correspondence will satisfy the usual boundary conditions. Whenever consumers can recall their own mixed actions, this correspondence is convex-valued. This ensures the existence of a symmetric competitive equilibrium.Received: 29 July 2004, Revised: 17 November 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: D51, D91, C73. Correspondence to: Thomas MariottiWe thank Michele Piccione for useful comments and suggestions. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System.     

Can oil shocks explain asymmetries in the US Business Cycle?

We consider whether oil prices can account for business cycle asymmetries. We test for asymmetries based on the Markov switching autoregressive model popularized by Hamilton (1989), using the tests devised by Clements and Krolzig (2000). We find evidence against the conventional wisdom that recessions are more violent than expansions: while some part of the downturn in economic activity that characterises recessionary periods can be attributed to dramatic changes in the price of oil, post-War US economic growth is characterized by the steepness of expansions. First Version Received: December 2000/Final Version Received: September 2001     

Learning for Innovation and the Skill Premium

The computer revolution took very long to pay off in productivity growth in the computer-using sectors. The relative wage of skilled workers, however, has risen sharply from the early days of the computer revolution onward. As skilled workers wages reflect their productivity, the two observations together pose a puzzle.This paper provides a micro-based explanation for the long diffusion period of the computer revolution. The general equilibrium model of growth zooms in on the research process and provides an explanation for sluggish growth with booming relative wages of the skilled. Technological progress in firms is driven by research aimed at improving the production technology (innovation) and by assimilation of ideas or principles present outside the firm (learning). A new General Purpose Technology (GPT) like the computer revolution generates an initial slowdown in economic growth and an increase in the skill premium.Acknowledgement I am indebted to Theo van de Klundert for suggestions and encouragement. Suggestions by Jan Boone, Bas Jacobs, Patrick Francois, Henri de Groot, Lex Meijdam, Niek Nahuis Sjak Smulders, Harald Uhlig and anonymous referees have contributed to the paper.     

Deposit insurance and bank regulation in a monetary economy: a general equilibrium exposition

Summary. It is commonly argued that poorly designed banking system safety nets are largely to blame for the frequency and severity of modern banking crises. For example, underpriced deposit insurance and/or low reserve requirements are often viewed as factors that encourage risk-taking by banks. In this paper, we study the effects of three policy variables: deposit insurance premia, reserve requirements and the way in which the costs of bank bailouts are financed. We show that when deposit insurance premia are low, the monetization of bank bailout costs may not be more inflationary than financing these costs out of general revenue. This is because, while monetizing the costs increases the inflation tax rate, higher levels of general taxation reduce savings, deposits, bank reserves, and the inflation tax base. Increasing the inflation tax rate obviously raises inflation, but so does an erosion of the inflation tax base. We also find that low deposit insurance premia or low reserve requirements may not be associated with a high rate of bank failure.Received: 2 January 2002, Revised: 1 March 2003JEL Classification Numbers: D5, E5, G1.B. D. Smith: Sadly, our co-author, colleague and dear friend, Bruce D. Smith, died on July 9, 2002.     

Diffusion of innovations in globally stable Walrasian equilibrium

When all products in the economy are weak gross substitutes, preferences are homothetic, and firms face menu costs then all prices in an industry move together at the same rate. In the closed-loop Nash noncooperative equilibrium, all firms invest in productivity and reduce real prices. As a result, in the case of quadratic menu costs, the outputs of industries and the economy go up along S-shaped time paths characteristic of diffusion of innovations.     

The replicator dynamics does not lead to correlated equilibria

It is shown that, under the replicator dynamics, all strategies played in correlated equilibrium may be eliminated, so that only strategies with zero marginal probability in all correlated equilibria survive. This occurs in particular in a family of 4×4 games built by adding a strategy to a Rock-Paper-Scissors game.     

World Oil Depletion Models: Price effects compared with strategic or technological interventions

World oil depletion, including natural gas liquids, was modelled in the past by many authors. Recently, Guseo and Dalla Valle have introduced and Guidolin has applied a new approach following perturbed life-cycle diffusion models. Here we examine joint effects of economic and strategic or technological interventions using a Generalized Bass Model (GBM). Statistical analysis takes into account three different hierarchical levels: natural diffusion, long memory interventions and stochastic components. The main results confirm the statistical significance of historical 1970s shocks and highlight a strong long memory effect due to an increase in oil production after World War II. The estimated peak-date, 2007, and the 90% depletion time, 2019, are determined under an equilibrium intervention hypothesis.     

Business models for material efficiency services: Conceptualization and application

Despite the abundant research on material flows and the growing recognition of the need to dematerialize the economy, business enterprises are still not making the best possible use of the many opportunities for material efficiency improvements. This article proposes one possible solution: material efficiency services provided by outside suppliers. It also introduces a conceptual framework for the analysis of different business models for eco-efficient services and applies the framework to material efficiency services. Four business models are outlined and their feasibility is studied from an empirical vantage point. In contrast to much of the previous research, special emphasis is laid on the financial aspects. It appears that the most promising business models are ‘material efficiency as additional service’ and ‘material flow management service’. Depending on the business model, prominent material efficiency service providers differ from large companies that offer multiple products and/or services to smaller, specialized providers. Potential clients (users) typically lack the resources (expertise, management's time or initial funds) to conduct material efficiency improvements themselves. Customers are more likely to use material efficiency services that relate to support materials or side-streams rather than those that are at the core of production. Potential client organizations with a strategy of outsourcing support activities and with experience of outsourcing are more keen to use material efficiency services.     

城镇社区安全管理模式的经济学分析

城镇社区安全是社会安全与稳定的基础。本文基于纳什均衡和帕累托理论，对城镇社区安全管理模式进行了经济学分析。结果显示，为实现社区安全管理资源的帕累托最优，需要改进现有的安全管理制度，通过契约协作的方式，协调社区联盟中每户居民的安全支出，以避免“搭便车”现象的发生。基于上述经济学理论分析，最后提出了有关实现社区安全管理制度创新的模式及相应对策措施。