Appropriate assumption on cross-hauling national input–output table regionalization

Input–output tables are useful for regional economic analyses. Although scholars often regionalize national input–output tables, cost-related issues make surveying regional trade flow difficult; hence, non-survey approaches are implemented instead. While location quotient (LQ) approaches have been used widely, they ignore cross-hauling in interregional trade. Therefore, alternative non-survey approaches with different assumptions on cross-hauling are used, such as cross-hauling depends on regional size and cross-hauling is proportional to its potential determined by output or demand. This study concludes that the most appropriate assumption, as per the relative performance of non-survey approaches, is that cross-hauling is in proportion to trade volume.     

Bear beta

We test whether bear market risk, time variation in the probability of future bear market states, is priced. We construct an Arrow–Debreu security that pays off in bear market states (AD Bear) from traded Standard & Poor’s (S&P) 500 index options and use its returns to measure bear market risk. We find that bear beta (exposure to bear market risk) has a strong relation with expected stock returns that is robust, persistent, and remains strong among liquid and large stocks. Historical bear beta also predicts future bear market risk exposure. We conclude that bear market risk is priced in the cross section of stock returns.     

Stochastic volatility: A tale of co-jumps,non-normality,GMM and high frequency data

In this article we introduce a linear–quadratic volatility model with co-jumps and show how to calibrate this model to a rich dataset. We apply GMM and more specifically match the moments of realized power and multi-power variations, which are obtained from high-frequency stock market data. Our model incorporates two salient features: the setting of simultaneous jumps in both return process and volatility process and the superposition structure of a continuous linear–quadratic volatility process and a Lévy-driven Ornstein–Uhlenbeck process. We compare the quality of fit for several models, and show that our model outperforms the conventional jump diffusion or Bates model. Besides that, we find evidence that the jump sizes are not normally distributed and that our model performs best when the distribution of jump-sizes is only specified through certain (co-) moment conditions. Monte Carlo experiments are employed to confirm this.     

The effect of controversial global sourcing practices on the ethical judgments and intentions of U.S. consumers

Global sourcing has led to lower cost and more effective supply chains for many companies. However, when the cost-driven practices of many suppliers in these chains come to light there is often considerable debate over the ethics of these practices. This research uses the well-known Hunt–Vitell framework as the theoretical foundation for a structural equation model of the deontological and teleological evaluations used by consumers when making ethical judgments of a firm's controversial cost-driven global sourcing practices. Data from a large-scale U.S. consumer survey show the importance of deontological and teleological evaluations in forming consumers’ ethical judgments of global sourcing practices, and establish a strong relationship between ethical judgment and the intention of consumers to alter consumption of a firm's products. Extensions to the framework and demographic analyses for age, gender, and income provide insights as to how perceptions of these practices affect consumer evaluations of a company involved in global sourcing and how consumers actualize their resultant intentions.     

A non-cooperative approach to the ordinal Shapley–Shubik rule

In bargaining problems, a rule satisfies ordinal invariance if it does not depend on order-preserving transformations of the agents’ utilities. In this paper, a non-cooperative game for three agents, based on bilateral offers, is presented. The ordinal Shapley–Shubik rule arises in subgame perfect equilibrium as the agents have more time to reach an agreement.     

Equilibrium theory under ambiguity

We extend the classical results on the Walras–core existence and equivalence to an ambiguous asymmetric information economy; that is, an economy where agents maximize Maximin Expected Utility (MEU). The interest of considering ambiguity arises from the fact that, in the presence of MEU decision making, there is no conflict between efficiency and incentive compatibility (contrary to the Bayesian decision making). Our new modeling of an ambiguous asymmetric information economy necessitates new equilibrium notions, which are always efficient and incentive compatible.     

Pareto-undominated and socially-maximal equilibria in non-atomic games

This paper makes the observation that a finite Bayesian game with diffused and disparate private information can be conceived of as a large game with a non-atomic continuum of players. By using this observation as its methodological point of departure, it shows that (i) a Bayes–Nash equilibrium (BNE) exists in a finite Bayesian game with private information if and only if a Nash equilibrium exists in the induced large game, and (ii) both Pareto-undominated and socially-maximal BNE exist in finite Bayesian games with private information. In particular, it shows these results to be a direct consequence of results for a version of a large game re-modeled for situations where different players may have different action sets.     

Impact of commuting by workers on household dietary diversity in rural India

Drawing insights from the literature on transformation of rural non-farm employment, pathways from agriculture to nutrition, and linkages between migration and nutritional status of household, we seek to understand differences in dietary diversity across three mutually exclusive types of rural Indian households: where all members work in rural areas, at least one member commutes to urban areas, at least one member has no fixed place of work. Our analysis is based on a nationally representative data set from India for the year 2009–10 and we use propensity score matching methods. We find that as compared to households with no commuters, households with rural–urban commuters have higher dietary diversity; whereas households with no fixed place workers have lower dietary diversity. We also find differences in dietary diversity across households which differ by their primary source of income.     

Updating Input–Output Tables with Benchmark Table Series

Numerous methods have been proposed to update input–output (I–O) tables. They rely on the assumption that the economic structure will not change significantly during the interpolation period. However, this assumption may not always hold, particularly for countries experiencing rapid development. This study attempts to combine forecasting with a matrix transformation technique (MTT) to provide a new perspective on updating I–O tables. Under the assumption that changes in the trend of an economic structure are statistically significant, the method extrapolates I–O tables by combining time series models with an MTT and proceeds with only the total value added during the target years. A simulation study and empirical analysis are conducted to compare the forecasting performance of the MTT to the Generalized RAS (GRAS) and Kuroda methods. The results show that the comprehensive performance of the MTT is better than the performance of the GRAS and Kuroda methods, as measured by the Standardized Total Percentage Error, Theil's U and Mean Absolute Percentage Error indices.     

On pure-strategy Nash equilibria in price–quantity games

This paper examines the existence and characteristics of pure-strategy Nash equilibria in oligopoly models in which firms simultaneously set prices and quantities. Existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium is proved for a class of price–quantity games. If the demand function is continuous, then the equilibrium outcome is similar to that of a price-only model. With discontinuous demand and limited spillover, there are rationing equilibria in which combined production falls short of market demand. Moreover, there might again be an equilibrium reflecting the outcome of a price game. Competition in price and quantity thus yields Bertrand outcomes under a variety of market conditions.