腐败对公共投资和经济增长的效应研究

公共投资对经济增长的积极效应为经济学家普遍认同,但是由于腐败的存在,这一问题变得比较模糊.文章将腐败与经济增长、公共投资与经济增长、腐败与公共投资等三个大的问题纳入一个分析框架下,研究公共投资、腐败和经济增长及其相互依赖的关系.构建了由关于经济增长、公共投资、腐败和私人投资四个方程组成的方程组,并利用三阶段最小二乘法实证分析了观测的面板数据.文章的结论指出,腐败增加了公共投资的水平,但是只有低腐败水平的国家才能享受到公共投资对经济增长的有效回报,而对于高腐败水平的国家,公共投资的效率因为腐败的存在而降低,以致于公共投资无法拉动经济增长.     

公务员高薪激励政策的现实局限——一个理论模型

结合经济转型国家的实际执法环境,提出一个不确定性条件下薪酬激励政策的理论模型,用来研究公务员高薪激励政策的现实局限性。研究结果表明,对于风险规避的代理人,由于存在现实的层级惩罚制度,一定范围内的腐败活动不可能由增薪得到遏制,只有在惩罚制度具有较好执行力的条件下,提高薪酬才能在一定程度上激励官员减少腐败;在转轨国家对腐败行为"有限容忍"的政策环境中,高薪激励手段能减少执法成本,但不能有效地遏制腐败。因此,一个旨在降低监督与执法成本的制度设计是治理腐败的较好选择。     

两类信贷腐败比较研究:审批腐败与支付腐败

企业在向银行寻求信贷融资时遇到的信贷腐败可分为两类：金融机构中主管信贷审批的高层人员的审批腐败;负责信贷发放的基层人员的支付腐败。通过分析两种类型的腐败在项目寻求信贷融资时的影响,揭示信贷腐败与信贷融资之间的关系,指出两类腐败具有相互影响的关系,基层支付腐败对信贷融资项目产生逆向选择,阻止了低风险项目的信贷融资行为,而高层人员倾向于和融资项目合作,因而具有减少基层机构支付腐败的动机。     

Victim or Victimizer: Firm Responses to Government Corruption

What is the relationship between government corruption and firm performance? To address this question, I conduct a review of articles published in the leading management journals on government‐business interactions pertaining to rent‐seeking activities and integrate findings from the fields of international business, social issues in management, public organization, institutional change, and corporate political activity. I find that while much empirical work corroborates the earlier findings suggesting a corrosive impact of government corruption on firm performance in general, management research also points to the heterogeneous impact of government corruption on individual firm performance, driven by the strategic activities conducted by firms in response to corruption. I propose an integrative model of firm strategy vis‐à‐vis corruption that predicts the activity choice of the firm as predicated by its organizational structure, political resources, industry regulation, and surrounding political and social institutions.     

The Role of Information in Building Reputation in an Investment/Trust Game

This article analyses the role of information in building reputation in an investment/trust game. The model allows for information asymmetry in a finitely repeated sender–receiver game and solves for sequential equilibrium to show that if there are some trustworthy managers who always disclose their private information and choose to return a fair proportion of the firm's income as dividend to the investor, then a rational manager will mimic such behaviour in an attempt to earn a reputation for being trustworthy. The rational manager will mimic with probability 1 in the early periods of the game. The investor, too, will invest with probability 1 in these periods. However, in the later periods, the rational manager will mimic with a certain probability strictly less than 1. The probability will be such that it will make the investor indifferent between investing and not investing, and he, in turn, will invest with a probability (strictly less than 1) that will make the rational manager indifferent between mimicking and not mimicking; that is, the game will begin with pure-strategy play but will switch to mixed-strategy play. There is one exception, though: when the investor's ex ante beliefs about the manager's trustworthiness are exceptionally high, the game will continue in a pure strategy, and the switch to mixed-strategy play will never occur. Identical results obtain if the manager's choice of whether to share his private information with the investor is replaced by exogenously imposed information sharing.     

A Daunting Task in Asia

Abstract

This article deals with the question of how to transform the public sector in Asia towards transparency and accountability. What are the main challenges and constraints in promoting transparency and accountability? What kind of strategies can we suggest to enhance and sustain transparency and accountability? It will start with the introduction, including environmental changes in public affairs, and a brief overview of transparency and accountability. Then it will look at what major challenges and constraints there are in enhancing transparency and accountability. This will be followed by a discussion of key strategies for the transformation and sustainability of transparency and accountability for further development in the Asian public sector.     

Political corruption shielding and corporate acquisitions

Corruption includes rent‐seeking behavior by public officials (e.g., lavish in‐kind benefits and monetary kickbacks for contracts/permits/regulatory leniency, improper political contributions/support, etc.) that can negatively affect firm valuations, performances, and strategic choices. Shielding strategies are used to diminish rent‐seeking attractiveness of firms. Acquisitions provide a better channel than cash or leverage for assessing the wealth effects of shielding strategies. We find that the mean 3‐day announcement returns for acquirers for a large sample of U.S. domestic acquisitions between 1990 and 2014 is significantly lower for firms headquartered in relatively higher corruption states. Our results survive an array of robustness tests.     

Drivers of firm formalization in Vietnam: an attention theory explanation

Informal enterprises are widely viewed as a mechanism to engage unemployed people in the economy and thereby alleviate poverty in developing economies. However, over-representation in an economy may lead to both economic growth and broader employment opportunities being sacrificed. This paper presents a process model to investigate three potential drivers for firms to formalize: the first from a desire to grow and develop the firm through innovation, the second from the wish to access government financial support and the third stimulated by the payment of unofficial payments or bribes. We use data from surveys of Vietnamese firms in 2005, 2007, 2009 and 2011 to investigate these drivers of formalization. Although we find support for all three of these drivers, the results differ in significance across years and firm types. We explain these differences using attention theory to show how different situations and events can make the formalization decision more likely over time.     

Corruption and market attractiveness influences on different types of FDI

Previous studies have proposed that a compensatory model predicts the level of foreign direct investment (FDI) in a country; FDI levels are a result of ‘trade‐offs’ between the positive effect of market attractiveness and the negative influence of corruption. In contrast, we hypothesize and find that the compensatory relationship only holds for market‐seeking investment; for resource‐seeking FDI the model appears to be noncompensatory. Greater market attractiveness mitigates the negative impact of corruption on market‐seeking investment, but the ability of market attractiveness to mitigate the negative impact of corruption on resource‐seeking FDI quickly disappears as corruption levels increase. Implications and future research directions are discussed. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

民营经济发展与“腐败有效论”的检验

据"腐败有效论"的已有研究结合私营企业发展路径分析试图解释中国高腐败和民营经济高增长并存的"双高之谜"。通过1998～2006年的省级面板数据实证检验,我们发现腐败与民营经济发展呈现著正相关关系,对民营经济发展而言"腐败有效论"是成立的。并且我们证明,腐败有利于民营经济发展起作用的一个重要渠道就是可以减少政府的掠夺和干预。说明面对一个扭曲的制度安排,必然存在另一个扭曲的制度对其进行纠正。而要根除这种次优的扭曲的资源配置方式,只有根除其赖以生存的制度环境,即只有坚定不移地推动市场化改革。