The explosive combination of religious decentralization and autocracy

The relationship between religion and politics is explored from a theoretical standpoint. Religious clerics can be seduced by an autocrat and political stability is at stake. The autocrat's decisions consist of two measures both capable of antagonizing religious clerics: adopting secular reforms and unduly appropriating part of the national wealth, which generally are complements. Compared to centralized religions, decentralized religions, such as Islam, tend to discourage secular reforms and corruption but those effects are not guaranteed if the autocrat accepts political instability. The main hypotheses and the central results of the theory are illustrated with regime case studies that refer to contemporary times.     

腐败循环博弈模型的构建

腐败循环是一种腐败问题持续发生的现象,为什么这一现象难以得以根除？文章利用官员和承包商之间一个简单的博弈模型来对此问题进行探析,找出阻断腐败循环的方法。     

Defining and Defending a Progressive Market Square: Bringing Institutionalist Development Discourse in Line with the Reality of Post-Soviet Transition Experiences

Abstract:

This article is a response to two crucial ideas about progressive institutional change: the first is J. Fagg Foster’s principle of “minimal social dislocation,” which asserts that socio-economic changes should be implemented gradually, to avoid unraveling the social fabric of the community; the second is Karl Polanyi’s principles of redistribution of rights and powers by relevant authorities and reciprocity, a symmetrical and highly personalized exchange system, which is likewise a protective mechanism that society employs against anonymity and disintegration brought about by unregulated market. Using lessons learned in the thirty-year transition to market in post-Soviet countries, this article argues that to commence progressive institutional change in the honesty- and transparency-resistant cultures of former Soviet states, impersonal exchange and impartial rule of law must be given far greater weight than personalization of contacts and continuation of cultural traditions.     

Optimal regulation under imperfect enforcement: Permits,tickets, or both?

Economic activity is often regulated through both permits and tickets (subsequent inspections). We study the effectiveness of such policies where corruption and an underground economy make enforcement imperfect. In the theoretical model, asymmetric information justifies regulatory action which is enforced by corruptible bureaucrats. We find that regulation through permits alone is useless when corruption exists, while tickets still offer some benefit. Surprisingly, we also find that a system with both permits and tickets achieves welfare that is higher than that which can be achieved with only tickets—that combining the two mechanisms has an effect that is greater than the “sum of the parts.”     

政治体制上端改革:反腐败斗争的迫切需要

我国的反腐败已经进入了一个特殊的高原期,能否实现政治体制上端的重大改革,是决定中国反腐败能否实现突破的关键。政治体制上端改革要坚持三个不动摇、发展党内民主、完善人民代表大会制度和改革政党制度,可以建立"廉洁岛"式的政治特区。     

廉政制度科学化在反腐倡廉建设中的基础性作用

党的十七届四中全会通过了《中共中央关于加强和改进新形势下党的建设若干重大问题的决定》提出了“提高党的建设科学化水平”、“推进党的建设科学化、制度化、规范化”的重大命题和重要任务.廉政制度建设是反腐倡廉建设中的基本组成部分.反腐倡廉建设科学化最终要通过廉政建设制度化来落实,也是建设科学化的根本保证.廉政制度科学化在反腐倡...     

建筑业反腐倡廉的思考与对策

建筑业涉及面广、专业性强、资金量大、关系复杂，是最容易滋生腐败的行业之一。近年来，党和政府将建筑业列为治理经济腐败问题的重点领域，并对其进行了多次大规模专项治理活动。文章认为，建筑业应该尽快建立完善的规章制度和监督机制，从根本上杜绝腐败现象的滋生及蔓延，保证社会主义现代化建设健康发展。     

The Underground Economy in the Late 1990s: Evading Taxes,or Evading Competition?

This paper studies the driving forces behind the considerable expansion of the underground economy during the late 1990s. I propose a novel explanation for this phenomenon: the sharp increase in market competition worldwide, which reduces prices and profits and drives firms into the shadow economy. Empirical evidence from a panel covering 45 countries from 1995 to 2000 shows that increased competition is indeed correlated with an expansion of the underground economy. The effect is strongest in low-tax, high-corruption countries that do not provide the public services which make it worthwhile for firms to remain official despite growing competitive pressure.     

论政法机关腐败问题的成因及对策

当前政法队伍中的腐败问题依然存在,少数干警的违法违纪问题还很严重,直接损害了当事群众的利益,影响了经济发展软环境,败坏了政法机关的形象,降低了法治的公信力,必须引起高度重视并努力加以解决。     

Governance, Democracy and Poverty Reduction: Lessons Drawn from Household Surveys in Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America

Public statistics face quite a challenge when it comes to measuring new dimensions of development (institutions, governance, and social and political participation). To take up this challenge, modules on Governance, Democracy and Multiple Dimensions of Poverty have been appended to household surveys by National Statistics Institutes in twelve African and Latin American developing countries. This paper presents the issues addressed and the methodological lessons learnt along with a selection of findings to illustrate this innovative approach and demonstrate its analytic potential. We investigate, for instance, the population's support for democratic principles, the respect for civil and political rights and the trust in the political class; the ‘need for the State’, particularly of the poorest; the extent of petty corruption; the reliability of expert surveys on governance; the perception of decentralization policies at local level; the level and vitality of social and political participation, etc. The conclusive appraisal made opens up prospects for the national statistical information systems in the developing countries. The measurement and tracking of this new set of objective and subjective public policy monitoring indicators would benefit from being made systematic.