信用管理在新兴产业发展中的作用探讨

通过对新兴产业企业、商业银行的融资状况进行调查,分析新兴产业企业目前的信用管理现状,商业银行对新兴产业开展信用评级的指标及内容等,以此推断泰州市新兴产业的信用管理状况。再结合当前经济发展实际,提出政府、新兴产业企业、商业银行三方联动的信用管理对策,推动新兴产业的可持续发展。     

The determinants of credit spreads changes in global shipping bonds

This paper investigates whether bond, issuer, industry and macro-specific variables account for the observed variation of credit spreads’ changes of global shipping bond issues before and after the onset of the subprime financial crisis. Results show that conclusions as to the significant variables of spreads depend significantly on whether two-way cluster-adjusted standard errors are utilized, thus rendering results in the extant literature ambigious. The main determinants of global cargo-carrying companies’ shipping bond spreads are found in this paper to be: the liquidity of the bond issue, the stock market’s volatility, the bond market’s cyclicality, freight earnings and the credit rating of the bond issue.     

ARBITRAGE‐FREE BILATERAL COUNTERPARTY RISK VALUATION UNDER COLLATERALIZATION AND APPLICATION TO CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS

We develop an arbitrage‐free valuation framework for bilateral counterparty risk, where collateral is included with possible rehypothecation. We show that the adjustment is given by the sum of two option payoff terms, where each term depends on the netted exposure, i.e., the difference between the on‐default exposure and the predefault collateral account. We then specialize our analysis to credit default swaps (CDS) as underlying portfolios, and construct a numerical scheme to evaluate the adjustment under a doubly stochastic default framework. In particular, we show that for CDS contracts a perfect collateralization cannot be achieved, even under continuous collateralization, if the reference entity’s and counterparty’s default times are dependent. The impact of rehypothecation, collateral margining frequency, and default correlation‐induced contagion is illustrated with numerical examples.     

Credit risk and asymmetric information: A simplified approach

We present a simple model for risky, corporate debt. Debtholders and equityholders have incomplete information about the financial state of the debt issuing company. Information is incomplete because it is delayed for all agents, and it is asymmetrically distributed between debtholders and equityholders. We solve for the equityholders' optimal default policy and for the credit spreads required by debtholders. Delayed information accelerates the equityholders' optimal decision to default. Interestingly, this effect is small, implying only a small impact on credit spreads. Asymmetric information, however, has a major impact on credit spreads. Our model predicts high credit spreads for short-term debt, as observed empirically in credit markets.     

Trade credit and the joint effects of supplier and customer financial characteristics

We examine how access to bank credit affects trade credit in the supplier–customer relationships of U.S. public firms. For identification, we use exogenous liquidity shocks to supplier firms in the form of staggered changes to interstate bank branching laws. Using a variety of tests, we show that supplier firms with greater access to banking liquidity offer more trade credit to their customers. We also show that when bank branching restrictions are relaxed in the supplier’s state, the supplier–customer relationship is more likely to survive.     

What Drives the Consequences of Intentional Misstatements? Evidence from Rating Analysts’ Reactions

This paper aims to identify the mechanisms through which intentional misstatements adversely affect firms by analyzing rating analysts’ reaction to misstatements. In order to identify the mechanisms through which the misstatement affects firms’ credit ratings, we analyze the content of rating reports. Rating analysts are concerned about seven different mechanisms. They are most concerned about misstatement‐related violations of debt covenants that increase a firm's liquidity risk. We find that, subsequent to an intentional misstatement becoming publicly known, credit ratings of misreporting firms are adversely affected for up to seven years. The adverse impact of an intentional misstatement on a firm's credit rating is most pronounced in cases in which rating analysts mention concerns about misstatement‐related violations of covenants. Our results suggest that these covenant violations are the most severe mechanism through which misstatements adversely affect firms’ creditworthiness.     

公共信用信息归集和使用的地方规则比较研究

公共信用信息的归集和使用是当前各地方政府社会信用体系建设的焦点问题。少数省、市在公共信用信息归集和使用规则制定上的经验值得借鉴。对江苏省和陕西省、杭州市和上海市的公共信用信息归集和使用的地方规则进行比较,从公共信用信息归集、使用、异议处理、管理机制几个方面进行总结并提出建议。     

Cross-hedging strategies between CDS spreads and option volatility during crises

This paper presents a joint analysis of the term structure of credit default swap (CDS) spreads and the implied volatility surface for five European countries from 2007 to 2012, a sample period covering both the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and the European debt crisis. We analyze to which extent effective cross-hedges can be performed between the credit and equity derivatives markets during these two crises. We find that during a global crisis a breakdown of the relationship between credit risk and equity volatility may occur, jeopardizing any cross-hedging strategy, which happened during the GFC. This stands in sharp contrast to the more localized European debt crisis, during which this fundamental relationship was preserved despite turbulent market conditions for both the CDS and volatility markets.     

The Risk Effects of Acquiring Distressed Firms

Existing research shows that bidder default risk increases following acquisitions due to a rise in post‐acquisition leverage and managerial risk‐taking actions offsetting the potential for asset diversification. This study examines whether the risk effects of acquiring distressed targets are fundamentally different and investigates possible explanations for any dissimilarities. Bidders often acquire relatively smaller distressed targets in domestic and related industries and have a higher initial target stake and more financial flexibility, thereby minimizing risk exposure. Controlling for several characteristics of bidder investment behaviour in both types of deals, however, we find that the increase in bidder default risk is substantially larger when acquiring distressed firms.