Stochastic evolution with slow learning

Summary. This paper studies the extent to which diffusion approximations provide a reliable guide to equilibrium selection results in finite games. It is shown that they do for a class of finite games with weak learning provided that limits are taken in a certain order. The paper also shows that making mutation rates small does not in general select a unique equilibrium but making selection strong does. Received: January 19, 2000; revised version: September 25, 2000     

基于合作博弈的西部国防科技产业集群竞争力分析——以陕西航空产业集群为例

本文基于合作博弈的视角,分析西部军用产业与民用产业在军民融合过程中的发展情况,通过建立军工产业与民用产业博弈的模型,认为合作博弈打破了国防科技产业的绝对垄断地位,使军民企业走出相对隔离的困境。在竞争中寻求合作,可有效提高产业集群的自主创新能力进而提高产业集群竞争力。     

Inequality of Happiness in the U.S.: 1972–2010

It is well accepted that a country's GDP may not fully reflect its level of well‐being. In recent years, happiness has emerged as an alternative indicator of well‐being, and research has mainly focused on determining the level of happiness. While it is important to look at the level, the distribution of happiness is also a salient aspect in any evaluation of inequality. There has been a growing interest in the distribution of happiness, although the ordinal nature of the data makes the use of standard inequality measures problematic. Our paper contributes to the literature by exploring the distributions for the U.S. from 1972 to 2010. Based on new methods developed for ordinal data, we are able to overcome the problems associated with ordinality and obtain unambiguous rankings of happiness distributions. We also compute the level of happiness inequality using existing measures based on median centred approaches. Further, we decompose the median based inequality measures of happiness by gender, race, and region.     

Medical Dominance and Institutional Change in the Delivery of Health Care Services

This paper puts the theory of medical dominance, as it understood as a sociological theory of historical change, into a broader theory of institutional change of the delivery of medical care. The application of medical dominance theory to three institutional contexts (Australia, USA, and Canada) is reviewed. The possibility of progressive institutional change in the delivery of medical care is addressed, as well as the type of technological innovation that might accompany such institutional change. The concept of medical dominance is useful to explain the dominant characteristics supporting the institution of medical practice. However, an explanatory theory of the evolution of health care delivery should be linked to the instrumentally warranted standards for medical care. These standards are then discussed.

Playing Cournot although they shouldn’t

Summary. In this note, we experimentally investigate the extended game with action commitment in a Cournot duopoly with asymmetric cost. Risk dominance considerations allow to select a unique equilibrium in which the low-cost firm is the Stackelberg leader. The data, however, do not support the theory as simultaneous-move play is modal. Average output choices are in line with the Cournot equilibrium. This suggests that Cournot is a much more robust predictor for competition in markets than theory suggests.Received: 14 October 2002, Revised: 1 December 2003, JEL Classification Numbers: C72, C92, D43. Correspondence to: Hans-Theo Normann     

国防支出与经济增长关系的战略选择——一个数理模型的分析与模拟

国防支出与经济增长之间的关系到底如何、怎样安排国防支出才能有利于国防和经济建设,这是国防经济学必须回答的基本问题。文章在一系列假设前提下,构建了一个简单的数学模型,描述了经济总量制约国防支出、国防支出又反作用于经济增长的内在机理,并通过数字模拟比较了三种国防支出战略对于经济增长和国防资本积累的不同影响,对现实中的很多问题给予了解释,得出了一些有意义的结论。     

Adaptive Learning and Iterated Weak Dominance

This article addresses the idea that rational players should not play iteratively weakly dominated strategies by showing that when a particular type of adaptive learning process converges, then players must have learned to play strategy profiles equivalent to those that survive iterated nice weak dominance and, for certain games, equivalent to those that survive iterated weak dominance. For games satisfying the weak single crossing condition, the set of strategies that survive iterated weak dominance is small in that its bounds are pure strategy Nash equilibria. The results hold regardless of the order in which dominated strategies are eliminated.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Number: C72.