Technology transfer with commitment

Summary. This paper considers technology transfer in a duopoly where the firms have two types of commitment strategies: incentive delegation and capacity installation. It turns out that the possibility of technology transfer significantly differs under these two types of commitment as well as depending on whether one or both firms commit. Under strategic incentive delegation, the possibility of technology transfer is minimal when both firms use the incentive delegation strategy and the costs of incentive delegation are negligible. If both firms choose the incentive delegation strategy and the costs of incentive delegation are significant then the possibility of technology transfer rises compared to a situation with no pre-commitment. In case of commitment to a capacity level before production, the possibility of technology transfer does not change when both firms simultaneously commit to their capacity levels. Different sets of results arise when only one firm can pre-commit. Received: February 10, 1997; revised version: December 16, 1999     

对我国上市公司退出机制的探讨

健全的退出机制是一国证券市场完善的重要标志,本文结合我国证券市场的特殊国情,对上市公司退出机制的现状进行了实证分析,并在此基础上提出了我国上市公司退出机制的基本模式及相应的政策建议。     

Tests of Fairness Models Based on Equity Considerations in a Three-Person Ultimatum Game

Two recent models incorporating fairness considerations into the economics literature based on agents' concerns about the distribution of payoffs between themselves and others (Fehr-Schmidt, 1999,Quarterly Journal of Economics. 114 (3), 769–816; Bolton-Ockenfels, 2000,American Economic Review. 90, 166–193) are investigated using a new three-person ultimatum game: One person allocates a sum of money to two others, one of which is randomly chosen to accept or reject the offer. Rejection gives both the responder and the proposer zero income and a positive consolation prize for the non-responder. The data show essentially no reductions in rejection rates, holding offers constant, with and without consolation prizes, contrary to both models' predictions.     

基于价格与信用的产业集群竞争优势博弈分析

产业集群是指某一特定区域内相互联系的企业与机构之间在地理上的集中,是介于市场和科层组织之间的一种新的空间经济组织形式.产业集群内企业之间的博弈可以导致某种企业均能接受、具有一定市场稳定性、与一般市场价格相比具有一定竞争优势的市场均衡价格.同时在产业集群内部,由于违背信任的代价高昂,企业有足够的动力维持相互之间的信任与合作关系,比邻而居的企业之间由于频繁的交往和经常性的合作,产生了面对面的观察与学习的便利性,可产生较强的联合行动效应.企业通过合作达成资源、信息上的共享,促进由于创新带来技术上的升级,从而使集群内企业互惠互利、共同发展.     

产权与信用:博弈中的原初逻辑

产权是有限理性的自利的人们在长期的博弈过程中内生出来的结果。产权自我维持的私人治理说明信用的产生是尊重并保护产权的结果。从某种原初状态出发,在漫长的历史演化过程中,经济人在相互生存竞争和博弈过程中自发地形成了产权关系,这一过程中信用也相伴而生。事实和逻辑都证明了产权的确立是信用产生的前提,产权明晰对信用具有强化作用。     

旅行社信用缺失及其控制:基于博弈理论的分析

近几年来,我国一些旅行社存在严重的信用缺失问题。通过利用博弈论的相关知识对旅行社诚信行为选择进行博弈分析,提出了有效抑制旅行社信用缺失的相关措施:引入对监管部门的奖励机制,充分调动监管部门的积极性,激励监管部门积极实施严监管;引入对监管部门的处罚机制,提高旅行社监管部门的责任意识;对失职监管部门加大处罚力度,来保证监管效果的实现;建立健全信用的奖惩机制,加大旅行社的失信成本。     

Preparations for Olympic Games

ⅠVenues 1.The completion of the Water Cube On January 28th,2008,after the construction of over four years,one of the symbolic architectures of Beijing Olympic—National Center of Swimming （The Water Cube）was completed and has been put into use.During the period from 31st of January to 5th of February, the first testing game was held in the Water Cube—China Swim Open,2008. After the Olympic Game,11 thousand temporary seats will be removed from the 4-storeyed Water Cube,which will become a water entertainment center for Beijing citizens.     

Stakeholder’s Preference and Rational Compliance: A Comment on Sacconi’s “CSR as a Model for Extended Corporate Governance II: Compliance, Reputation and Reciprocity”

Lorenzo Sacconi’s recent re-statement of his social contract account of business ethics is a major contribution to our understanding of the normative nature of CSR as the expression of a fair multi-party agreement supported by the economic rationality of each participant. However, at one crucial point in his theory, Sacconi introduces the concept of stakeholders’ conformist preferences – their disposition to punish the firm if it defects from the agreement, refusing to abide by its own explicit CSR policies and norms. We take issue with him over this concept: we show that the assumption of conformist preferences is a moral premise, and it arguably weakens the normativity of the theory as a whole. As an alternative, we propose an evolutionary game theoretic approach. We draw upon recent applications of evolutionary game theory to moral philosophy (Skyrms, Danielson), and we use a computer simulation of the trust game. According to this approach, the failure of the logic of reputation, which is the problem conformist preferences were introduced to solve, is overcome through the dynamics of interaction.     

基于面板数据的地方税收与经济差异性研究

由于地方政府与中央政府博弈造成的效率损失,名义税负与实际税负的错位使得地方税收的主体税种对地方经济的影响各异。营业税对地方经济发展有较强的正效应,而企业所得税则对地方经济增长产生了抑制作用,且在三大区域存在不同的效应。     

Behave Brave After the Snow——Wan Jifei Meets With Hunan Governor Zhou Qiang

On the morning ofMarch 4th,Chairman Wan Jifei,Vicechairman Wang Jin zhen met with Governor Zhou Qiang,vice governor Gan Lin of Hunan province and the delegation,who are attending NPC and CPPCC sessions in Beijing.