Calibrating spatial models of trade

Empirical spatial models of trade that are based on a mathematical programming specification often exhibit a large discrepancy between the equilibrium solution and the observed demand, supply and levels of trade flows among countries. This discrepancy may be due to several causes. Assuming, however, that a trade model is not misspecified – in the sense that behavior of the economic agents involved in the specific commodity markets has been included in the study and that the relevant policy instruments have been properly taken into account – the cause of discrepancy may be traced either to imprecision of unit transaction costs or to imprecision in the measurement of the demand and supply functions' parameters, or both. Policy assessments based on this type of imprecise models are distorted. This paper presents a methodology for calibrating mathematical programming spatial trade models of increasing complexity, from the one-commodity case to a multi-commodity model with asymmetric slope matrices of demand and supply functions. The proposed calibration procedure identifies corrections of imperfectly measured parameters. The calibrated models generate solutions that exactly reproduce quantities produced and consumed in all countries, as well as trade flows among all pairs of countries, observed in a given base year. Such models may then serve as a springboard for assessing the impact of various policy changes on economic agents in the countries under study.     

Credit rationing, interest rates and capital accumulation

A simple endogenous growth model is developed to characterize credit rationing through the capital accumulation process. The model shows that credit rationing on investment loans decreases as capital accumulates and the enforcement cost decreases. We find that the evolution of the interest rate factor (lending interest rate/depositing interest rate) has a similar pattern to the credit rationing probability. However, simulations show that the evolution of the interest rate spread through the capital accumulation process depends on the degree of the enforcement cost. In the empirical part of the paper, we consider fifty-two countries, at different stages of development, over the period 1995–2005. We confirm the theoretical findings relative to the evolution of the interest rate spread and interest rate factor with capital accumulation. These results suggest that, for economies endowed with costly contract enforcement, the interest rate factor could be a better proxy of credit rationing than the interest rate spread.     

Investigating regional house price convergence in the United States: Evidence from a pair-wise approach

In this paper we examine long-run house price convergence across US states using a novel econometric approach advocated by Pesaran (2007) and Pesaran et al. (2009). Our empirical modelling strategy employs a probabilistic test statistic for convergence based on the percentage of unit root rejections among all state house price differentials. Using a sieve bootstrap procedure, we construct confidence intervals and find evidence in favour of convergence. We also conclude that speed of adjustment towards long-run equilibrium is inversely related to distance.     

A note on quantitative trade restrictions, income effects and wage inequality

This paper examines the effects of conversion of one type of physical trade restrictions into another on the intra-country wage inequality in a standard 2 × 2 × 2 Heckscher–Ohlin–Samuelson model. It shows that a conversion of an import-quota into an equivalent voluntary export restraint raises wage-inequality in the country importing the unskilled-labor intensive good and lowers the wage-inequality in its trading partner. This result does not depend on whether the unskilled-labor intensive good or the skilled-labor intensive good was initially subject to an import quota. Conversion of the import-quota into an equivalent import tariff, on the other hand, may lead to a rise in wage inequality in both countries. The driving force behind these results is the real income effect that conversion of one type trade restriction instrument into another results in.     

The effects of environmental taxes and quotas on the optimal timing of emission reductions under Choquet–Brownian uncertainty

The effects of two environmental policy options for the reduction of pollution emissions, i.e. taxes and non-tradable quotas, are analyzed. In contrast to the prior literature this work endogenously takes into account the level of emissions before and after the adoption of the new environmental policy. The level of emissions is determined by solving the firm's profit maximization problem under taxes and fixed quotas. We find that the optimal adoption threshold under taxes is always larger than the adoption threshold under fixed quota, even in a setting characterized by ecological uncertainty and ambiguity – in the form of Choquet–Brownian motions – on future costs and benefits over adopting environmental policies.     

The high/low divide: Self-selection by values in auction choice

Most prior theoretical and experimental work involving auction choice has assumed bidders find out their value after making a choice of which auction to enter. We examine whether or not bidders knowing their value prior to making a choice of which among multiple alternative auction formats to enter impacts their choice decision and/or the outcome of the auctions. The results show a strong impact on auction choice. Subjects with low values choose the first price sealed bid auction more often while subjects with high values choose the ascending auction more often. The number of bidders in each auction, revenue, efficiency and average bidder surplus all end up equalized.     

Coalitional bargaining games with random proposers: Theory and application

We consider a non-cooperative coalitional bargaining game with random proposers in a general situation for which players differ in recognition probability and time preference. We characterize an efficient equilibrium as the generalized Nash bargaining solution that belongs to the core. The model is applied to wage bargaining between an employer and multiple workers. Although involuntary unemployment may occur in equilibrium, full employment emerges as players become sufficiently patient.     

Can contracts solve the hold-up problem? Experimental evidence

In the contract-theoretic literature, there is a vital debate about whether contracts can mitigate the hold-up problem, in particular when renegotiation cannot be prevented. Ultimately, this question has to be answered empirically. As a first step, we have conducted a laboratory experiment with 960 participants. We consider investments that directly benefit the non-investing party. While according to standard theory, contracting would be useless if renegotiation cannot be ruled out, we find that option contracts significantly improve investment incentives compared to a no-contract treatment. This finding might be attributed to Hart and Moore?s (2008) recent idea that contracts can serve as reference points.     

Must improved labor standards hurt accumulation in the targeted sector? Stylized analysis of a developing economy

This paper analyzes a stylized small open economy that consists of two tradable output-producing sectors: a manufacturing sector and a (mainly tourism-related) services sector. Assuming sectoral differences based on stylized facts, we explore the impact of higher labor standards in the manufacturing sector on the long-term prospects of the economy using comparative dynamic exercises to analyze changes in relative prices, foreign capital flows, and the sectoral distribution of investment and output. We find, in particular, that imposing higher standards across the manufacturing sector could, under certain conditions, shift the structure of the domestic economy in favor of that sector. This result is driven by changes in relative profitability in the presence of learning-by-exporting.     

How effective is European merger control?

This paper applies an intuitive approach based on stock market data to a unique dataset of large concentrations during the period 1990–2002 to assess the effectiveness of European merger control. The basic idea is to relate announcement and decision abnormal returns. Under a set of four maintained assumptions, merger control might be interpreted to be effective if rents accruing due to the increased market power observed around the merger announcement are reversed by the antitrust decision, i.e. if there is a negative relation between announcement and decision abnormal returns. To clearly identify the events' competitive effects, we explicitly control for the market expectation about the outcome of the merger control procedure and run several robustness checks to assess the role of our maintained assumptions. We find that only outright prohibitions completely reverse the rents measured around a merger's announcement. On average, remedies seem to be only partially capable of reverting announcement abnormal returns. Yet they seem to be more effective when applied during the first rather than the second investigation phase and in subsamples where our assumptions are more likely to hold. Moreover, the European Commission appears to learn over time.