注重实施激励机制 提升护理质量

通过运用激励机制对护士进行激励,有效提高了护理质量、护理管理水平、提升了护护、医护、护患关系的满意度,增强了护士凝聚力,打造了高素质的护理队伍。     

我国公益性捐赠的税收政策缺陷分析

税收激励是鼓励公益性捐赠的重要方式,有效的税收优惠政策可以实现社会财富的再分配,促进社会公益事业的发展。     

新形势下会计变更为上市公司带来了什么

本文列举了从2001～2004年以来发生会计变更的上市公司.对上市公司的会计变更与会计报表收益之间的关系进行了描述以及对变更方式进行了归纳,并对会计变更的动机进行了详细的解析.最后浅谈了对上市公司会计变更的启示.     

Let the evidence speak again! Financial incentives are more effective than we thought

In this essay, the authors rejoin the debate about financial incentive effectiveness. They (a) briefly review the state of the literature in 1998, (b) highlight new meta‐analytic findings and update conclusions regarding the financial incentives–performance relationship, (c) address the myth that financial incentives erode intrinsic motivation, (d) provide explanations for the presumed failure of financial incentives and (e) offer some concluding thoughts and suggestions for future research.     

Who's the Boss at the Top? A Micro‐Level Analysis of Director Expertise,Status and Conformity Within Boards

In this paper we address how director expertise impacts a director's social status and conformity within the board. Our results, derived from two unique multi‐source datasets of peer ratings on director status and conformity of non‐executive directors from Dutch organizations, indicate that industry‐specific expertise and financial expertise differently impact directors’ social status and influence within the board. We find that directors’ individual performance orientation – the motivation to demonstrate expertise – acts as an important contingency for expertise to increase directors’ status within the board. Additional analyses using archival data and interviews with non‐executive directors substantiate our findings and provide additional insight into the dynamics operating within boards. This study extends existing research on boards of directors and provides unique micro‐level insights into the boardroom dynamics that connect director expertise to director status and conformity within boards.     

母子公司间高管纵向兼任与上市公司资本配置效率

已有研究主要基于母公司或控股股东等委托方利益视角,形成了对纵向高管兼任治理效应的认识。但这种假定忽视了兼任高管作为独立利益主体的利益诉求与私利动机对治理效应的影响。本文基于兼任高管所代表不同利益主体的视角,分析并检验母子公司间高管纵向兼任对上市公司资本配置效率的影响。研究表明,当母子公司间兼任高管代表母公司利益时,母子公司间高管兼任会通过降低子公司代理成本发挥监督效应,进而提升上市公司的资本配置效率;但是当兼任高管代表子公司利益时,母子公司间高管兼任并未发挥治理效应,甚至存在母子公司间高管兼任的上市公司中,代表子公司利益的高管兼任会将争取超额资金异化为寻租渠道,进而降低上市公司资本配置效率。本文将扩展对高管纵向兼任治理效应的理论解释,丰富上市公司资本配置效率决定机理的研究,对完善母子公司结构下的治理机制具有一定的启示意义。     

CEO optimism,CEO selection,compensation, and corporate investment decision: The case of CEOs who were rehired as CEOs by another firms after turnover

What happens to CEOs after they are let go by their firm? This study is designed to investigate CEOs who are rehired as CEOs by another firms after turnover. CEOs defined as “moderately optimistic” and those who left voluntarily from their departing firms, are younger, have better prior performance, and work in larger firms are found to have a greater likelihood of being rehired as a CEO by another employer. Moreover, new-hire firms with higher growth opportunity and higher R&D expenditures are found to be significantly more willing to hire overconfident CEOs. Furthermore, more-optimistic CEOs are found to receive higher total compensation from their new-hire firms than CEOs who are less optimistic. Finally, overconfident CEOs working in firms with high growth opportunity and higher R&D show a significantly greater tendency toward increasing firm investment.     

创新驱动发展与企业劳动收入份额

选取2012—2020年沪深A股上市公司为样本,实证检验创新驱动发展与企业劳动收入份额之间的关系,以及高管股权激励和员工持股对上述关系的调节效应。研究发现：企业创新驱动发展能够有效提高企业劳动收入份额;实施高管股权激励和员工持股计划均能显著增强上述关系。进一步研究发现,盈利水平发挥了部分中介效应,且当企业处于成长期和衰退期、市场化程度较高的地区以及为非国有企业时,上述关系更显著。研究结论表明,特别是处于成长期与衰退期、市场化程度较高地区的企业,以及非国有企业,大力推动创新驱动发展,并辅之以高管股权激励和员工持股计划,可以提高企业劳动收入份额,实现和谐发展,推进共同富裕目标实现。     

Executive compensation in government-linked companies: evidence from Malaysia

The aim of this study was to explore the characteristics of executive pay, equity ownership incentives and pay–performance relationship in government-controlled firms. Data were hand-collected from the annual reports of 179 companies listed on Bursa Malaysia. The results show that executive pay is lower in government-linked companies. Positive pay–performance relationship is also not evident for this category of firms, which indicates that their executives were largely guaranteed with certain level of pay irrespective of performance. The level of equity ownership incentives provides the executives in government-controlled firms with very little incentive to produce effort that can improve firm performance. Overall, our findings are consistent with the inefficient pay hypothesis developed in this study.     

Ex post participation constraint in a principal–agent model with adverse selection and moral hazard

This paper analyzes optimal contracting when an agent has private information before contracting and exerts hidden effort that stochastically affects the output. Additionally, the contract is constrained to satisfy the agentʼs ex post participation. We highlight three features of this model. First, the agent faces countervailing incentives. Second, the separation of types is never optimal. Third, the optimal constant bonus rewarding success is distorted downward below its efficient level.