Incentive Effects, Monitoring Mechanisms and the Market for Corporate Control: An Analysis of the Factors Affecting Public to Private Transactions in the UK

Abstract:   This paper investigates the factors that influence the decision to change the status of a publicly quoted company to that of a private company. We find that firms that go private are more likely to have higher CEO ownership and higher institutional ownership. In relation to their board structures, firms going private tend to have more duality but there is no statistical difference in the proportion of non‐executive directors. They do not show signs of having excess free cash flows but there is some evidence of lower growth opportunities. We do not find that firms going private experience a greater threat of hostile acquisition. The results are therefore consistent with incentive and monitoring explanations of going private. Calculation of the probability of going private shows that incentive effects are stronger than the monitoring effects.     

Generalized vs. specific locus of control expectancies of chief executive officers

Hodgkinson (1992) recently advocated in this journal that measures of generalized control expectancies, such as the well known Rotter I-E scale (Rotter, 1966), are not suited to study the relationship between the locus of control beliefs of Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) on the one hand and strategic, structural and performance variables on the other hand. According to Hodgkinson (1992) a more specific scale, measuring strategic control expectancies, should be used in future research. We argue and empirically illustrate that such a methodology will not lead to interesting research results in the ‘strategic leadership’ domain. More specifically, measures of firm-specific control expectancies are likely to be influenced by the CEO's perception of the situational context of the firm and are therefore not indicative of fundamental personality differences between CEOs. Consequently, such measures cannot give an answer to the basic research question whether and why the personality of CEOs plays an important role in explaining organizational behavior and performance.     

Board control and ceo compensation

The board of directors has been identified as a key internal control mechanism for setting CEO compensation. Theory suggests that CEOs will attempt to circumvent board control in an effort to maximize salary. This hypothesis was tested using a sample of 193 firms in a cross-section of industries. Corporate governance literature was reviewed to develop a multiple indicator measure of board control. Although, as hypothesized, CEO salaries were greater in firms with lower levels of control, CEO compensation was not significantly related to firm size or profitability.     

Insider Privatisation and Restructuring Incentives

In the literature on privatisation and restructuring it is a generally held belief that manager owned firms will be restructured more rigorously than worker owned companies. This gives the clear recommendation that property rights and control rights should be allocated to managers in the process of (insider-) privatisation. One of the implied arguments is, that managers' career concerns will make them eager to prove their ability by improving company efficiency. The present model shows that in the transition context managers' career concerns might result in the opposite effect. If the bulk of job opportunities are in worker controlled firms, the managers of the few manager controlled firms will want to appear soft on excess labour capacity – hence, restructure less harshly – in order to improve their career opportunities.     

Firm‐specific human capital,organizational incentives,and agency costs: Evidence from retail banking

This paper explores conflicting implications of firm‐specific human capital (FSHC) for firm performance. Existing theory predicts a productivity effect that can be enhanced with strong incentives. We propose an offsetting agency effect: FSHC may facilitate more‐sophisticated ‘gaming’ of incentives, to the detriment of firm performance. Using a unique dataset from a multiunit retail bank, we document both effects and estimate their net impact. Managers with superior FSHC are more productive in selling loans but are also more likely to manipulate loan terms to increase incentive payouts. We find that resulting profits are two percentage points lower for high‐FSHC managers. Finally, profit losses increase more rapidly for high‐FSHC managers, indicating adverse learning. Our results suggest that FSHC can create agency costs that outweigh its productive benefits. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The compensation of top managers and the performance of Italian firms

This paper examines one of the most studied aspects regarding the compensation of top managers: the relationship between remuneration and corporate performance. The principle research objective is to find evidence of this correlation in Italian companies. Based on a sample of 145 Italian companies listed on the Milan Stock Exchange, as analysed during the period between 2004 and 2009, the research findings do not demonstrate a link between company performance and the pay of top managers. Another empirical result that should be highlighted is the presence of a greater correlation between rate of pay and company size, in terms of stock turnover, which demonstrates the likely presence, at least in certain situations, of a dimensional premium that is to the benefit of the managers of larger companies. This research project evidences empirical results in the Italian context that support the findings of the most important international literature on the subject, as regards the absence of a connection between the compensation of managers and the performance of their firms.     

多重视角下公司治理水平对企业绩效的影响分析——来自房地产上市公司的证据

以2000—2012年房地产上市公司为样本,从微观视角分析股权结构、董事会治理、高管激励对企业绩效的影响,发现房地产上市公司治理对企业绩效的影响整体上显著;采用因子分析法构造公司治理综合排名指标G1和企业绩效综合排名指标JX,从宏观视角审视公司治理与企业绩效之间的关系,发现房地产上市公司治理综合排名提高会导致企业绩效显著上升。     

新时代背景下国企高管权力制衡的研究

国企自身的特征容易导致公司出现治理结构不完善、所有者缺位、委托代理等问题.不完善的公司治理结构使董事会、监事会、管理层及职工之间不能各司其职,委托代理问题中代理链条过长加剧了委托人和代理人之间信息不对称程度,为高管滥用权力为自己谋取利益提供了条件,国企所有者缺位使得虚拟的"所有者"对高管的监督缺乏动机,内部监督机制不健全也是导致国企高管权力失衡的原因之一.研究认为应该结合十九大提出的"坚持党对一切工作的领导"的精神,加强党组织和职代会在国企治理中的参与度,通过明晰产权主体和补全所有者缺位,建立动态的权力配置机制和实施相应激励措施缩短委托代理链条,建立有效的内部监督机制,以期合理有效配置高管的权力.     

环境不确定性、高管持股与创新投入

以2014—2018年A股上市公司为研究样本,通过多元回归分析实证检验环境不确定性与企业创新投入的关系及高管持股的调节作用.研究发现:环境不确定性与企业创新投入呈负相关关系,且高管持股会削弱二者关系.进一步研究表明,国有上市公司与非国有上市公司的环境不确定性与企业创新均呈负相关,高管持股在非国有企业会减弱二者的关系,在国有企业的调节作用不显著.     

不确定性环境下企业高管环境扫描行为研究综述

在梳理国内外大量相关文献的基础上,本文从环境扫描概念、环境分类及扫描焦点、感知环境不确定性及其与扫描行为之间的关系、环境扫描的两种主流模式等方面,对国内外学者的环境扫描成果进行了梳理和分析,指出现有研究的局限性以及国内外研究的不足之处,并对未来研究给出建议。