高管薪酬粘性的公司治理因素研究——基于我国制造业上市公司数据的实证研究

基于我国制造业上市公司2010-2011年的统计数据,实证研究公司治理变量对高管薪酬粘性的影响。结果表明,两职分离、薪酬委员会的设置、董事会独立性均对高管薪酬粘性影响不大,而第一大股东持股比例、董事会规模与高管薪酬粘性显著负相关,意味着股权集中度提高、大股东持股比例扩大、董事会规模扩张都有利于抑制公司高管薪酬的粘性。     

晋升激励、土地财政与经济增长的区域差异——基于面板数据联立方程的估计

在中国改革和发展过程中,政治晋升激励和土地资源扮演了举足轻重的角色,为社会经济发展做出了重要贡献。本文在对现有文献进行系统梳理的基础上,利用中国1999—2010年31个省市区的面板数据,构建面板联立方程模型检验了晋升激励和土地财政对经济增长的影响效应,研究结果表明:(1)晋升激励与土地财政存在显著的正向互动关系,而且晋升激励对土地财政的作用程度大于土地财政对晋升激励的作用;(2)晋升激励和土地财政对经济增长的影响显著为正,地方政府的晋升激励和土地财政是中国经济长期保持较快增速的重要原因;(3)晋升激励和土地财政对经济增长的影响呈现出一定的区域差异,对东部地区经济增长的影响小于中西部地区。     

跨区域经济合作中的地方政府博弈和制度创新分析——以粤桂经济合作区为例

随着区域之间竞争的加剧,跨区域经济合作逐渐成为一种主流的区域竞争模式,这一模式有利于合作方之间资源共享和联合竞争。粤桂经济合作区就是这一新模式的产物。然而,由于跨区域合作的特殊性,合作中的地方政府必然在政绩竞赛、利益选择和制度创新等方面产生博弈行为,既相互掣肘,又紧密联系。通过对跨区域经济合作中政府博弈的绩效分析、行为分析和制度创新分析可以清晰地了解其博弈动机,有效降低博弈成本,实现跨区域合作中博弈双方的共赢。     

Decentralisation,clientelism and social protection programmes: a study of India’s MGNREGA

Abstract

Does decentralisation promote clientelism? If yes, through which mechanisms? We answer these questions through an analysis of India’s (and the world’s) largest workfare programme, the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA), in two Indian states: Rajasthan and Andhra Pradesh (AP). The two states adopted radically different implementation models: Rajasthan’s decentralised one stands in contrast with Andhra Pradesh’s centralised and bureaucracy-led model. Using a mixed method approach, we find that in both states local implementers have incentives to distribute MGNREGA work in a clientelistic fashion. However, in Rajasthan, these incentives are stronger, because of the decentralised implementation model. Accordingly, our quantitative evidence shows that clientelism is more serious a problem in Rajasthan than in AP.     

Commitment to regulatory bureaucracy

A model is considered in which ‘regulatory bureaucracy’ is in the best interest of consumers as well as the regulated firm. Making it more costly for the regulator to discern the firm's true costs can help motivate the firm to act in the interest of consumers. But this is only true if the regulator cannot make binding precommitments concerning the use of his policy instruments. Endowed with the ability to precommit, prices below marginal cost, investment in excess of efficient levels, and the absence of regulatory bureaucracy will characterize the optimal regulatory policy.     

Corporate governance and incentives in German companies: Evidence from top executive turnover and firm performance

This paper examines executive turnover—both for management and supervisory boards—and its relation to firm performance in the largest companies in Germany in the 1980s. Turnover of the management board increases significantly with poor stock performance and particularly poor (i.e. negative) earnings, but is unrelated to sales growth and earnings growth. These turnover-performance relations do not vary with measures of stock ownership and bank voting power. Supervisory board appointments and turnover also increase with poor stock performance, but are unrelated to other measures of performance.     

对国土资源管理秩序的制度思考

由于矿权市场和土地市场体系的建设与完善是一个需要时日的历史过程 ,在此过程中 ,出现了一些不规范甚至混乱的现象。据此 ,本文提出在制度创新的层面上完善国土资源管理秩序 ,实现资源的高效率配置     

Influences of top management team incentives on firm risk taking

In our work, the influences on subsequent firm risk taking of fixed incentives relative to variable incentives as well as the separate effects on subsequent corporate risk taking of variable incentives are examined. Focusing on the top management team members, we find a higher proportion of incentives that are devoted to fixed incentives relative to variable incentives tend to be inversely associated with subsequent firm risk taking. Managerial stock options are directly and uniformly associated with subsequent corporate risk taking. Executive shareholdings, however, display a curvilinear relationship with subsequent enterprise risk taking. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Symbolic or substantive document? The influence of ethics codes on financial executives' decisions

With the recent spate of scandals resulting from the questionable behavior of corporate leaders, there have been calls for various governance mechanisms including ethics codes to guide executive decision‐making. However, the extent to which ethics codes are actually used by executives when making strategic choices as opposed to being merely symbolic is unknown. We develop our hypotheses by combining stakeholder management theory and the theory of planned behavior, and test them with a survey of 302 senior financial executives (e.g., CFOs, VPs of Finance). We find that financial executives are more likely to integrate their company's ethics code into their strategic decision processes if (a) they perceive pressure from market stakeholders to do so (suppliers, customers, shareholders, etc.); (b) they believe the use of ethics codes creates an internal ethical culture and promotes a positive external image for their firms; and (c) the code is integrated into daily activities through ethics code training programs. The effect of market stakeholder pressure is further enhanced when executives also believe that the code will promote a positive external image. Of particular note, we do not find that pressure from non‐market stakeholders (e.g., regulatory agencies, government bodies, court systems) has a unique impact on ethics code use. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Time-Limited Property Rights and Investment Incentives

Although it is axiomatic that property rights of infinite duration are necessary for owners to make efficient long term investments in their property, time limits on property rights are pervasive in the law. This paper provides an economic justification for such limits by arguing that they actually enhance property values in the presence of imperfect information. In so doing, the analysis offers a coherent approach for understanding what otherwise appear to be unrelated doctrines in the law.