How Common Are Intentional GAAP Violations? Estimates from a Dynamic Model

This paper uses data on detected misstatements—earnings restatements—and a dynamic model to estimate the extent of undetected misstatements that violate GAAP. The model features a CEO who can manipulate his firm's stock price by misstating earnings. I find the CEO's expected cost of misleading investors is low. The probability of detection over a five‐year horizon is 13.91%, and the average misstatement, if detected, results in an 8.53% loss in the CEO's retirement wealth. The low expected cost implies a high fraction of CEOs who misstate earnings at least once at 60%, with 2%–22% of CEOs starting to misstate earnings in each year 2003–2010, inflation in stock prices across CEOs who misstate earnings at 2.02%, and inflation in stock prices across all CEOs at 0.77%. Wealthier CEOs manipulate less, and the average misstatement is larger in smaller firms.     

员工股权激励与内部控制质量

利用2008—2016年A股上市公司数据，考察员工股权激励对内部控制质量的影响。研究发现，员工股权激励与内部控制质量显著正相关；整体来看，股权激励计划的实施有助于提升企业内部控制质量。员工股权激励对内部控制质量的提升作用同时体现在对内部控制要素和内部控制目标的影响上。具体而言，一方面员工股权激励能够促进控制环境、控制活动以及信息与沟通要素发挥作用，另一方面员工股权激励还有助于促进内部控制战略目标和经营目标的实现。进一步分析发现，员工股权激励对内部控制的促进作用在市场化水平更低、行业竞争程度更高的公司中更加显著。这说明，当企业面临的外部环境条件不利于企业实现股权激励计划设定的业绩目标时，激励对象可能会致力于改善公司的内部环境，通过促进内部控制质量的提升来为业绩目标的实现提供内部环境保障和内源动力。     

Wealth effects and committed cost allocation: An agency theory perspective

In this article we examine the effects of committed costs (CC) on compensation and effort (production) decisions in a principal-agent (P-A) setting. In the case where moral hazard is present, the compensation and effort (production) decisions are independent of CC whenever P has constant absolute risk aversion. When P has decreasing absolute risk aversion, he demands as increased risk premium, therefore increases the spread of the compensation schedule, and induces A to increase effort (production) and vice versa. The optimal compensation scheme can be decomposed to conform to incentive schemes that are generally observed in practice. In particular, we decompose the optimal compensation scheme that depends on CC into two parts—a part that is based on cash flows and a part that is based on income (after allocating committed costs). In the case where effort is observable, CC does not effect the compensation scheme and effort decisions, when P has constant absolute risk aversion. In contrast to earlier studies that examine the owner-manager case, when P has decreasing absolute risk aversion, effort (production) could either increase or decrease. The presence of moral hazard affects the effort (production) decision differently than when risk-sharing considerations alone exist. The reduction in A's compensation induced by increased CC never exceeds the amount of CC.     

The Limitations of Experimental Design: A Case Study Involving Monetary Incentive Effects in Laboratory Markets

We replicate an influential study of monetary incentive effects by Jamal and Sunder (1991) to illustrate the difficulties of drawing causal inferences from a treatment manipulation when other features of the experimental design vary simultaneously. We first show that the Jamal and Sunder (1991) conclusions hinge on one of their laboratory market sessions, conducted only within their fixed-pay condition, that is characterized by a thin market and asymmetric supply and demand curves. When we replicate this structure multiple times under both fixed pay and pay tied to performance, our findings do not support Jamal and Sunders (1991) conclusion about the incremental effects of performance-based compensation, suggesting that other features varied in that study likely account for their observed difference. Our ceteris paribus replication leaves us unable to offer any generalized conclusions about the effects of monetary incentives in other market structures, but the broader point is to illustrate that experimental designs that attempt to generalize effects by varying multiple features simultaneously can jeopardize the ability to draw causal inferences about the primary treatment manipulation.     

Alternative standards and instruments for air pollution control in Poland

Like other Central European countries, Poland faces the twin challenges of improving environmental quality while also fostering sustainable economic development. In this study we examine the costs of different standards for air pollution control, and the cost savings from using incentive-based policy instruments in lieu of more rigid command-and-control policies. The comparisons are based on the results of a simulation model of energy use and air pollution control for the Polish economy over 1990–2015. The model simulates least-cost energy supply decisions under different environmental policy assumptions, the corresponding emissions, and the cost of achieving the specified policy objectives. The model results suggest that incentive-based policies will have efficiency gains over command policies that are at least worthy of consideration and may be quite substantial. The size of the gains in practice depends in part on how much flexibility is built into the command approach, e.g., capacity for intrafirm trading as well as alack of technology-specific requirements. To achieve these gains, an increase in the current levels of emissions fees is desirable both to strengthen abatement incentives and to improve the capacity of the Polish government to overcome past environmental damages. However, it seems highly unlikely in practice that fees could be raised to the levels necessary to meet current Polish emissions standards. To make further headway, an evolutionary approach to emissions trading patterned after (and profiting from the experience with) emissions trading in the U.S. seems useful. The program could start out relatively modestly and increase in ambitiousness as the Polish economic transition proceeds.     

Housing,prices and tax policy in Spain

This paper analyses the consequences of different tax policies upon the evolution of housing prices and residential capital stock (in the form of home ownership) in Spain. The framework is a computational aggregate model of housing as an asset. Policies under consideration are the removal of housing subsidies implicit in the personal income tax and the introduction of investment incentives in housing (i.e., policies addressed specifically to newly-produced housing). Both long-run effects and dynamic trajectories are discussed herein. With regards to the latter, distinction is made between those situations in which economic agents have rational expectations (i.e., perfect foresight) and static expectations.JEL Classification: H22, H24, R21The author is indebted to Jorge Onrubia, Jose Felix Sanz, Juan Jose Rubio and an anonymous referee for their helpful comments on an earlier version. I am deeply indebted to Lluis Alseda, for his efficiency and patience in the design of the algorithm for solving systems of differential equations used to undertake the simulations to be presented below. This work would not have been possible without the encouragement of Luis Gonzalez Calbet. Last but not least, I would like to thank James Poterba, who showed an uncommon intellectual generosity in instantly replying in the most impeccable way to the provisional notes sent to him by the author on the introduction of land prices in aggregate housing models. Needless to say, the usual disclaimer applies. This work originated from a larger project funded by the Instituto de Estudios Fiscales (Ministry of Finance, Spain). Institutional support from the Spanish Science and Technology System (Project No. BEC2000-0415) and the Catalan Government Science Netwotk (Project No. SGR2001-160) is also gratefully acknowledged.     

Delegation in Oligopoly: Managerial Schemes and Loan Commitments

This paper examines an industry in which firms must arrange financing for the production levels they plan to undertake in equilibrium. Financing can rely on the spot, or it can be obtained from options in the form of loan commitments. In that context, we analyze whether the owners of the firms centralize financing and output decisions or delegate these decisions to managers. We show a multiplicity of equilibria from a number of organizational modes under delegation. An organizational form where the owner decides on short-term financing but delegates production with a long-term managerial scheme is not an equilibrium organizational form. Received November 26, 2001; revised version received June 10, 2002 Published online: February 17, 2003 We thank María-Paz Espinosa and two referees for their helpful comments. We also acknowledge financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Education under projects SEC99-0820 (CICYT) and SEC2002-00266. The usual disclaimer applies.     

When and why? A critical survey on coordination failure in the laboratory

Coordination games with Pareto-ranked equilibria have attracted major attention over the past two decades. Two early path-breaking sets of experimental studies were widely interpreted as suggesting that coordination failure is a common phenomenon in the laboratory. We identify the major determinants that seem to affect the incidence, and/or emergence, of coordination failure in the lab and review critically the existing experimental studies on coordination games with Pareto-ranked equilibria since that early evidence emerged. We conclude that there are many ways to engineer coordination successes.      

产权激励与企业绩效关系的实证研究

本文通过对产权激励与企业绩效关系的实证研究发现,自然人控股的上市公司由于受产权激励的影响,其经营效率与经济效益均优于其他同类公司;在同为自然人控股的上市公司内,企业家控制(特指资本家与企业家合二为一)的企业因"剩余索取权"与"剩余控制权"相对应,更有助于发挥企业家人力资本的作用及企业价值的提升。     

民俗旅游开发中经济激励研究

民俗旅游能给民俗地区带来经济收入，这实际上就是一种经济激励。这种经济激励的质量影响着民俗地区居民对开发民俗旅游的态度。分析了经济激励的作用、缺陷，并提出了改进经济激励的建议，以期更好地发挥经济激励在民俗旅游开发中的作用。