Evaluating the effects of equity incentives using PSM: Evidence from China

This paper investigates the effects of equity incentives on firm performance in Chinese listed firms. We address the sample selection problem by employing the propensity score matching methodology. Results show that, (1) On the whole, performance is positively related to equity incentives even after controlling for sample selection bias; (2) The final control rights have an important impact on the effects of equity incentives. The execution of equity incentives in privately owned firms can significantly decrease the agency costs between shareholders and managers, but such effects cannot be observed in state-owned firms; (3) Effects of equity incentives depend on the incentive type, that is, comparing to stock-based incentives, option-based incentives can reduce the agency costs significantly, thus are more effective; (4) Ownership structure also has important impacts on the effects of equity incentives. The agency costs decrease in firms with more decentralized ownership after introducing equity incentive, while in concentrated firms the effect is negligible.     

Can the ECB be Truly Independent? Should It Be?

Most of the literature on the independence of the Central Bank assumes only one policy instrument is available: monetary policy. If we introduce fiscal policy as well, when preferences may differ among policy-makers, the situation is radically different. In this case fiscal policy will substantially weaken the impact of the Central Bank's actions, and may annihilate them altogether. The Stability Pact may then be a liability, instead of an asset, because it renders both policies impotent (even if credible). We examine whether there is any incentive to retain monetary policy independence; and whether accountability can and should be used to ensure fiscal and monetary policies support each other, rather than undermine each other.     

Real options and real value: the role of employee incentives to make specific knowledge investments

Real options reasoning emphasizes the strategic value of making flexible investments in a turbulent environment. Employees' investments in specific human capital are often critical to the success of a real option project, but the very flexibility that allows a firm to change course in response to new information also affects employees' incentives to make such specific human capital investments. We develop a model of real option investment that explicitly incorporates the role of employee incentives. The model suggests that the effect of investing in a real option project on employee incentives may be positive, further increasing the value of the project, or negative, sometimes more than offsetting the benefit of flexibility and resulting in reduced project value. Therefore, firms and managers should take into consideration the role of employee incentives when applying real options logic to investment decision making. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Complaint management and the role of the chief executive

The aim of this paper is to encourage a new stream of research into complaints and the role of the chief executive officer (CEO). The objectives of this paper were firstly to assess the intensity of dissatisfaction driving customers to complain directly to the CEO and secondly to ascertain if the reasons for complaining to the CEO were different to those of complainants using ‘normal’ channels. A leading financial services company in the UK provided access to its complaint letters and its CEO. Based on analysis of a sample of 100 letters sent to the CEO and 100 standard complaint letters, it was found that customers complaining directly to the CEO have a significantly greater intensity of dissatisfaction. However, unexpectedly, despite the greater positional power of the CEO, the reasons for complaining to the CEO were little different to the reasons for using the ‘normal’ channels. Interestingly most of the complainants to the CEO had multiple reasons for complaint suggesting that complaints to the CEO are motivated by multiple underlying service failures.     

R&D Returns,Spillovers and Firm Incentives: Evidence from China

Using a new data set of 12,000 firms in China, this paper estimates the returns to R&D investment and its spillover effects, and investigates how the returns to R&D depend on firm incentives. For the firms in the sample, the results show that on average firm output increases around 0.4 yuan for each additional 1 yuan spent on R&D in the previous year, and there is high R&D return regardless of whether the endogeneity of R&D intensity is dealt with or not. Interestingly, the marginal return to R&D is significantly higher in firms whose CEOs were not appointed by the government, and lower when CEO pay is directly related to annual performance. The return to R&D is higher in relatively poor regions and for firms with worse access to finance. There are also non-trivial R&D spillover effects.     

高管激励、环境规制与技术创新

以2007－2014年沪深A股上市的重污染行业的公司为研究对象,构建交互效应模型,实证检验了环境规制对技术创新的影响,以及高管激励与环境规制交互效应对技术创新的影响。研究结果发现环境规制对技术创新有显著的促进作用,但是这种促进作用在国有企业以及非东部地区企业中并不明显,表明波特假说的成立有一定的条件。其次,高管短期薪酬与环境规制的交互作用、高管持股比例与环境规制的交互作用对技术创新均存在正向作用。而高管在职消费仅在东部地区企业中增强波特假说的有效性。     

媒体监督是否能抑制高管薪酬过快增长?--基于PSM的再检验

媒体监督是否能发挥治理作用,受自身报道偏好和报道强度的影响。为检验媒体治理的有效性,本文以倾向性匹配得分法控制内生性的干扰,并将报道强度异质性纳入考察范围,研究发现：只有多年持续报道能显著抑制薪酬的过快增长,媒体总体关注和集中报道则未发挥治理作用;按最终控制人性质分组检验后发现,不管是对民营企业,央企还是地方国企,总体关注和集中报道均未发挥治理作用,而持续报道的治理作用只在国有企业中显著,且对央企的作用强于地方国企。表明媒体能在一定程度上发挥薪酬治理的作用,其作用方式依赖于政府介入以及持续报道形成的舆论压力,为深入研究媒体薪酬治理的作用机制和效果提供了经验证据。     

晋升激励、金融市场化与担保圈现象

近年来,担保圈现象成为影响公司稳健运行和区域经济发展的一大问题,本文研究了担保圈问题的形成机理。结果发现,晋升激励越大、金融市场化水平越低,企业加入担保圈的可能性越大。控股股东的侵占风险越高,晋升激励和金融市场化水平影响担保圈形成的作用更强。晋升激励主要影响国企加入担保圈的行为,而金融市场化水平主要影响非国有企业加入担保圈的行为。本文揭示了担保圈的形成机理,对于新常态下通过深化改革、完善治理提升信贷资源配置效率具有一定的启示。     

Environmental tax incentives and corporate environmental behaviour: An unintended consequence from a natural experiment in China

Using the implementation of the Environmental Protection Tax (EPT) Law in China as a natural experiment, we explore the impact of environmental tax incentives on corporate environmental engagement. Evidence shows that, after the implementation of the EPT Law, there exists a significant improvement in the environmental performance of firms located in regions with increased EPT rates. However, our results reveal an unintended consequence that this effect is more salient for nonheavy-polluting companies rather than for heavy polluters that are more targeted by the EPT Law.     

Microfinance Beyond Group Lending

Microlending is growing in Eastern Europe, Russia and China as a flexible means of widening access to financial services, both to help alleviate poverty and to encourage private-sector activity. We describe mechanisms that allow these programmes to successfully penetrate new segments of credit markets. These features include direct monitoring, regular repayment schedules, and the use of non-refinancing threats. These mechanisms allow the programmes to generate high repayment rates from low-income borrowers without requiring collateral and without using group lending contracts that feature joint liability.