Economics of compatibility standards and competition in telecommunication networks

The pro- and anti-competitive implications of technical compatibility standards are introduced in general terms and then applied to current issues in telecommunications policy. The demand and supply for standards under regulated monopoly and the transition to deregulation and competitive entry create a tradeoff between the traditional goal of achieving positive externalities from interconnection and the alternative goal of providing enhanced service offerings that may involve sacrificing universal connectivity. We argue that this tradeoff has affected the utilization of data communication networks in the U.S. and Europe. In addition, we identify problems of competing interests that complicate the European approach to standards “harmonization” in the case of telecommunications. We conclude by noting that the nature of standards and standard-setting process can have marked effects on the incentives to conduct private research and development.     

Information design,externalities, and government interventions

We consider a model of Bayesian persuasion with spillovers. A sender provides information to persuade a receiver to take an action with external effects. We consider how government interventions, including corrective subsidy and tax, affect social welfare. In addition to internalizing externalities, government interventions affect social welfare through an informational channel. Subsidies to the sender's preferred action incentivize the sender to reveal less information, but taxes on the sender's preferred action incentivize the sender to reveal more information. Because of such an informational effect, the optimal subsidy and tax may be different from the size of the externalities. In some cases, social welfare is maximized with no government intervention.     

Biased managers with network externalities

In network industry under Cournot and Bertrand competition, we examine a model when owners of firms hire biased managers who have incorrect market demand. Contrast to previous studies, we show that (i) regardless of the strength of network externalities when consumers form the responsive and passive expectations, owners realize strategic advantage by hiring biased managers to be more aggressive under Cournot and Bertrand competition, (ii) firms prefer facing passive expectations for the weak network externalities and vice versa for the strong network exteranlities under Bertrand and Cournot competition, (iii) if the network size is sufficiently large, then the prisoner's dilemma that firms hire aggressive managers no longer exists under both competition modes. As with no delegation case, we obtain the different rankings of firms' profit depending on both network externalities and forming of expectations under Cournot and Bertrand competition.     

A spatial theory of urban segregation

We provide a competitive equilibrium theory of urban segregation in a linear city. Households demand consumption and housing along the city and are exposed to neighborhood externalities. We show that equilibria that are robust to small coalitional deviations are segregated. Our results explain urban segregation in a standard neoclassical framework and shed new light on the difficulties faced by authorities to integrate cities.     

Sickness absence and health care in an economic federation

This paper addresses vertical fiscal externalities in a model where the state governments provide health care and the federal government provides a sickness benefit. Both levels of government tax labor income and policy decisions affect labor income as well as participation in the labor market. The results show that the vertical externality affecting the state governments’ policy decisions can be either positive or negative depending on, among other things, the wage elasticity of labor supply and the marginal product of expenditure on health care. Moreover, it is proved that the vertical fiscal externality will not vanish by assigning all powers of taxation to the states.      

国外计划报废理论研究综述

国外学者对计划报废理论早已开展了许多富有成效的研究;然而,在国内至今罕有相关方面的文献研究。因此,开展相关研究具有非常重要的理论和现实意义。首先,以iPod为例,引出了计划报废的概念和模型。然后分别从网络外部性与兼容性决策、耐用性决策、新产品引进、技术进步和研发决策等五个方面,对有关研究进行了综述。     

我国食品安全问题的管制经济学分析

管制经济学是经济学的一个重要分支,是解决市场失灵的有效手段之一。近年来,由食品安全问题引发的各种恶性案件不断发生,令人触目惊心。这是经济市场失灵在食品安全方面的具体表现。本文立足于政府管制理论,运用经济学的分析方法解释食品安全的外部性和信息不对称问题,重申市场自身调节的局限性,并由此得出政府进行适当管制的必要性,最后提出相应的政策建议。     

Recurrent crises in global games

Global games have unique equilibria in which aggregate behavior changes sharply when an underlying random fundamental crosses some threshold. This property relies on the existence of dominance regions: all players have a highest and lowest action that, for some fundamentals, is strictly dominant. But if the fundamental follows a random walk, it eventually spends nearly all of its time in these regions: crises gradually disappear. We obtain recurring crises by adding a single large player who lacks dominance regions. We also show that in order to obtain recurring crises, one must either relax dominance regions or restrict to fundamentals that continually return to or cross over a fixed region.     

宏观审慎监管的基础：政策角度

2013年8月,世界银行经济学家奥古斯托·德拉·托尔（Augusto de la Torre）和阿兰·伊兹（Alain Ize）共同发表《宏观审慎监管的基础》（《The Foundations of Macroprudential Regulation》）。文章从政策的角度出发,研究把政府干预与市场失灵系统性联系起来的金融摩擦,并对宏观审慎监管的基础进行了详细分析。     

A Note on Green Taxes and Double Dividends

Two highly influential articlesin the literature on green taxes and double dividends are Bovenbergand de Mooij (1994) and Goulder (1995). Goulder's primary concernis whether or not green tax reforms may increase welfare definedexclusive of environmental quality, while Bovenberg and de Mooijprimarily focus on the employment effects of such reforms. Unfortunately,Goulder misinterprets Bovenberg and de Mooij's results in takingthe sign of the uncompensated wage elasticity of labour supplyas being the decisive factor for whether or not welfare exclusiveof environmental quality rises under a green tax reform. Thiserror is pointed out and corrected in this note.