Incentive Contract and Weather Risk

We study contracts designed to remunerate a farmer for the production of an ecosystem service with the payment dependent on the results of the farmer’s actions and on weather conditions. Two contracts are proposed: the first takes into account both the results of the farmer’s actions and a weather variable that reflects the actual atmospheric conditions during the life of the contract; the second bases the payment on the results alone incorporating only the average effect of weather. Social welfare is optimal when both the results and the specific atmospheric conditions are taken into account; however, this type of contract may be less acceptable to the farmer due to his perception of the level of risk involved.We thank two referees for valuable comments.     

Competition and Regulation in Franchise Bidding

In this work we show that the separation property identified in the franchise bidding literature depends strictly on the hypothesis of coincidence of the regulator's beliefs with those of the competing firms. Nevertheless, in many contexts it is more truthful to hypothesize that the regulator's information is vaguer than that of the producers, so we introduce the possibility that the regulator is dealing with a double informational asymmetry as compared to the firms. In this case, the separation property is no longer valid, and the optimal tariff becomes a decreasing function of the degree of competition exercised during the auction.     

Efficiency wages and union-firm bargaining with private information

We consider efficiency wage effects in a union-firm bargaining model with private information. We show that an increase in the efficiency wage effects does not necessarily increase the wage level at equilibrium, even when the wage bargaining with private information is close to one with complete information. However, if it is commonly known that the firm is stronger than the union and the demand is sufficiently elastic, then an increase in the efficiency wage effects increases for sure the wage at equilibrium.JEL Classification: J41, J50, J52We thank Juan Dolado and two anonymous referees for valuable comments. Vincent Vannetelbosch is Chercheur Qualifié at the Fonds National de la Recherche Scientifique. The research of Ana Mauleon has been made possible by a fellowship of the Fonds Européen du Développement Economique Régional (FEDER). Financial support from the Belgian French Communitys program Action de Recherches Concertée 99/04-235 (IRES, Université catholique de Louvain) is gratefully acknowledged.     

公司治理结构·会计信息系统·独立审计:结构与效率分析

公司治理结构、会计信息系统和独立审计是微观经济运行系统的三个基本组成单元。三者以委托代理关系为中心形成了功能互补、共生互动的经济运行系统 ,共同维持着受托责任机制运行中的公平与效率。通过对三者的经济关系结构进行理论描述 ,分析其内在关系结构的缺陷以及与虚假会计信息之间的关联性 ,并在此基础上提出共同预防虚假会计信息的治理措施     

湖南信息化带动工业化机制研究

人类社会已入入21世纪，对处于工业化中期初级阶段的湖南而言，继续完成工业化无疑是现代化过程中艰巨的历史任务，与此同时，大力国民经济和社会信息化，也是覆盖湖南现代化建设全民的战略措施，为此，正确处理工业化与信息化的关系，以信息化带动工业化，是关系湖南现代化建设的一个极为重要的问题，本文首先分析了湖南信息化和工业化的现状，然后对80年代中期以来的湖南信息化水平和工业化水平进行相关分析，在此基础上对他们相互影响的机制进行分析，最后就湖南今后实际信息化带动工业化提出具体措施。     

中英电信"双寡头垄断"模式比较研究

中国电信南北分拆以后,将在固定电话和移动电话两个业务领域形成新一轮"双寡头垄断"竞争格局.英国是率先实行"双寡头垄断"作为过度,最终走向电信全面开放竞争的典范.中国电信业在1994～1999年第一阶段改革中,曾试图仿效"英国模式",构建中国电信和中国联通的"双寡头垄断",最终以失败告终.在中国即将形成新一轮"双寡头垄断"竞争格局之时,我们有必要通过对英国电信改革的理论背景、具体实施过程、取得的成就的回顾,探求英国"双寡头垄断"成功的奥秘,并为中国新一轮电信重组所借鉴,提升中国的电信业国际竞争力,更好地应对WTO的挑战.     

生态系统服务测度下市域生态空间管控体系构建

生态空间承载着人类、动植物和自然生态多种过程，是生态系统服务功能的策源地和枢纽区。以实施生态空间管控为导引，借助多源数据和ArcGIS、C-Plan系统工具，核心应用系统保护规划(SCP)技术，建立生态服务测度下市域生态空间管控体系的构建方法。基于此，以哈尔滨为例，以不可替代性为表征实现生态空间测度指标综合与功效评价，构建生态空间关键区识别、功能区优划以及网络格局优化模型，提出“重点保护-分区指引-格局优化”的市域生态空间管控体系，为新型城镇化及绿色发展战略的实施奠定科学基础和提供技术支撑。     

Joint implementation under asymmetric information and strategic behavior

Joint Implementation (JI) under the Framework Convention on Climate Change means that countries could partly offset their national abatement commitments by investing in CO₂ abatement projects abroad. JI is introduced as a mechanism for achieving a certain global abatement target less costly by separating the commitments from the implementation of measures. This paper studies the design of a JI contract when the investor has incomplete information about the foreign firm which carries out the JI project (the host). Asymmetric information leads to a decrease in the potential cost savings from JI. Furthermore, private information held by the potential host firm could give the firm a significant positive utility of participating in JI projects. The possibility of being a host for a JI project in the future can prevent potential host firms from investing in profitable abatement projects today. The paper analyzes the impact on emissions of CO₂ of strategic behavior among potential hosts for JI projects.     

Regulating an externality-generating public utility: A multi-dimensional screening approach

In this paper, I present a monopoly screening model in which a firm holds private information on fixed abatement costs. Because of the nature of the optimal contracts, bunching is never optimal even with ‘n’ distinct types. A characterization of full and limited information solutions is offered and it is shown that the design standards alone determine the value of an information rent. The variable charge is completely free of any marginal information costs. This allows the variable charge to track marginal damages and thereby ensures that marginal social costs are covered. A fixed charge implements the optimal solution.     

Researching Preferences,Valuation and Hypothetical Bias

A number of recent papers in environmental economics have focused on the process of researching preferences – agents are uncertain about preferences but with effort may narrow their uncertainty. This issue has arisen in formulating bids in contingent valuation (CV) as well as the debate over the divergence between WTP and WTA. In the context of CV, it has been suggested that the hypothetical nature of the preference elicitation process biases responses. This paper provides both a theoretical model and experimental evidence to contribute to this debate. The model is a model of competitive bidding for a private good with two components that are particularly relevant to the debate. The first component is that bidders are unsure of their own value for the private good but may purchase information about their own value (researching preferences). The second component is that there is a probability that the auction is hypothetical – that the winning bidder will not get the private good and will not pay the winning bid. The experiment tests this theoretical model of bidding equilibrium and analyzes the effects of variations in the parameters (hypotheticalness, information costs and number of agents) on the endogenous variables (such as the proportion of bidders who become informed and the winning bid). Experimental results suggest that an increase in the hypotheticalness of an auction tends to decrease the likelihood that bidders pay for information on their valuation with an ambiguous effect on the winning bid.