不对称信息理论与会计信息披露问题研究

会计信息披露是资本市场实现资源有效配置的基础,也是会计工作的基本目标之一。本文通过不对称信息理论深入分析了目前我国会计信息披露中产生的各种问题,并找出其中的内在动因,为规范我国会计信息披露制度进行了深入的思考和分析。本文的结构分为三个部分,首先简单介绍一下不对称信息理论及其基本理论,其次分析目前我国证券市场上会计信息披露存在的各种问题,最后利用不对称信息理论针对这些问题进行深入的分析研究,并得出相应的结论。     

第三方物流服务的顾客满意度研究

首先分析了第三方物流服务顾客满意度的特性，接着对第三方物流服务顾客满意度的指标体系的建立和测评做了描述，并分析了顾客满意度指标的分析方法和改进措施。     

公众期望与会计信息真实性的关联分析

公众对会计的期望与对会计行为的认识之间存在期望差距,基于不同期望水平对会计信息失真现象所作的分类揭示了会计信息真实性的内涵。通过公众期望与会计信息真实性的关联分析可以发现,加强公众与会计界的沟通理解以及强化会计信息失真的治理,是解决会计信息真实性问题的有效途径。     

物流信息系统对物流现代化影响的探讨

阐述了现代物流与传统物流的区别,分析服务和信息技术对现代物流的作用,研究提高物流信息系统性能的途径,提出了物流技术新概念。     

中国服务贸易竞争力的国际比较研究

服务贸易是当前国际贸易中发展最为迅速的领域,已成为我国经济新的增长点.通过服务贸易的国际横向比较,服务贸易TC指数大部分长期为负值,且各行业之间TC指数差异大,我国服务贸易竞争力水平远远落后于发达国家.从制约因素分析来看,提升我国服务贸易的国际竞争力,必须重视服务贸易营销,寻求国内市场支持,建立服务贸易扶持政策.     

Does seeing more deeply into a game increase one’s chances of winning?

The substantively rational value of the games studied in this paper does not help predict subject performance in the experiment at all. An accurate model must account for the cognitive ability of the people playing the game. This paper investigates whether the variation in measured rationality bounds is correlated with the probability of winning when playing against another person in games that exceed both players’ estimated rationality bound. Does seeing deeper into a game matter when neither player can see to the end of the game? Subjects with higher measured bounds win 63 percent of the time and the larger the difference the more frequently they win.     

Jointness in production and farmers' willingness to supply non-marketed ecosystem services

This paper highlights how farmers' willingness to supply non-marketed ecosystem services (ES) is influenced by whether or not the non-marketed ES are produced jointly with agricultural products. When marketed products and non-marketed ES share some production inputs the production relationships between the two may be complementary, competitive or substitutive. Using a cost minimization framework, it is shown how complementary relationships lead to costless voluntary provision of non-marketed ES (typically the case for ES that are supportive of provisioning ES for marketed farm products). It is also shown how competitive production relationships lead to provision of non-marketed ES at lower cost than when non-marketed ES are direct substitutes for farm products or are produced outside of agriculture. The paper closes by showing how the minimum willingness to accept (WTA) payment for ES that are complementary/competitive is less than or equal to the minimum WTA for the same ES produced in substitute or independent production relationships.     

信息约束下的金融监管与银行声誉

如何在信息不对称的约束条件下降低金融风险、提高监管绩效,是金融监管中的一项重要课题.本文分析了信息结构对于监管的重要性,认为声誉机制的建立可以降低银行与监管部门之间信息不对称的程度和风险发生的概率,并运用KMFW模型,分析了不对称信息下银行声誉机制减少违规动机的过程,指出应该注重激励相容的制度安排,将外部监管与自律有机结合起来,促使银行自发选择接受监管且减少进行高风险投资的动机,这是信息不对称条件下提高监管效率的重要策略.结合我国实情,本文提出可通过银行风险评级、建立可置信的惩罚机制、完善银行内部治理机构、改进监管人员激励约束机制、构建和完善金融监管信息系统等措施,建立健全银行声誉机制,以进一步改善监管绩效.     

EDGAR on the internet: The welfare effects of wider information distribution in an experimental market for risky assets

Policies such as the SEC’s Fair Disclosure Rule, and technologies such as SEC EDGAR, aim to disseminate corporate disclosures to a wider audience of investors in risky assets. In this study, we adopt an experimental approach to measure whether this wider disclosure is beneficial to these investors. Price-clearing equilibrium models based on utility maximization and non-revealing and fully-revealing prices predict that in a pure exchange economy, an arbitrary trader would prefer that no investors are informed rather than all are informed; non-revealing theory further predicts that an arbitrary trader would prefer a situation in which all traders are informed rather than half the traders are informed. These predictions can be summarized as “None > All > Half”. A laboratory study was conducted to test these predictions. Where previous studies have largely focused on information dissemination and its effects on equilibrium price and insider profits, we focus instead on traders’ expected utility, as measured by their preferences for markets in which none, half, or all traders are informed. Our experimental result contradicts the prediction and indicates “Half > None > All”, i.e. subjects favor a situation where a random half is informed. The implication is that in addition to testing predictions of price equilibrium, experiments should also be used to verify analytical welfare predictions of expected utility under different policy choices. JEL Classification D82, D53, G14, L86 This work was largely completed while this author was at The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology.     

Timing of Public Information and Cost Reduction

Received July 31, 2000; revised version received July 18, 2001