中小企业会计信息失真原因及对策

随着社会的发展,会计信息对投资者、企业,甚至是整个国家经济都有着举足轻重的影响。但由于多种原因,当前我国中小企业会计信息失真现象普遍存在,严重影响了中小企业经营决策的制定和我国经济发展。为此,在对中小企业会计信息现状和会计信息失真主要表现及原因分析的基础上,提出了针对该现状的治理对策。     

How does news sentiment affect the states of Japanese stock return volatility?

This paper examines the impact of public news sentiment on the volatility states of firm-level returns on the Japanese Stock market. We firstly adopt a novel Markov Regime Switching Long Memory GARCH (MRS-LMGARCH), which is employed to estimate the latent volatility states of intraday stock return. By using the RavenPack Dow Jones News Analytics database, we fit discrete choice models to investigate the impact of news sentiment on changes of volatility states of the constituent stocks in the TOPIX Core 30 Index. Our findings suggest that news occurrence and sentiment, especially those of macro-economic news, are a key factor that significantly drives the volatility state of Japanese stock returns. This provides essential information for traders of the Japanese stock market to optimize their trading strategies and risk management plans to combat volatility.     

Carrot and stick: A role for benchmark-adjusted compensation in active fund management

Investors delegating their wealth to privately informed managers face not only an intrinsic asymmetric information problem but also a potential misalignment in risk preferences. In this setting, we show that by tying fees symmetrically to the appropriate benchmark investors can tilt a fund portfolio toward their optimal risk exposure and realize nearly all the value of managers’ information. They attain these benefits despite an inherent inefficiency in the choice of the benchmark, and at no extra cost of compensating managers for exposure to relative-performance risk. Under certain conditions, benchmark-adjusted performance fees are necessary to prevent passive alternatives from dominating active management. Our results shed light on a recent debate on the appropriate fee structure of active funds in contexts of high competition from passive funds.     

Pricing, learning, and strategic behavior in a single-sale model

Summary. We analyze an infinite horizon model where a seller who owns an indivisible unit of a good for sale has incomplete information about the state of the world that determines not only the demand she faces but also her own valuation for the good. Over time, she randomly meets potential buyers who may have incentives to manipulate her learning process strategically. We show that i) the seller's incentives to post a high price and to experiment are not necessarily monotonic in the information conveyed by a buyer's rejection; and ii) as the discount factors tend to one, there are equilibria where the seller always ends up selling the good at an ex-post individually rational price. Received: January 6, 1999; revised version: July 15, 2000     

Herd Behaviour in Adoption of Network Technologies

In technology adoption, herd behaviour can lead to a suboptimal outcome as shown, among others, by Choi (1997). However, empirics find little support for the idea that a less efficient technology can conquer the market and lock out a more efficient one. Accordingly, we improve and generalize Choi's results, by introducing an additional source of uncertainty: the economic environment. We investigate how the economic environment can affect herding and consequently the efficiency of the technology choice. The result is a smaller adoption bias. In the limit, firms may optimally experiment with the new technology that turns out to be social welfare improving.     

Subjective recursive expected utility

We axiomatize a subjective version of the recursive expected utility model. This development extends the seminal results of Kreps and Porteus (Econometrica 46:185–200 (1978)) to a subjective framework and provides foundations that are easy to relate to axioms familiar from timeless models of decision making under uncertainty. Our analysis also clarifies what is needed in going from a represention that applies within a single filtration to an across filtration representation.Part of this research was conducted when Ozdenoren visited MEDS in Fall 2003. We thank Tapas Kundu, Costis Skiadas, Jean-Marc Tallon and Tan Wang for helpful discussions and also thank audiences at Koc University, Northwestern University, the CERMSEM conference “ Mathematical Models in Decision Theory” at Universite Paris I, and the FUR XI conference on foundations and applications of utility, risk and decision theory     

Conditions for Asymmetric Information Solutions when Alliances Provide Acquisition Options and Due Diligence

One main problem with both acquisitions and alliances is separating the attractive partners from the rest. An additional problem with alliances is getting each partner to provide its best assets and efforts. One solution offered for the acquisition adverse selection problem is due diligence through a pre-acquisition alliance; however, none of the papers recommending such an approach analyze the alliance adverse selection and moral hazard problems. This paper presents the first formal model of joint venturing as acquisition due diligence, detailing how the joint solution works and under what conditions.revised version received October 20, 2003     

Competition and Regulation in Franchise Bidding

In this work we show that the separation property identified in the franchise bidding literature depends strictly on the hypothesis of coincidence of the regulator's beliefs with those of the competing firms. Nevertheless, in many contexts it is more truthful to hypothesize that the regulator's information is vaguer than that of the producers, so we introduce the possibility that the regulator is dealing with a double informational asymmetry as compared to the firms. In this case, the separation property is no longer valid, and the optimal tariff becomes a decreasing function of the degree of competition exercised during the auction.     

Efficiency wages and union-firm bargaining with private information

We consider efficiency wage effects in a union-firm bargaining model with private information. We show that an increase in the efficiency wage effects does not necessarily increase the wage level at equilibrium, even when the wage bargaining with private information is close to one with complete information. However, if it is commonly known that the firm is stronger than the union and the demand is sufficiently elastic, then an increase in the efficiency wage effects increases for sure the wage at equilibrium.JEL Classification: J41, J50, J52We thank Juan Dolado and two anonymous referees for valuable comments. Vincent Vannetelbosch is Chercheur Qualifié at the Fonds National de la Recherche Scientifique. The research of Ana Mauleon has been made possible by a fellowship of the Fonds Européen du Développement Economique Régional (FEDER). Financial support from the Belgian French Communitys program Action de Recherches Concertée 99/04-235 (IRES, Université catholique de Louvain) is gratefully acknowledged.     

公司治理结构·会计信息系统·独立审计:结构与效率分析

公司治理结构、会计信息系统和独立审计是微观经济运行系统的三个基本组成单元。三者以委托代理关系为中心形成了功能互补、共生互动的经济运行系统 ,共同维持着受托责任机制运行中的公平与效率。通过对三者的经济关系结构进行理论描述 ,分析其内在关系结构的缺陷以及与虚假会计信息之间的关联性 ,并在此基础上提出共同预防虚假会计信息的治理措施