推行精细化管理 提高内部审计效能

全面推行工程项目精细化管理,对于建筑施工企业的发展具有重大的意义,随着精细化管理逐步展开,对内部审计工作也提出了更为严格的要求。     

市政工程造价预结算审核要点与解决对策

在市政工程造价管理和质量控制过程中,相关单位必须重视预结算审核工作,即严格按照我国相关法律法规和相关要求,对预结算加以全面核算,及时发现预结算中存在的问题,且严格监控整个市政工程的建设过程,对市政工程进行科学合理的目标管理,从而有效保证市政工程建设的正常开展。本文主要阐述市政工程造价预结算审核要点,并结合存在的问题提出切实可行的解决对策。     

Balance sheet conservatism and audit reporting conservatism

Financial reports are prepared on a going‐concern (GC) basis rather than a liquidation basis even when companies are highly distressed. This allows distressed companies to report book values of assets that greatly exceed their liquidation values, implying a lack of conservatism in the balance sheet. We argue that auditors issue going‐concern opinions in order to warn investors about this lack of balance sheet conservatism. This argument leads to two testable hypotheses. First, for companies that are at risk of bankruptcy, auditors are more likely to issue GC opinions when the book values of assets under the GC assumption are high relative to the expected liquidation values of assets (i.e., when the GC assumption causes the balance sheet to lack conservatism). Second, for companies that enter bankruptcy, the issuance of a prior GC opinion has predictive information content with respect to the wedge between the book values of assets and the future liquidation values of those same assets. Our results strongly support both hypotheses. The findings are important because they indicate that conservative audit reporting helps to compensate for a lack of conservatism in the balance sheet, which arises because the GC assumption permits the book values of assets to exceed their liquidation values.     

The Unintended Consequences of the Frequency of PCAOB Inspection

After more than 50 years of self‐regulation of the US auditing profession, the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) created the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) as a quasi‐governmental entity with statutory authority to inspect accounting firms that audit public clients. The frequency of this inspection is annual or triennial, based upon the number of public clients the firm audits. We examine the effects of these two levels of inspection frequency on financial reporting quality and audit fees for clients of small and midsize public accounting firms. Our findings provide evidence of significantly higher audit quality and audit fees for clients of annually inspected firms relative to clients of triennially inspected firms. These findings are robust to auditor‐client alignment analyses, propensity score matching, time‐series analyses, examination of firms that have changed from triennial to annual inspection, and particular examination of firms with inspection deficiencies. Overall, our study suggests that the two‐tier frequency system of PCAOB inspection may have also resulted in two‐tier audit quality and audit fee systems for small and midsize public accounting firms, with more frequent inspection leading to more rigorous and informed auditor decisions. We discuss the implications of our results for the Board and the profession at large.     

Board Committees in Corporate Governance: A Cross‐Disciplinary Review and Agenda for the Future

The importance of board committees – specialized subgroups that exist to perform many of the board's most critical functions, such as setting executive compensation, identifying potential board members, and overseeing financial reporting – has grown over time due to increased legal requirements and greater complexity of the environment in which firms operate. This has resulted in a large body of work examining board committees across the accounting, finance, and management disciplines. However, this research has developed rather independently within each discipline, preventing scholars and practitioners from developing a comprehensive understanding of board committees. To address this issue, we conduct a comprehensive review of the literature that: 1) summarizes and synthesizes antecedents and outcomes associated with board committees in publicly‐traded firms in English common law countries; and 2) offers a critical analysis of existing research, providing recommendations for advancements and new directions in board committee research.     

高管机会主义品行与公司信息披露决策

文章构建相应策略识别了高管机会主义品行，并探究其对公司信息披露决策的影响。研究结果表明，高管的机会主义品行会显著增加公司信息披露违规、真实盈余管理行为；提升公司选择非国际“四大”会计师事务所的概率，并支付更高的审计费用。随着高管机会主义水平上升，公司更有可能作出上述决策。进一步地，国有产权能在一定程度上抑制高管机会主义品行对信息披露质量的负面影响，却显著增加了公司应计盈余管理；当高管机会主义水平较高时，国有产权也无法发挥有效治理作用。从经济后果看，高管的机会主义品行能被资本市场识别，并显著减损公司未来价值。     

Debt Covenant Restriction,Financial Misreporting,and Auditor Monitoring*

Theory suggests that financial report-based debt covenants engender incentives for the manager to relax covenant constraints through accounting choices in order to avoid costly covenant violations. Prior studies directly testing this hypothesis in the context of financial misreporting fail to find consistent evidence. Using a more refined measure of debt covenant restriction, we find that debt covenant restriction is positively associated with the probability of financial statement misstatements. This positive association is driven by performance covenants rather than capital covenants and is more consistent with the manager striving to avoid a “false-positive” violation than to delay the violation. Our results also imply that managers resort to both income-increasing and non–income-increasing misreporting to relieve covenant constraints and rely more on the latter when faced with greater earnings management constraints. Additionally, the auditor charges higher audit fees to firms with more binding covenants even outside the violation state, and audit fees increase with constraints relative to both performance and capital covenants, reflecting greater financial reporting risk and bankruptcy risk, respectively. Within capital covenants, we find some evidence of even higher audit fees for tighter intangible-inclusive versus intangible-exclusive capital covenants. Lastly, our evidence suggests that the positive association between covenant constraints and misreporting is attenuated when the auditor has more experience with debt covenants, has greater bargaining power over the client, or faces greater litigation risk.     

做好医院内部审计工作的几点思考

目前,随着我国社会经济的高速发展,医疗产业发展与经营形式的不断变化,医疗资源紧缺与群众就医需求的矛盾凸显,对医疗机构的内控管理提出了更高的要求。完善内部审计机制,优化内控管理的整体质量,不仅是新时期医院实现自我监督的改革路径,同时也是提升医疗资源配置形式,协调不同工作部门责任关系的关键内容。在此基础上,建立现代化内部审计机制,结合医院新时期发展特征,不断调整内控机制中不适应发展需求的部分,已经成为当前阶段医疗机构满足内部发展需求,创新财务管理模式的首要任务。     

新形势下医院内审范围及内容的思考

本文主要介绍了新形势下医院内审的范围及内容,并针对审计工作范围及内容扩大这一情况,提出了相应的解决对策。     

风险导向内部审计应用研究

在经济高速发展的大环境下,审计作为提升企业竞争力的一项措施受到了广泛重视。提及审计,大多数人都仅仅会想到其中的财务审计这一块,而在企业实际运营工作中,如何做好风险评估仍然存在很多欠缺之处,所以推动风险导向的内部审计发展,使其成为企业管理的一种重要手段,对于企业自身的发展具有重大意义,也是一个任重而道远的过程。