国外跨国破产管辖制度及对我国立法的启示

目前西方主要国家跨国破产案件的管辖原则有住所地管辖原则、破产财产管辖原则、债权人国籍或住所地管辖原则、业务活动管辖原则等。为解决各国管辖原则差异,国际社会通行的管辖原则是兼采住所地管辖和长臂管辖,并以主要破产程序和非主要破产程序对破产案件的管辖权进行区分。在我国《破产法》对跨国破产的管辖权问题还没有涉及的情况下,需要顺应国际跨国破产管辖制度的立法趋势合理设置连接点;参照国际组织的立法模式设置主附破产程序。有条件地引入协议管辖制度以化解跨国破产案件管辖纠纷。     

Attitudes towards euro area reforms: Evidence from a randomized survey experiment

This paper provides insights into the determinants of euro area reform preferences by means of a randomized survey experiment in Germany. Respondents are confronted with a pro and a contra argument to reform proposals on a European Unemployment Benefit Scheme and a Sovereign Insolvency Procedure, respectively, with the contra argument being varied across respondents. Our results for the control group suggest that there is a low willingness to accept fiscal risk-sharing through common unemployment insurance, while a sovereign insolvency procedure aimed at strengthening market discipline is supported by a majority of the survey participants. Our randomized treatments highlighting specific potential adverse effects of the reforms lead to significant downward shifts in approval rates. Altruism, EU support, nationalism, political preferences and income are important predictors of support for the reform proposals. We also show that there is a striking contrast between the low level of support for transfers to other euro area member states and a broad acceptance of inner German transfers.     

货币政策、市场约束与银行风险承担行为的实证分析

本文采用面板数据回归方法分析货币政策、市场约束与银行风险之间的相关关系。实证研究发现:宽松的货币政策会降低银行的破产风险,且短期比长期更有效;另外,银行股价的异质化波动和银行的破产风险之间存在显著的负相关关系,即市场约束越有效,越有助于降低银行的破产风险;进一步发现,不同货币政策下,市场约束机制对银行破产风险的影响存在差异,即在从紧的货币政策下,市场约束机制对我国商业银行的影响变得更显著,但是其对不同所有权属性的银行破产风险的影响并没有显著差异。     

Private Equity,Buy‐outs and Insolvency Risk

Private equity restructuring using debt has been criticized for increasing financial distress and bankruptcy especially following the financial crisis. We build a unique dataset comprising the population of over 9 million firm‐year observations and 153,000 insolvencies during the period 1995–2010. We compare the insolvency hazard of the spectrum of buy‐out types within the corporate population over time and investigate the risk profile of the companies pre‐buy‐out. Controlling for size, age, sector and macro‐economic conditions, private‐equity backed buy‐outs are no more prone to insolvency than non‐buy‐outs or other types of management buy‐ins. Moreover, leverage is not the characteristic that distinguishes failed buy‐outs from those surviving.     

Debtholders’ Demand for Conservatism: Evidence from Changes in Directors’ Fiduciary Duties

Debtholders’ demand has been widely discussed as a key determinant of conservatism but clear causal evidence is not yet established. Using a natural experiment setting, wherein a Delaware court ruled that the fiduciary duties of directors in near insolvent Delaware companies extend to creditors, we predict and find that firms subject to the ruling significantly increased their accounting conservatism. In addition, our results suggest that the increase in conservatism is more pronounced in near insolvent Delaware firms with stronger boards, confirming that the court ruling takes effect through the channel of the board of directors. Our results are robust to using alternative measures of conservatism and near insolvency status, and controlling for potential confounding factors and other stakeholders’ demand for conservatism. Overall, our study provides empirical evidence to support the causal relation between debtholders’ demand and accounting conservatism previously suggested in the literature, and offers some insights into the role of the board of directors in financial reporting.     

Dividend Covenants and Income Measurement

This paper constructs a theory of dividend restrictions in incomplete markets in an attempt to better understand the role of accounting constructions in optimal dividend restrictions. An entrepreneur, through his company, borrows money from a lender, and repays the debt from a stream of stochastic cash flows. Dividend restrictions are used to balance insolvency costs against the costs of accumulating surplus cash. Of particular concern is whether optimal dividend restrictions can be characterized as defining an accounting-earnings-based reservoir available for dividends, and whether earnings calculated for this purpose exhibit conservatism.     

Capitalization of the Property-Liability Insurance Industry: Overview

The 1990s witnessed an unprecedented decline in leverage ratios in the United States property-liability insurance industry. The premiums-to-surplus ratio, the most commonly used leverage ratio in the industry, fell from its historical average of 2.0 to less than 1.0 by the end of 2000; and the industry-wide capital-to-asset ratio increased from an historical average of about 25% to 35%. The international reinsurance industry also experienced significant capital increases and leverage declines during the 1990s (Cummins and Weiss, 2000).¹ These unusual trends raised widespread concerns that the property-liability insurance industry had become over-capitalized (The Economist, 1999; Bowers, 2001; Seifert, 2001). To investigate the growth in capitalization and its potential causes, the Conference on Capitalization in the Property-Liability Insurance Industry was held at the Wharton School in September 2000 under the joint sponsorship of the Wharton Financial Institutions Center and AON. Selected papers from the conference comprise this issue of the Journal of Financial Services Research (JFSR).     

Regulation of Insurance Markets

There have been major changes in the way European insurance markets are regulated, and there is still considerable debate about what the form and scope of regulation should be. This article examines the arguments for solvency regulation when consumers are fully informed of the insurer's insolvency risk. It is shown firms always provide enough capital to ensure solvency, unless there are restrictions on the composition of their asset portfolios. The conclusion holds even when competition means that only normal profits can be earned. This suggests that the role of regulation in insurance markets should be confined to providing consumers with information about the default risk of insurers.     

A Systemic Debt Payoff Policy

The average family in the US takes on debt to buy homes, to get education, and sometimes to even pay for normal daily expenditures. Outstanding debt generates a stream of rents to creditors and has become a significant burden on many households. A policy of household debt forgiveness could increase both economic equality and individual liberty. Under what conditions might such a policy be socially acceptable and what would be the implications of such a policy? For debt forgiveness to gain social acceptance the U.S. population would have to perceive the policy as fair and believe that such a program would treat all households equally. Furthermore, any such policy would be politically impossible if it stripped asset owners of money due or would not substantially lower household debt levels. This article explores some possible parameters that a politically feasible policy would contain, and it offers an estimate of policy costs.