A Suggested Interpretation of Some Experimental Results on Preplay Communication

M. Rabin (1994, J. Econ. Theory63, 370-391) proposes a model of behavior in two-person complete-information games with preplay communication, using non-equilibrium notions in the spirit of rationalizability to derive lower bounds on players' expected payoffs when players have unlimited communication opportunities. This paper adapts Rabin's model so that it can be used to analyze the results of the experiments of R. Cooper et al. (1989, Rand J. Econ.20, 568-587) on structured preplay communication in the Battle of the Sexes and the results of the unstructured bargaining experiments of Roth, Malouf, and Murnighan. Adding empirically motivated restrictions that allow the model to predict the payoff effects of changes in bounded communication possibilities like those in the experiments, it is shown that the data from both experiments are generally consistent with Rabin's model, and with the predictions of the extended model. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C70, C72, C78, C91.     

府谷治污怪招的理论分析

地方保护主义严重存在于我国环境保护过程中，造成这一状况的原因主要是环境保护法律制度不健全、环境保护机构设置不科学和国民的环境保护意识不强。本文就此指出了改变现状的措施：强化国民环境意识、完善环境立法和改革环境保护体制。     

On the evolutionary edge of altruism: a game-theoretic proof of Hamilton’s rule for a simple case of siblings

We offer a game-theoretic proof of Hamiltons rule for the spread of altruism. For a simple case of siblings, we show that the rule can be derived as the outcome of a one-shot prisoners dilemma game between siblings.JEL Classification: A13, C70, D64Correspondence to: Oded Stark, ZEF, University of Bonn, Walter-Flex-Strasse 3, 53113 Bonn, GermanyWe are indebted to an anonymous referee and to Uwe Cantner for helpful comments and suggestions. Partial financial support from the National Institute on Aging (grant RO1-AG13037) and from the Humboldt Foundation is gratefully acknowledged.     

Why Punish? Social reciprocity and the enforcement of prosocial norms

Recently economists have become interested in why people who face social dilemmas in the experimental lab use the seemingly incredible threat of punishment to deter free riding. Three theories with evolutionary microfoundations have been developed to explain punishment. We survey these theories and use behavioral data from surveys and experiments to show that the theory called social reciprocity in which people punish norm violators indiscriminately explains punishment best.JEL Classification: C91, C92, D64, H41 Correspondence to: Jeffrey P. CarpenterWe thank Carolyn Craven, Corinna Noelke and two referees for comments, and Middlebury College for financial assistance. In addition, Carpenter acknowledges the support of the National Science Foundation (SES-CAREER 0092953).     

"农户+公司"型农产品供应链协同机制研究

文章在市场价格不确定的环境下,构建了一个农户—公司灰色博弈模型并借此探讨了农户+公司型农产品供应链在动态价格下的协同稳定机制,最后通过实例说明了协同机制模型的合理性与有效性。     

既有大型公建节能改造中的进化博弈论分析

运用进化稳定策略为核心的进化博弈方法,对目前我国既有大型公共建筑节能改造工作进行研究,分析得出政府与产权方之间在节能改造问题中的进化博弈解。     

电信业技术变迁的演化博弈分析

本文利用演化博弈理论的最新研究成果,构造了一个电信技术市场模仿者动态博弈模型来考察电信业技术变迁过程。研究结果表明:在电信业技术变迁过程中,可能出现非效率技术"锁定",也可能出现非效率技术被更有效率的技术取代;电信技术"锁定"在一定条件下是可以被破解的,政府可通过对更有效率的技术的研发提供补贴或降低其交易成本等措施来打破非效率技术"锁定",使得电信业技术变迁向更有效的方向演进。     

基于声誉约束的民间金融组织动态博弈及其风险防范

民间金融组织的设立来自于发起者承诺的高收益和参与者期望的高回报,这是一个双方博弈的过程。发起者违约惩罚的贴现值和合约执行成本是民间金融组织能否顺畅运行的主要因素。     

政府与企业在排污权定价中的演化稳定策略研究

本文从动态博弈的视角分析了政府与企业在排污权价格制定上的策略演化,获得了与现实世界较为拟合的演化稳定策略,对政府制定公平有效的排污权定价模式提供了可资借鉴的参考。     

我国城市污水处理投融资模式的实证研究

本文结合博弈论和计量经济学的Eview5工具对我国城市污水处理过程中各投资主体和资金来源进行实证研究,结果表明:民间资本在城市污水处理投融资过程中的地位越来越重要,所起作用已经超过政府资本;政府资本效用的下降,说明了政府资本使用效率低的问题,但政府在整个过程中监督管理的角色不会变。接下来我国城市污水处理的投融资模式将以市场化为主,政府资本为辅这一基本思路进行选择。