A dynamic model of R&D competition

This study considers a dynamic model of R&D competition in a situation of no uncertainty with identical firms in a perfect foresight. We are going to find out about the effects of firms' absorptive capacity on R&D strategies in the presence of technological spillovers. The conditions for the existence and uniqueness of a feedback–Nash equilibrium on firms' R&D expense will be also discussed. Numerical simulations will show as the introduction of the absorptive capacity reduces the impact of spillovers degree on firms' R&D strategies.     

Introduction to Repeated Games with Private Monitoring

We present a brief overview of recent developments in discounted repeated games with (imperfect) private monitoring. The literature explores the possibility of cooperation in a long-term relationship, where each agent receives imperfect private information about the opponents' actions. Although this class of games admits a wide range of applications such as collusion under secret price-cutting, exchange of goods with uncertain quality, and observation errors, it has fairly complex mathematical structure due to the lack of common information shared by players. This is in sharp contrast to the well-explored case of repeated games under public information (with the celebrated Folk Theorems), and until recently little had been known about the private monitoring case. However, rapid developments in the past few years have revealed the possibility of cooperation under private monitoring for some class of games. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C73, D43, D82, L13, L41.     

A Suggested Interpretation of Some Experimental Results on Preplay Communication

M. Rabin (1994, J. Econ. Theory63, 370-391) proposes a model of behavior in two-person complete-information games with preplay communication, using non-equilibrium notions in the spirit of rationalizability to derive lower bounds on players' expected payoffs when players have unlimited communication opportunities. This paper adapts Rabin's model so that it can be used to analyze the results of the experiments of R. Cooper et al. (1989, Rand J. Econ.20, 568-587) on structured preplay communication in the Battle of the Sexes and the results of the unstructured bargaining experiments of Roth, Malouf, and Murnighan. Adding empirically motivated restrictions that allow the model to predict the payoff effects of changes in bounded communication possibilities like those in the experiments, it is shown that the data from both experiments are generally consistent with Rabin's model, and with the predictions of the extended model. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C70, C72, C78, C91.     

府谷治污怪招的理论分析

地方保护主义严重存在于我国环境保护过程中，造成这一状况的原因主要是环境保护法律制度不健全、环境保护机构设置不科学和国民的环境保护意识不强。本文就此指出了改变现状的措施：强化国民环境意识、完善环境立法和改革环境保护体制。     

中国移动通信业价格竞争本质解析

中国移动通信业的价格竞争,经过了无价格竞争阶段、显性价格竞争阶段、隐性价格竞争阶段、后价格竞争阶段的演化,体现了制度调节与市场选择并行的内在规律性,也增进了市场协调、提高了市场效率。中国移动通信业价格竞争具有非合作博弈的特性,行业管制与市场选择共同推动了竞争的有序化。因此,要实现中国移动通信市场的有效竞争,市场机制的作用是有限的,还离不开适当的政府行政参与下的不对称管制政策,而且不对称管制政策也需要根据市场变化进行调整和改进。     

我国私营企业劳资博弈的囚徒困境及其求解

我国私营企业为社会创造了巨大的财富和就业机会,成为以公有制为主体的国民经济发展中必不可少的一部分.但是,在私营企业迅速发展的同时,越来越多的劳资冲突成为其健康、持续发展的阻碍.文章在分析私营企业劳动关系现状的基础上,就工资问题构建了私营企业的劳资合作博弈机制;同时为解决劳资冲突,提出政府在促进劳资合作中应有所作为、发挥企业在促进劳资合作中的作用、劳动者要努力增强在劳资博弈中的力量等对策和建议.     

Has Inflation Persistence Changed under EMU?

This paper analyzes the persistence of inflation in the euro area and, in particular, whether the persistence properties have changed since the start of European Monetary Union(EMU). For that purpose, we compare pre‐ and post‐EMU inflation persistence, use rolling‐window estimates of persistence, and apply tests specifically designed to detect break dates near the end of the sample period. In contrast to previous research, we find that inflation persistence has fallen significantly since the start of EMU. Persistence of consumer price inflation, which is central to the European Central Bank's policy mandate, has fallen more than the persistence of deflator inflation. The drop in inflation persistence is consistent with the results from a simulated small New Keynesian model with a shift toward a more aggressive monetary policy stance.     

基于信用博弈模型下的我国民营企业融资策略分析

当前,由于民营企业自身缺陷和金融机构供给不足,我国民营企业很难通过资本市场和债务市场融资。信用博弈模型分析结果表明,在不考虑费用成本的情况下,民营企业能否获得贷款,完全取决于银行推断企业信用好坏的概率。因此,民营企业应塑造良好的信用形象,并根据自身所处的发展阶段,采取相应的融资策略。     

基于古诺模型的四种市场的社会福利

市场根据垄断程度的不同。可以分为完全竞争、垄断竞争、寡头垄断和完全垄断市场四种类型。基于古诺模型,用博弈论方法研究n个厂商市场情形的总产量、价格、总收益和消费者剩余并把它们归纳为统一的公式。从四种市场情形总产量和价格的特点推出其供给曲线的形状,进而比较其社会福利的状况。研究结果表明,随着垄断性的加强,市场的社会福利会越来越劣,完全竞争市场的社会福利最好,垄断竞争市场次之,寡头垄断市场更次,完全垄断市场的社会福利最差。