从过度投资到产能过剩:理论与经验证据

过度投资与产能过剩是长期困扰中国经济发展的严峻问题,然而现有研究往往笼统地将二者视为一体。实际中,过度投资与产能过剩分别指向企业投资生产过程中的不同决策阶段,前者与需先行做出的长期投资决策有关,而后者则是后发的即期生产决策的结果。通过引入一个包含投资和生产两阶段的动态实物期权模型,尝试性地刻画从过度投资到产能过剩的形成机制,以及经济与政策这两种异质不确定性对这一形成机制的影响,进一步基于2003-2018年中国企业的微观数据进行了实证检验。理论与实证结果表明:(1)尽管产能过剩总是源自前期投资的过度扩张,但并不是所有的过度投资最终都会导致产能过剩;(2)不确定性是导致过度投资与产能过剩的重要因素,但过度投资更多地源于政策不确定性,而产能过剩则主要源于经济不确定性;(3)不确定性对产能过剩的影响要强于对过度投资的影响。因此,对过度投资的治理应以政策不确定性为主,保持政策调节的稳定性和连续性;对产能过剩的治理则应以经济不确定性为主,维护市场运行体系的稳定性。     

债务期限与企业投资行为:一项理论分析

在单时期模型和企业投资决策中的实物期权思想的基础上构建的两时期模型,证明了短期债务其实有可能使得企业发生过度投资行为,短期债务也有可能使得企业发生投资不足行为,长期债务总是导致企业发生投资不足行为,短期债务对企业投资不足的影响较长期债务要轻,以及平均债务期限与企业投资呈负向关系等重要结论。     

盈余稳健性与企业过度投资行为——来自中国上市公司的经验证据

以中国上市公司为研究样本,采用Khan和Watts(2007)构建的公司层面盈余稳健性度量方法,实证考察了盈余稳健性对企业过度投资行为的影响。实证结果表明,盈余稳健性能够显著抑制中国上市公司的过度投资行为,并降低过度投资行为对自由现金流量或经营活动现金流量的敏感度,从而提高投资效率。因此,中国会计稳健性原则的发展对资源配置效率提高起到了正向促进作用。     

金融发展、信贷资源配置与过度投资

本文旨在分析金融发展对信贷资源配置效率的影响,从而为金融发展促进经济增长提供微观证据。基于2004-2007年中国制造业上市公司的样本数据,实证结果表明:金融发展水平的提高对企业贷款量产生显著的正向作用;但是,企业获得长期贷款越多后更容易进行过度投资,而金融发展水平的提高并没有使债务对企业过度投资行为产生抑制作用。本文研究意味着,在缺乏债务治理效应发挥的金融生态环境中,金融发展(金融深化)可能会拖累经济增长。     

投资者情绪对企业资源配置效率的影响--基于过度投资的视角

文章从过度投资的视角研究了投资者情绪对企业资源配置效率的影响,并进一步考察了何种类型企业的过度投资行为更易受投资者情绪的影响。基于中国沪深两市上市公司1998—2010年的样本数据,文章的实证结果显示,在中国市场上投资者情绪对公司过度投资有显著为正的影响;拥有越多自由现金流量的公司,其过度投资行为受投资者情绪的影响程度越高;而融资约束程度越高的公司,其过度投资行为受投资者情绪的影响程度越低。这一研究发现拓展了对投资者情绪影响公司投资行为经济后果的研究,有助于我们更好地从微观视角理解金融市场的非理性是如何影响企业的资源配置效率,乃至影响到整个实体经济的发展。     

股权分置改革能抑制控股股东过度投资行为吗?

文章基于上市公司投资行为的视角研究了控股股东侵占与公司治理问题,特别考察了股权分置改革是否有助于缓解控股股东过度投资。基于Richardson(2006)预期投资模型,文章的研究结果显示控制权与现金流权分离度对过度投资有显著的正向影响,而股权分置改革能够显著弱化这种分离度与过度投资之间的正向关系。政府控股公司比私人控股公司的过度投资更为严重,而改善外部治理环境在一定程度上可以抑制过度投资。文章为控股股东侵占行为提供了证据,同时表明股权分置改革有效缓解了过度投资。     

基于管理者过度自信的企业投资异化研究综述

企业的投资异化现象普遍存在于各国的企业中,这种异化会给企业及其利益相关者带来损失。随着行为金融学的兴起,近年来,从管理者过度自信角度研究企业投资异化问题成为学术界一个研究的热点,逐步形成了一些理论模型,得出了相应的研究结论。就该领域主要的理论研究和实证研究,从管理者过度自信所引起的过度投资、投资不足、过度并购以及由此带来的价值损毁等问题,对相关文献进行了回顾和评述,并对未来的研究方向进行了一定的展望。     

The value of cash holdings in hotel firms

Extant research in finance suggests asymmetric information increases the cost of external financing substantially and creates underinvestment problems. While franchising might reduce underinvestment problems, it might exacerbate overinvestment problems in poorly-governed firms. Using combined postulations from both the pecking order theory and the free cash flow theory, this study examines the value of cash holdings in hotel firms and the extent to which franchising, financial constraints, and corporate governance affect this value. The findings suggest that cash can be a curse and a blessing; cash is more valuable for financially constrained firms than for unconstrained firms and less valuable for poorly-governed firms than for well-governed firms. Also, financial constraints have a greater effect on the value of cash holdings than weak corporate governance. Although franchising could solve underinvestment problems, it makes poorly-governed firms more vulnerable to overinvestment. Practical and theoretical implications are discussed within realms of corporate finance and franchising.     

China's Overinvestment and International Trade Conflicts

For a long time, China's impressive growth performance has been driven by investment and high productivity gains. Based on a discussion of possible overcapacities and overinvestment in China, this paper investigates the sustainability of China's investment and export‐driven growth model. Since the turn of the millennium, buoyant capital inflows and low interest rates have been at the root of overinvestment and misallocation of capital, which necessitated export subsidies to clear markets. The overinvestment boom is argued to have ended around 2014. Since then, the overcapacities have weakened China's bargaining position in the US–Chinese trade conflict and have tempted Chinese authorities to postpone the restructuring of the Chinese economy by providing low‐interest credit. The gradual reemergence of quasi‐soft budget constraints is seen to undermine China's long‐term growth potential.     

Do corporations overinvest？ Evidence from Tunisia

The authors study the positive relationship existing between internal net worth and investment. This relationship has been interpreted in the financial literature as evidence showing that the management overinvests the free cash flow available to them in poorly-performing, sub-optimal investment projects. In this paper, the authors empirically tackle this problem in the case of the manufacturing and industrial Tunisian corporations and show that our empirical regularities do not stand for this interpretation. The authors conversely prove that overinvestment does not seem to occur on the basis of the grouping results. Hereby, there do not corroborate the empirical regularities documented in Lamont （1997）.