控股股东、自由现金流与过度投资

以我国沪深A股上市公司2006—2008年数据为研究样本,从股权特征角度考察公司自由现金流过度投资行为,结果表明：（1）正自由现金流更易诱发过度投资行为;（2）大股东持股越高,现金流过度投资行为越严重;（3）股权制衡在一定程度上抑制过度投资;（4）第一大股东为国有股性质时,过度投资行为更严重。     

管理层权力、内部控制与过度投资——基于国有上市公司的证据

管理层权力结构是公司内部治理机制的核心要素之一,合理配置管理层权力有利于提高公司内部控制的有效性,进而抑制过度投资。研究发现：（1）内部控制有效性越高,过度投资水平越低;（2）对于国有上市公司而言,内部控制对过度投资的抑制作用受制于管理层权力。在管理层权力集中的情况下,内部控制对过度投资的抑制作用并不显著。     

21世纪海上丝绸之路运输通道的海运效率评价——基于SBM模型和DEA窗口分析方法

建设完善21世纪海上丝绸之路沿线运输通道是实现互联互通的关键,而运输通道海运效率的高低直接影响沿线国家贸易的绩效。基于SBM模型和DEA窗口分析方法对21世纪海上丝绸之路五条主要运输通道(分别是中国—南太平洋、中国—东北亚、中国—东非—地中海、中国—波斯湾以及中国—东南亚)2010—2017年的海运效率进行实证研究发现,中国—南太平洋运输通道的海运效率最高,其次是中国—东北亚运输通道,中国—东非—地中海运输通道的海运效率最低;五条运输通道均存在产出不足与投入冗余问题,其中中国—东北亚运输通道港口基础设施建设投入过多,造成了一定程度的资源浪费,而中国—东非—地中海运输通道货物吞吐量产出严重不足;“一带一路”倡议提出后,中国—波斯湾和中国—东非—地中海运输通道海运效率有所提高,中国—东北亚和中国—东南亚运输通道海运效率趋于平缓,中国—南太平洋运输通道海运效率近年略有下降,但整体上仍然高于其他四条运输通道。而运输通道为避免资源浪费及效率低下等问题,一要优化港口资源配置,二要提高与全球航运网络的连通度,三要缩小同一运输通道沿线各国海运效率的差距。     

Monitoring mechanisms,managerial incentives,investment distortion costs,and derivatives usage

We relate derivatives usage to the level of corporate governance/monitoring mechanisms, managerial incentives and investment decisions of UK firms. We find evidence to suggest that the monitoring environment, e.g., board size, influences both currency and interest rate derivatives usage. Managerial compensation plans also influence derivatives usage. Investment decisions are affected by the governance and managerial compensation plans of firms, which in turn impact on derivatives usage. We find a strong tendency for UK firms to reduce derivatives usage in situations where derivatives usage should be increased. There is limited evidence that firms use hedging substitutes to avoid monitoring from external capital markets.     

Subsidy competition,industrial land price distortions and overinvestment: empirical evidence from China’s manufacturing enterprises

In China, offering inexpensive industrial land is a major means for local governments to participate in interregional subsidy competition, which caused regional industrial land price distortions. This article examines the effect of regional industrial land price distortions on the overinvestment of Chinese manufacturing enterprises. Chinese industrial enterprises data and land price monitoring data of 49 major cities in China between 1998 and 2007 are employed. This article has found that industrial land price distortions will significantly stimulate the overinvestment of manufacturing enterprises. Such a promoting effect varies among manufacturing enterprises of different ownership and industry attributes. Industrial land price distortions have the most significant promoting effect on the overinvestment of foreign-invested firms, followed by private firms, while state-owned enterprises are the least affected. Compared with private heavy-industry firms, industrial land price distortions have a more significant effect on the overinvestment of private light-industry firms. Compared with foreign-invested heavy-industry firms, industrial land price distortions have a more significant effect on the overinvestment of foreign-invested light-industry firms. This study represents a positive exploration and supplement to the existing studies on the effects of subsidy competition on corporate investment behaviours and the studies on Chinese-style subsidy competition.     

Foreign Acquisitions and Managerial Discretion

Foreign acquisitions have been growingdramatically since the 1980s despite academic studiesshowing that shareholders of acquirers generally donot realize any significant gain. In this paper, weinvestigate whether foreign acquisitions aremotivated by managerial self-interest. Logisticregressions are performed to establish a link betweenforeign acquisitions and the acquirer's free cashflow. The results show that foreign acquisitions oflow-Q firms are strongly influenced by managerialdiscretion. In addition, acquisitions of low-Q firmsare conducted without consideration of theperformance of the acquirers. Foreign acquisitions ofhigh-Q firms, however, do not representoverinvestments.     

Examining a key corporate role: The influence of capital allocation competency on business unit performance

Research on the role of the corporate office in firm performance has focused on establishing how much performance variance can be attributed to a “corporate effect,” with little attention devoted to understanding how this influence occurs. In this study, we model capital allocation competency as a dynamic managerial capability and find that lower levels of allocation competency in the form of excess investment to business units with relatively poorer future prospects reduce business unit performance. We also find that market conditions affect performance implications of capital allocation—allocation competency is more salient in more competitive markets. These results enhance our understanding of how the corporate office influences business unit performance through its role in allocating capital across business units. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Investment Decisions in Anticipation of Recessions and Outperformance of Pre-Acting Firms

We empirically examine whether firms make investment decisions in anticipation of recessions and subsequently perform better. Using a large quarterly dataset of fixed asset investments for U.S. firms during 1984–2012, we show that not all firms efficiently adjust their investment decisions in anticipation of a recession. However, we find that pre-acting firms that properly adjust their investment decisions (i.e., underinvest) before a recession outperform re-acting firms that fail to make proper investment decisions (i.e., overinvest) before a recession in subsequent returns on assets, returns on investments, and market-adjusted return measures.     

金字塔结构、过度投资与财务风险——基于民营上市公司的实证研究

文章基于我国转型时期特殊的制度背景,以民营上市公司2007-2011年财务数据为样本,研究金字塔股权结构如何影响公司的投资决策的经济后果,考察其是否会加剧公司过度投资带来的财务风险。研究发现：企业的过度投资会导致财务风险的增加;随着现金流权与控制权两权分离度的增加,过度投资带来的财务风险更大。本文的研究结论能够帮助理解民营企业中大股东通过金字塔持股对过度投资的作用,并对通过合理安排股权结构来降低过度投资带来的财务风险有一定的参考意义。     

渠道势力、纵向压榨与过度投资

本文从纵向关系的视角出发,通过建立产业间投资决策权衡模型,对零售业压榨制造业利润的问题进行了全新的研究。本文采用1995年～2005年中国18个轻工制造业与零售业盈利影响因素面板数据进行分析发现,零售业存在利用渠道势力对制造业利润进行纵向压榨的现象,且这种优势有被滥用从而使零售业自身陷入过度投资的陷阱;与国外先进制造业相比,中国制造业整体表现出技术水平不高、盈利手段局限于简单的规模扩张。