全文获取类型
收费全文 | 6683篇 |
免费 | 268篇 |
国内免费 | 108篇 |
专业分类
财政金融 | 930篇 |
工业经济 | 388篇 |
计划管理 | 1023篇 |
经济学 | 1467篇 |
综合类 | 703篇 |
运输经济 | 41篇 |
旅游经济 | 90篇 |
贸易经济 | 940篇 |
农业经济 | 760篇 |
经济概况 | 717篇 |
出版年
2024年 | 30篇 |
2023年 | 136篇 |
2022年 | 128篇 |
2021年 | 191篇 |
2020年 | 303篇 |
2019年 | 201篇 |
2018年 | 191篇 |
2017年 | 219篇 |
2016年 | 225篇 |
2015年 | 227篇 |
2014年 | 363篇 |
2013年 | 572篇 |
2012年 | 527篇 |
2011年 | 590篇 |
2010年 | 435篇 |
2009年 | 383篇 |
2008年 | 434篇 |
2007年 | 371篇 |
2006年 | 399篇 |
2005年 | 285篇 |
2004年 | 186篇 |
2003年 | 146篇 |
2002年 | 113篇 |
2001年 | 89篇 |
2000年 | 72篇 |
1999年 | 49篇 |
1998年 | 43篇 |
1997年 | 37篇 |
1996年 | 24篇 |
1995年 | 20篇 |
1994年 | 21篇 |
1993年 | 18篇 |
1992年 | 9篇 |
1991年 | 7篇 |
1989年 | 1篇 |
1988年 | 2篇 |
1987年 | 2篇 |
1986年 | 1篇 |
1985年 | 2篇 |
1984年 | 3篇 |
1982年 | 2篇 |
1981年 | 1篇 |
1980年 | 1篇 |
排序方式: 共有7059条查询结果,搜索用时 15 毫秒
61.
62.
Price caps have been shown to have incentive properties superior to traditional rate of return regulation. Average-revenue-lagged regulation (ARL) is attractive in that steady-state prices are known to be efficient. We show that the ARL scheme can be manipulated by the firm so as to yield the unregulated global profit maximum. While tests exist that can provide the regulator with evidence of this strategic behavior, we also demonstrate that the unregulated global profit maximum will not be attainable if Laspeyres (L) regulation is employed.Jel classification: L43, L51I would like to thank Michael Crew and an anonymous referee for their extremely helpful suggestions. 相似文献
63.
中国加入WTO后,关税减让协议的逐步实行对我国进口贸易产生了极大影响.研究结果表明,关税与我国进口贸易额之间存在着高度的负相关关系,在影响我国进口效应的诸多因素中.关税起到了主要作用,但并非唯一因素.而关税减让在影响我国进口商品结构方面的作用不大.可见,在优化我国进口商品结构方面还需要其他政策措施的辅助与调整. 相似文献
64.
论中国期货市场价格操纵行为监控体系的构建 总被引:4,自引:0,他引:4
为防范我国期货市场的价格操纵行为,在详细剖析期货市场价格操纵行为的具体表现形式及其成因的基础上,采用定性与定量相结合的方法系统构建了防范期货市场价格操纵行为的监控体系,包括监控组织机构、监控数据库系统、价格和仓单自动监控系统、大户监控报告系统、不当交易举报系统和监控反应机制六个部余对扼制我国期货市场的价格操纵行为给出具体的对策建议。 相似文献
65.
如何界定反倾销调查中的"生产成本"概念 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
“生产成本”是反倾销调查中的核心问题。该文通过国际反倾销法“生产成本”概念的界定,分析了反倾销调查中企业“生产成本”的差异,提出了按照国际惯例进行调整的方法,以及为反倾销调查取证提供的承诺。 相似文献
66.
Joseph W. Trefzger Peter F. Colwell 《The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics》1996,12(1):23-35
Governmental entities at all levels are empowered to acquire private property for the public's benefit, provided that just compensation is paid. The level of compensation typically viewed by courts as just is market value, but questions arise as to whether market value compensation motivates the private owner of land, potentially subject to a taking, to improve the property to a degree that is socially efficient. Earlier works have found market value to be a compensation level too high to promote efficiency. The present paper offers an analysis, based on a simple model of investor profit maximization, that provides a unified view of models presented in some important earlier works. In a special application of the general case, it is shown that market value can be too low a level of compensation to promote efficient behavior by the land owner. 相似文献
67.
The Effects of Megamergers on Efficiency and Prices: Evidence from a Bank Profit Function 总被引:4,自引:0,他引:4
Akhavein JALAL D. Berger Allen N. Humphrey David B. 《Review of Industrial Organization》1997,12(1):95-139
This paper examines the efficiency and price effects of mergers by applying a frontier profit function to data on bank megamergers. We find that merged banks experience a statistically significant 16 percentage point average increase in profit efficiency rank relative to other large banks. Most of the improvement is from increasing revenues, including a shift in outputs from securities to loans, a higher-valued product. Improvements were greatest for the banks with the lowest efficiencies prior to merging, who therefore had the greatest capacity for improvement. By comparison, the effects on profits from merger-related changes in prices were found to be very small. 相似文献
68.
This paper considers price discrimination when competing firms do not observe a customer’s type but only some other variable correlated to it. This is a typical situation in many insurance markets—such as motor insurance—where it is also often the case that insurance is compulsory. We characterise the equilibria and their welfare properties under various price regimes. We show that discrimination based on immutable characteristics such as gender is a dominant strategy, either when firms offer policies at a fixed price or when they charge according to some consumption variable that is correlated to costs. In the latter case, gender discrimination can be an outcome of strategic interaction alone in situations where it would not be adopted by a monopolist. Strategic price discrimination may also increase cross subsidies between types, contrary to expectations.JEL Classification No.: L13, G22 相似文献
69.
Englund Peter Hwang Min Quigley John M. 《The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics》2002,24(1-2):167-200
An unusually rich source of data on housing prices in Stockholm is used to analyze the investment implications of housing choices. This empirical analysis derives market-wide price and return series for housing investment during a 13-year period, and it also provides estimates of the individual-specific, idiosyncratic, variation in housing returns. Because the idiosyncratic component follows an autocorrelated process, the analysis of portfolio choice is dependent upon the holding period. We analyze the composition of household investment portfolios containing housing, common stocks, stocks in real estate holding companies, bonds, and t-bills. For short holding periods, the efficient portfolio contains essentially no housing. For longer periods, low-risk portfolios contain 15 to 50 percent housing. These results suggest that there are large potential gains from policies or institutions that would permit households to hedge their lumpy investments in housing. We estimate the potential value of hedges in reducing risk to households, yet yielding the same investment returns. The value is surprisingly large, especially to poorer homeowners. 相似文献
70.
方红生 《中央财经大学学报》2002,(2):61-65
经研究发现 ,张维迎教授在 2 0 0 1年第五版的《博弈论与信息经济学》中所借用的承诺要胁诉讼博弈例子中对诉讼费用的处理有点不妥 ,便作出了适当的调整 ,但却得出了令人沮丧的结论 :承诺要胁诉讼不成立 !继续研究发现只有打破这种败诉风险由当事人承担的机制 ,才能传递出有力量的信号 ,才能做到真正的威胁 ,那就是建立“生死与共”的竞争性的律师定价机制和保费率真正是胜诉率信号的诉讼费用保险机制与最经济的诉讼程序与非诉讼程序、保障其实现的机制和可供的备选机制。本文论证了其合理性 相似文献