风暴潮灾害经济损失评估分析——以山东省为例

风暴潮灾害已成为目前致灾最严重的海洋灾害,合理评估风暴潮灾害经济损失是灾害管理的重要方面,对于防灾减灾及规划建设具有重要的研究意义。考虑到灾害系统的复杂性,间接经济损失往往难以统计,本文运用投入产出方法,采用山东省沿海受灾城市2003—2007的统计数据,对风暴潮灾害造成的间接损失进行科学评估,在此基础上测算了历年受灾城市的总损失,并制定出山东省风暴潮灾害综合损失分布的区划图。评估结果按综合损失程度排序依次是：威海、烟台、青岛、潍坊、东营、滨州、日照。     

非经常性损失与监管利润关系及对审计的启示

非经常性损益是我国证监会提出的监管概念,其中,非经常性损失能够调高监管利润,客观上粉饰公司市场形象与融资能力。本文将非经常性损失的确定性程度分为三个等级,作为分类变量;将非经常性损失与利润总额绝对值比率作为考察变量,分析不确定性对监管利润的影响。我们得出的结果是非经常性损失的不确定性越高,监管利润被粉饰的可能性越大。建议在审计实践中关注具有不确定性的非经常性损失,防止企业将正常损失混入非经常性损失。     

Copula‐Based Formulas to Estimate Unexpected Credit Losses (The Future of Basel Accords?)

The model used to estimate the capital required to cover unexpected credit losses in financial institutions (Basel II) has some drawbacks that reduce its ability to capture potential joint extreme losses in downturns. This paper suggests an alternative approach based on Copula Theory to overcome such flaws. Similarly to Basel II, the suggested model assumes that defaults are driven by a latent variable which varies as a response to an unobserved factor. On the other hand, the use of copulas allows the identification of asymmetric dependence between defaults which has been registered in the literature. As an example, a specific copula family (Clayton) is adopted to represent the association between the latent variables and a formula to estimate potential unexpected losses at a certain level of confidence is derived. Simulations reveal that, in most of the cases, the alternative model outperforms Basel II for portfolios with right‐tail‐dependent probabilities of default (supposedly, a good representation for real loan portfolios).     

我国产险公司承保亏损原因分析及建议

近年来,我国产险市场保持快速增长,但自2006年起承保效益连续出现大面积亏损,严重影响产险公司偿付能力。本文分析了产险公司承保效益情况,并剖析了造成普遍亏损的原因,认为要扭转产险行业普遍亏损的现状,保险企业要转变经营理念,提升自身经营绩效及经营水平;保险监管部门要在尊重市场规律基础上,推出有效的监管措施,为促进有序竞争提供制度保障。     

Computing welfare losses from data under imperfect competition with heterogeneous goods

We study the percentage of welfare losses (PWL) yielded by imperfect competition under product differentiation. When demand is linear, even if prices, outputs, costs and the number of firms can be observed, PWL is arbitrary in both Cournot and Bertrand equilibria. If in addition the elasticity of demand (resp. cross elasticity of demand) is known, we can calculate PWL in a Cournot (resp. Bertrand) equilibrium. When demand is isoelastic and there are many firms, PWL can be computed from prices, outputs, costs and the number of firms. We find that price–marginal cost margins and demand elasticities may influence PWL in a counterintuitive way. We also provide conditions under which PWL increases or decreases with concentration.     

国有资产流失的博弈分析

从博弈论视角分析,国有资产流失,是不同经济主体间利益冲突的一种博弈行为结果。从博弈扩展模型分析,表现为信息不对称下委托—代理双方为追求利益最大化而在消极心态下的非合作行为,以及代理方利用权力,在积极心态下追求最大利益的违规行为与委托方监督管理间的博弈均衡。应从激励机制、风险机制、约束机制、监督机制、配置机制等方面阻止国有资产流失。     

信贷损失准备计提的理论分析

本文在预期损失与损失准备概念的基础上,通过对贷款价值、预期损失与违约升水之间关系的分析提出了信贷损失准备计提的理论与方法,指出基于未来现金流量折现法的信贷准备计提方法更能反映贷款的真实价值。最后结合银行信贷损失准备计提的实践,对理论方法与实践中的作法进行了简要的评析。     

Using and Influence Level of Information to Explain the Non-consensus Process Loss

Much of the Group Support System (GSS) literature comparing GSS groups with manual groups has produced contrarian results. One of the more confusing is that GSS groups have a higher level of non-consensus than manual groups. Lack of consensus in GSS groups is considered to be a negative aspect of GSS. This paper argues that low levels of consensus are not necessarily harmful and should be expected given the assumptions about GSSs. This study uses an alternate measure to compare face-to-face groups with GSS groups; an influence level of information. Experimental results using an influence level of information show no difference between face-to-face group members and GSS group members. We discuss these implications, as well as additional directions for further consensus research.     

Banks' Use of Accounting Discretion and Regulatory Intervention: The Case of European Banks' Impairments on Greek Government Bonds

This paper analyzes troubled banks' use of accounting discretion and its interaction with regulatory intervention in a time of financial distress. We analyze impairment losses that Europe's largest banks recognized on Greek Government Bonds (GGB) during 2011, the time during which GGB were considered impaired. Our findings reveal considerable variation in the impairment ratios across banks. Banks with larger GGB exposures, for which a full impairment would deplete a large share of regulatory capital, recognize significantly lower impairment ratios. Furthermore, we find that troubled banks delay full impairments until state aid is provided. Troubled banks recognize significantly lower impairment ratios in the quarter before they are provided with state aid, but substantially increase their impairment ratios afterwards. This pattern is consistent with the notion that troubled banks initially understate impairments to conceal the full extent of their financial difficulties from less sophisticated non-regulator outsiders (e.g., depositors and the general public), which increases regulators' ability to practice forbearance by not intervening immediately.     

Do investors hold that they know? Impact of familiarity bias on investor’s reluctance to realize losses: Experimental approach

In this article we investigate the impact of familiarity bias on the individual investor’s reluctance to realize losses. Our experimental approach reveals a strong correlation between familiarity and disposition effect. We conducted 714 tests in which different respondents could sell stocks of two types – winners and losers. One group of respondents “owned” familiar assets and another group operated anonymous portfolios. The results of the experiment show that an individual investor’s tendency to ride losers too long is more than twice as high in the case of unfamiliar stocks as it is when assets are familiar to the holder.