公司财务控制机理:一个基于制度博弈的分析

财务控制的目标是对出资者和经营者之间形成的代理契约的冲突进行管理和协调.以出资者与经营者的制度博弈模型为分析基础,可以清楚表明财务控制机理特征:首先,财务控制本身具有的制度成本(控制成本)是制约控制成效的关键因素;其次,财务控制作为一种制度安排,应具备使经营者违背代理契约的外部成本内部化的功能;最后,财务控制本质是一种契约安排,是出资者和经营者之间多次动态博弈的结果,因此需要不断进行修正完善.     

基于混合激励机制的两层供应链产品开发合作博弈分析

针对供应商与制造商在产品开发合作中潜在的风险,建立了动态合作博弈模型,通过对正负激励策略的比较分析,得出两种激励策略按照一定结构混合运用能有效地发挥负激励降低合作风险、正激励增加合作收益的作用的结论。     

Reforming the Direct–Indirect Tax Mix

This paper provides a new framework for evaluating the welfare effects of commodity tax reforms. It is shown that tax reforms are welfare improving if and only if they satisfy the following intuitive property: on average, consumer prices fall for commodities with high marginal excess burdens. The rule is then applied to analyze a shift from differentiated commodity taxation to direct flat-rate taxation of labour income. The welfare impact of such reforms can be decomposed into two effects: (i) the increase in welfare associated with substitution among taxed commodities, and (ii) the loss in welfare associated with substitution between commodities and leisure. On balance, a shift towards direct taxation is desirable when inter-commodity substitution effects are large relative to commodity–leisure substitution effects. The analysis allows us to reconcile the apparently conflicting results of the tax reform and optimal taxation literatures.     

Capital structure and the control of managerial incentives

We present a theory of capital structure based on the power of shareholders, bondholders and managers to control the incentive conflicts in large corporations. The manager–owner conflict produces a trade-off between inefficiency in the low state and rents in the high state, and the shareholder–bondholder conflict produces under-investment as in Myers [Journal of Financial Economics 19 (1997) 147]. Since managers and bondholders both prefer more efficient actions in the low state, the two conflicts are interdependent. With risk-less levels of debt, there are no shareholder–bondholder agency costs, but managerial control over the incentive-setting process produces excessive rents. With risky debt, shareholders focus more on returns in the high state so that shareholder–bondholder agency costs increase but managerial rents decrease. Efficient levels of debt holder protection facilitate a reduction in manager–owner agency costs that outweighs shareholder–bondholder agency costs, and are decreasing in firm performance. The results are consistent with the separate empirical results relating control to both compensation and leverage, and suggest how future studies can be integrated.     

Cap and trade policies in the presence of monopoly and distortionary taxation

We extend an analytical general equilibrium model of environmental policy with pre-existing labor tax distortions to include pre-existing monopoly power as well. We show that the existence of monopoly power has two offsetting effects on welfare. First, the environmental policy reduces monopoly profits, and the negative effect on income increases labor supply in a way that partially offsets the pre-existing labor supply distortion. Second, environmental policy raises prices, so interaction with the pre-existing monopoly distortion further exacerbates the labor supply distortion. This second effect is larger, for reasonable parameter values, so the existence of monopoly reduces the welfare gain (or increases the loss) from environmental restrictions.     

我国增值税类型选择的经济学思考

增值税有生产型、消费型和收入型三种.1994年我国税制改革选择了生产型增值税,对抑制投资膨胀,保证财政收入起到积极作用.随着市场经济的深入发展,我国税制改革应取向于消费型增值税,因其能避免重复征税而有利于分工协作,刺激投资,保护基础产业的发展.     

China＇s Regional Disparity and Its Policy Responses

The fruits of China＇s rapid economic development over the 3 decades have not been distributed fairly across different regions. Using data from a sample of 815 Chinese listed firrns during 1998-2004, our error-correction investment model showes evidence of different financial constraints on firms＇ investment in different regions. We argue that China＇s regional development policies have contributed greatly to the regional inequalities. To control the rising inequality, China has shifted its focus from the coast to the interior regions. However, it is becoming increasingly difficult for the government to direct the economy, as market mechanisms now have afar greater influence on the economy than the government does. The people-centered approach of the current leadership has meant that substantial attention has been placed on regional development disparities in an attempt to build a ＂harmonious society. ＂ China needs further extensive reforms if all the measures for reducing regional disparity are to be effective.     

欧盟成员国银行业政策主要特点分析

本文认为欧盟《第二银行指令》全面推动了欧盟各成员国银行业规制协调,可将成员国近20年以来的银行业政策主要特点归纳为四个方面,即全面放松管制、私有化、鼓励银行并购和对外扩张,金融监管体制一体化。这些政策促进了各成员国银行业竞争和快速发展,提高了欧盟银行业效率和盈利,有助于降低消费者和企业的融资成本,提高欧盟银行业整体抗风险能力。     

高新技术产业项目的绩效管理——基于软件项目管理的实证研究

针对高新技术产业广泛采用项目驱动的管理模式,在理论分析和实地调查的基础上,实证研究了客户、项目经理和激励制度对项目业绩的影响。结果发现客户对定制化需求大,但对标准化软件却有更高的边际利润;政府机构是大客户,但其垄断地位,所带来的销售利润率和项目交付率并不高;地域商务环境影响交易成本,进而显著地影响了项目的业绩水平;项目业绩受项目经理激励程度和方式的影响,但与项目经理认知特征无显著关系。这些结论说明软件企业在制定战略时,需以定制产品和定制服务为起点,但最终必须研发成为具有行业特点的标准化应用软件;在资源分配时,应重点关注地域商务环境好的客户,适当提高非政府机构行业客户的资源分配比例;应健全项目经理激励制度,促使项目提前完工,从而降低开发成本,增加项目业绩。