Excluded coalitions and the distribution of power in parliaments

In this article, we introduce a new value for cooperative games. This value is based on the Shapley (1953) value and takes into account that players exclude coalitions with other players. One example of such exclusions are the coalition statements of parliamentary parties. A case study demonstrates the application of the new value for these situations.     

The political economy of corruption and the role of economic opportunities1

In many developing and transition countries, we observe rather high levels of corruption. We argue that the missing political support for anti‐corruption policies is due to a lack of economic and financial reforms. Our model is based on the fact that corrupt officials have to pay entry fees to get lucrative positions. In a probabilistic voting model, we show that this, together with the lack of economic opportunities, makes anti‐corruption policies less likely. Compared to a reformed economy, more voters are part of the corrupt system and, more importantly, rents from corruption are distributed differently. Economic liberalization increases the support for anti‐corruption measures. The additional effect of financial liberalization is ambiguous.     

Determinants of Voter Support for a Five‐Year Ban on the Cultivation of Genetically Modified Crops in Switzerland

While much effort has been devoted to estimating market premiums for non‐genetically modified (GM) food, the results of such research are largely silent about the preferences for the public good aspects, or externalities, of GM food production. For public goods, the closest substitute of private consumption decisions is voting on referenda. In November 2005, 55.7% of 2 million Swiss voters approved a five‐year moratorium (ban) on the commercial cultivation of GM plants in Switzerland. The present study examines how individual voting decisions were determined by: (i) socioeconomic characteristics; (ii) political preference/ideology; and (iii) agreement with a series of arguments in favour and against the use of GM plants in Swiss agriculture. The analysis is based on the data of the regular voter survey undertaken after the national‐level voting in Switzerland. The results suggest that current concerns about the use of genetically engineered plants in agriculture may not automatically decrease with higher levels of education/knowledge and generational change. Furthermore, analysis of voter motives suggests that public support for a ban on GM crops may be even larger in other countries, where industrial interests in crop biotechnology are less pronounced.     

Determinants of voting behaviour on the Keystone XL Pipeline

After lengthy debate, the Keystone XL Pipeline bill passed in January 2015. We use this event to better understand the determinants of Senator voting behaviour. Specifically, this article attempts to examine the relative impacts of political and economic influences. This is accomplished through the use of a binary logit regression model with legislator vote as the dependent variable. Results indicate that while legislators do appear to be representing their political constituency, the role of campaign funding plays an important role as well. The economic effect of such funding, controlling for other factors, is quantitatively small.     

Condorcet meets Bentham

We show that if the statistical distribution of utility functions in a population satisfies a certain condition, then a Condorcet winner will not only exist, but will also maximize the utilitarian social welfare function. We also show that, if people’s utility functions are generated according to certain plausible random processes, then in a large population, this condition will be satisfied with very high probability. Thus, in a large population, the utilitarian outcome will be selected by any Condorcet consistent voting rule.     

Weighted approval voting

To allow society to treat unequal alternatives distinctly we propose a natural extension of Approval Voting by relaxing the assumption of neutrality. According to this extension, every alternative receives ex-ante a strictly positive and finite weight. These weights may differ across alternatives. Given the voting decisions of every individual (individuals are allowed to vote for, or approve of, as many alternatives as they wish to), society elects the alternative for which the product of total number of votes times exogenous weight is maximal. If the product is maximal for more than one alternative, a pre-specified tie-breaking rule is applied. Our main result is an axiomatic characterization of this family of voting procedures.      

独立董事保护了中小股东权益吗？——基于中国上市公司投票机制的研究

本文研究表明：（1）上市公司年度内举行独立董事会会议次数越多，即独立董事越勤勉，越有可能实施累积投票制度；（2）上市公司董事会设立审计委员会，即独立董事运作机制越好，实施累积投票制度和网络投票的可能性越高。基于此，本文建议从单纯强调独立董事规模与比例，转向注重提升独立董事的勤勉程度和完善独立董事运作机制，切实保护中小股东权益。     

On probability models in voting theory

This paper illustrates the use of probability models to study properties of voting rules. In particular, a simple occupancy distribution and its limiting Dlrichlet form are introduced, corresponding to simplifying assumptions about voters' preferences. We use as illustrations the occurrence probability of the Condorcet Paradox, a vintage problem in social choice theory, along with the related concept of Condorcet efficiency, a measure of goodness for voting rules. Further examples include properties of a lottery rule and the vulnerability of certain voting rules to strategic manipulation. Prospects for future work are indicated.     

The Costs of Implementing the Majority Principle: The Golden Voting Rule

In a context of constitutional choice of a voting rule, this paper presents an economic analysis of scoring rules that identifies the golden voting rule under the impartial culture assumption. This golden rule depends on the weights β and (1−β) assigned to two types of costs: the cost of majority decisiveness (‘tyranny’) and the cost of the ‘erosion’ in the majority principle. Our first main result establishes that in voting contexts where the number of voters n is typically considerably larger than the number of candidates k, the golden voting rule is the inverse plurality rule for almost any positive β. Irrespective of n and k, the golden voting rule is the inverse plurality rule if β ≥ 1/2 .. This hitherto almost unnoticed rule outperforms any other scoring rule in eliminating majority decisiveness. The golden voting rule is, however, the plurality rule, the most widely used voting rule that does not allow even the slightest ‘erosion’ in the majority principle, when β=0. Our second main result establishes that for sufficiently “small size” voting bodies, the set of potential golden rules consists at most of just three rules: the plurality rule, the Borda rule and the inverse plurality rule. On the one hand, this finding provides a new rationalization to the central role the former two rules play in practice and in the voting theory literature. On the other hand, it provides further support to the inverse plurality rule; not only that it is the golden rule in voting contexts, it also belongs, together with the plurality rule and the Borda method of counts, to the “exclusive” set of potential golden voting rules in small committees. We are indebted to Jim Buchanan, Amichai Glazer, Noa Nitzan, Ken Shepsle, and an anonymous referee for their useful comments.