Political economy of taxation,debt ceilings,and growth

This study presents voting on policies, including labor and capital income taxes and public debt, in an overlapping-generations model with physical and human capital accumulation, and analyzes the effects of a debt ceiling on a government's policy formation and its impact on growth and welfare. The results show that the debt ceiling induces the government to shift the tax burdens from the older to younger generations, but stimulates physical capital accumulation and may increase public education expenditure, resulting in a higher growth rate. Alternatively, the debt ceiling is measured from the viewpoint of a benevolent planner and lowering the debt ceiling (i.e., tightening fiscal discipline) makes it possible for the government to approach the planner's allocation in an aging society.     

Expressive voting with booing and cheering: Evidence from Britain

Previous work on Expressive Voting has focused on the desire of voters to express what they are for and thus who they are. But, often also as important, is the desire of voters to express what they are against, and who they are not. In this paper we extend the standard formulation of Expressive Voting to account for this possibility. Using data for the UK we find empirical evidence that the desire to boo has been increasingly important at recent elections. The implications of this for recent trends in political polarization are discussed.     

Higher turnout increases incumbency advantages: Evidence from mayoral elections

We analyze the effect of electoral turnout on incumbency advantages by exploring mayoral elections in the German state of Bavaria. Mayors are elected by majority rule in two-round (runoff) elections. Between the first and second ballot of the mayoral election in March 2020, the state government announced an official state of emergency. In the second ballot, voting in person was prohibited and only postal voting was possible. To construct an instrument for electoral turnout, we use a difference-in-differences strategy by contrasting turnout in the first and second ballot in 2020 with the first and second ballots from previous elections. We use this instrument to analyze the causal effect of turnout on incumbent vote shares. A 10-percentage point increase in turnout leads to a statistically robust 3.4 percentage point higher vote share for incumbent mayors highlighting the relevance of turnout-related incumbency advantages.     

Voting in assemblies of shareholders and incomplete markets

Summary. An economy with two dates is considered, one state at the first date and a finite number of states at the last date. Shareholders determine production plans by voting - one share, one vote - and at -majority stable stock market equilibria, alternative production plans are supported by at most percent of the shareholders. It is shown that a -majority stable stock market equilibrium exists if where S is the number of states at the last date and J is the number of firms. Moreover, an example shows that -majority stable stock market equilibria need not exist for smaller s.Received: 23 December 2002, Revised: 14 June 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: D21, D52, D71, G39. Correspondence to: Hervé CrésThe authors are grateful to an anonymous referee for helpful comments and suggestions. Financial support from the Danish Research Councils and hospitality of HEC is gratefully acknowledged by Mich Tvede and support from Fondation HEC is gratefully acknowledged by Hervé Crés.     

Remittances and incumbency: Theory and evidence

By raising household income, remittances lower the marginal utility of targeted electoral transfers, thus weakening the efficacy of vote buying. Yet, remittances make individuals wealthier and believe the national economy is performing well, which is positively attributed to the incumbent. Building on these insights, I show that the confluence of these divergent channels generate a surprising result that at increasingly higher levels of dissatisfaction with the incumbent, a remittance recipient is more likely to vote for the incumbent than a non‐remittance recipient. These predictions and their underlying mechanisms are substantiated across 18 Latin American countries.     

论股东表决权的限制

表决权是股东最本质的固有权利,原则上不得剥夺并限制。但是,决议的最终目的是公正地产生股东们普遍意愿,决议应代表全体股东或大多数股东的利益。但有时候会存在大股东滥用表决权或表决权的行使会损害公正性的危险。因此,本文将从股东表决权的限制角度,阐述如何实现对中小股东利益的保护。     

上市公司股东不可撤销表决权委托研究——问题、挑战与监管

表决权是上市公司股东参与管理决策的重要方式。证券监管实践表明,不可撤销表决权委托既有规避股份限售和减持规则的动机,也有出于增强控制权转让交易中博弈弹性的考虑。表决权委托并非一项简单的债权债务法律关系,其合规性及对证券市场的影响需引起足够的重视。为规范上市公司股东不可撤销的表决权委托,本文建议:在信息披露监管方面,重点关注表决权委托对权益变动、控制权稳定性、投资者保护的影响;在制度规范方面,发布表决权委托示范协议指引等规则,明确表决权委托的关键要素和监管要求。     

Similarly traded securities: Greek common vs. preferred stock

This paper examines the price spread between voting (common) and non‐voting (preferred) stocks during the period 1990–95 for a sample of 55 Greek companies. Because in Greece preferred stocks are not essentially different from common stocks, a number of hypotheses were tested to explain the observed differences. The data reveal an average spread of 27.5% for the entire period which, however, varies across years considerably. In cross‐sectional regressions it was found that the volatility of common stock returns, the liquidity of common shares relative to preferred shares, the ownership concentration, and the minimum dividend yield guaranteed to preferred stockholders explain a significant portion of the spread.     

Influence Allocation Methods in Group Decision Support Systems

Influence allocation processes are voting and opinion aggregating methods that allow members to distribute some or all of their decision making influence to others in the group in order to exploit not only the group's knowledge of the alternatives, but its knowledge of itself. Only with the common use of group decision support systems (GDSS) has their use become practical. In this paper we reconsider SPAN, an influence allocation process introduced by MacKinnon (1966a). Experimental comparison shows SPAN to be significantly better at selecting a correct option from a set of options than two common voting methods. An alternative influence allocation process that we call RCON (Rational Consensus), is based on a weighting method proposed by DeGroot (1974) and has been explicated as a normative standard for combining opinion by Lehrer and Wagner (1981). The judgmental inputs to SPAN would appear to be logically related to those for RCON. Submitting the SPAN inputs from the experiment, transformed in this logical way, to the RCON process results in somewhat better performance than with SPAN. However, evidence indicated that the two methods are conceptually and psychologically sufficiently different that an experimental comparison is needed between them.     

Measuring voting power in an international institution: the United States and the inter-American development bank

This paper applies a measure of relative voting power to the weighted voting system of the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB). Almost all assessments of internal governance of the IADB and other international financial institutions make reference to members' votes as a proxy for relative influence. But as this paper demonstrates, voting weights are misleading. The number of votes a country has in a weighted voting system does not necessarily denote its ability to affect outcomes. The conventional wisdom holds that the United States is omnipotent in the IADB because it has a large number (over 30 percent) of all the votes. This paper reveals that the U.S. obtains much more control over outcomes than originally intended by the institutions' designers. Received: September 2000 / Accepted: October 2001