Teachers and politics

I find that self-selection into teacher training programs in Germany is co-determined with ideology. Incoming teacher-trainees are more left-wing in ideology and political preferences than the average incoming university student. I find also that teacher training programs exert a socialization effect: as compared to the average student, teacher trainees’ views are reinforced and they become more left-wing as they progress in their studies. In a third step, I use the German Socio-Economic Panel to compare tenured teachers’ political attitudes with other university graduates and other civil servants, and find that tenured teachers are more left-wing than the average in the respective reference groups. I consider possible explanations for the left-wing orientation of teachers in the German educational system and implications of indoctrination and imbalance of views.     

Correcting for survey effects in pre‐election polls

Pre‐election polls can suffer from survey effects, causing biases in forecasted election outcomes. We advocate a simple methodology to estimate the magnitude of survey effects, by collecting data both before and after the election. This method is illustrated by means of a field study with data concerning the 2009 European Parliament elections in the Netherlands. Our study provides empirical evidence of significant positive survey effects with respect to voter participation, especially for individuals with low intention to vote. For our data, the overall survey effect on party shares is small. This effect can be more substantial, for example, if political orientation and voting intention are correlated in the sample.     

Measuring Electoral Control

If voters do not pay attention to whatrepresentatives do, representatives are not stimulatedto be responsive. Therefore, electoral control, theextent to which voters base their vote on thebehaviour of representatives is, at least potentially,an important variable in the explanation of thebehaviour of representatives. Moreover, electoralcontrol seems to be an important variable from anormative point of view. In this article four ways tomeasure the minimal level of local electoral controlusing the outcomes of local elections (electoralstatistics) are presented. The general idea behind themeasures is fairly simple. If local elections arecompletely determined by nonlocal factors, then thelosses and gains of local divisions of nationalparties from one local election to another are`identical' across municipalities. A deviation fromthis pattern can be interpreted as an indication ofthe minimal level of local electoral control in aspecific municipality. The measures are externallyvalidated using data from a survey among council members.     

Some consequences of the early twentieth-century British divorce of ownership from control

Because ownership was already more divorced from control in the largest stock market of 1911 (London) than in the largest stock market of 1995 (New York), the consequences for the economy, for good or ill, could have been considerable. Using a large sample of quoted companies with capital of £1 million or more, this article shows that this separation did not generally operate against shareholders' interests, despite the very substantial potential for agency problems. More directors were apparently preferable to fewer over a considerable range, as far as their influence on company share price and return on equity was concerned: company directors were not simply ornamental. A greater number of shareholders was more in shareholders' interest than a smaller, despite the enhanced difficulties of coordinating shareholder ‘voice’. A larger share of votes controlled by the board combined with greater board share ownership was also on average consistent with a greater return on equity. Corporate governance thus appears to have been well adapted to the circumstances of the Edwardian company capital market. Hence the reduction in the cost of capital for such a large proportion of British business conferred a substantial advantage on the economy.     

我国合并会计报表合并范围探讨

本文针对我国《合并会计报表暂行规定》的不足之处，结合国际惯例，对合并会计报表的合并范围进行了探讨。认为：应以控制与被控制关系是否存在来判断某企业是否应纳入企业集团合并会计报表的合并范围，理论上以是否拥有半数以上表决权作为确定合并会计报表合并范围的依据。     

Shareholders' choice

We address the question of which production decisions are reached via shareholder voting, if the firm's shareholders disagree. The median-voter approach is applied. Three dichotomies are explored: the one-man-one-vote versus the one-share-one-vote rule, naive versus sophisticated investors, before- versus after-trade voting. Novel asymptotic results are obtained.     

The voice of minority shareholders: Online voting and corporate social responsibility

In 2014, the Shenzhen Stock Exchange introduced “Rules for the Implementation of Online Voting” to standardize the implementation of online voting for its listed companies. Using this event as an exogenous shock, we design a difference-in-differences model to show that minority shareholders’ participation in online voting improves firms’ corporate social responsibility performance. We reveal that this improvement is achieved through minority shareholders’ positive influence on firms’ internal control and transparency and is more pronounced for private firms and firms with lower levels of profitability and less external monitoring. Accordingly, since the standardization of online voting, minority shareholders have played an important role in corporate governance and have a positive influence on firms’ sustainable development.     

投票制转为审核制的评优问题分析

X公司优秀员工的评审机制由投票制改为审核制,虽然在一定程度上有进步,但还是存在着诸多问题:私立性动机替代了制度公正;管理者未能实质性控制评优局面;缺乏客观合理的材料审核标准;评优专家本身是优秀参评者;利益链纠葛涣散了团队精神。探索更加有效的评选机制势在必行,为此X公司需要从以下几个方面着手:"参评人回避+外聘专家"盲审参评人材料;核准制须从根本上做到科学性;割断利益链给考核制度减负。     

Voting for Redistribution under Desert‐Sensitive Altruism*

We endow individuals who differ in skills and tastes for working, with altruistic preferences for redistribution in a voting model where a unidimensional redistributive parameter is chosen by majority voting in a direct democracy. When altruistic preferences are desert‐sensitive (i.e., when there is a reluctance to redistribute from the hard‐working to the lazy), we show that lower levels of redistribution emerge in political equilibrium. We provide empirical evidence that preferences for redistribution are not purely selfish, and that desert‐sensitive motivations play a significant role. We estimate that preferences for redistribution are significantly more desert‐sensitive in the US than in Europe.     

The Political Economy of Social Security

We consider a two-period overlapping generations model in which individual voters differ by age and by productivity. In such a setting, a redistributive pay-as-you-go system is politically sustainable, even when the interest rate is higher than the rate of population growth. The workers with medium wages (not those with the lowest wages) and the retirees form a majority which votes for a positive level of social security. This level depends on the difference between the rates of population growth and interest as well as on the redistributiveness of the benefit rule.