用脚投票带来了什么?——Tiebout模型的文献评述

Tiebout(1956)提出了著名的用脚投票的命题,开启了地方公共经济学研究序幕,也成为城市经济学研究的一个重要参考系。从Tiebout模型的提出、资本化问题、学校选择、社区的均质化、税收竞争等方面考察和评述了Tiebout模型的发展。实证研究的基本结论为地方政府的财政支出不同程度地资本化在当地住宅中;人们对高质量学校的需求,导致学区住房价格升高;社区均质化研究趋势是早先从专注于社区的均质化到现在的居住分割,从影响人们迁移的税收—支出套餐演进到环境—就业机会套餐,从验证居住区分割到分析这种分割的原因与影响。此外,还分析了Tiebout模型引致的税收竞争与政府竞争理论的发展,这也是Tiebout模型研究的重要部分。     

Purchase power: An examination of consumption as voting

Abstract

There has been a reported increase in political activity through the marketplace in the form of ‘consumer votes’. The use of marketplace votes by consumers to address their concerns about societal issues is a phenomenon that has growing relevance for firms, since they are often affected by such consumer citizenship. Therefore, this paper aims to enhance our conceptual understanding of the consumer voting phenomenon. It explores marketplace power relations and the constraints and enabling mechanisms they may pose to consumers seeking change through consumer voting. Consumer voting practices, consumer sovereignty discourses, and power tensions in marketplace encounters are examined in relation to Foucault's notions of power, technologies of the self, and governmentality. Foucault provides a critical lens to illuminate the potential for consumer resistance, an approach that so far has been somewhat neglected by the extant marketing and consumer research literature.     

Electoral competition with policy-motivated candidates

In the multi-dimensional spatial model of elections with two policy-motivated candidates, we prove that the candidates must adopt the same policy platform in equilibrium. Moreover, when the number of voters is odd, if the gradients of the candidates' utility functions point in different directions, then they must locate at some voter's ideal point and a strong symmetry condition must be satisfied: in particular, it must be possible to pair some voters so that their gradients point in exactly opposite directions. If the number of dimensions is more than two, then our condition is knife-edge. When the number of voters is even, the situation is worse: such equilibria never exist, regardless of the dimensionality of the policy space.     

From 2000 Bush–Gore to 2006 Italian elections: voting at fifty-fifty and the contrarian effect

A sociophysical model for opinion dynamics is shown to embody a series of recent western hung national votes all set at the unexpected and very improbable edge of a fifty-fifty score. It started with the Bush–Gore 2000 American presidential election, followed by the 2002 Stoiber–Schröder, then the 2005 Schröder–Merkel German elections, and finally the 2006 Prodi-Berlusconi Italian elections. In each case, the country was facing drastic choices, the running competing parties were advocating very different programs and millions of voters were involved. Moreover, polls were given a substantial margin for the predicted winner. While all these events were perceived as accidental and isolated, our model suggests that indeed they are deterministic and obey to one single universal phenomena associated to the effect of contrarian behavior on the dynamics of opinion forming. The not hung Bush–Kerry 2004 presidential election is shown to belong to the same universal frame. To conclude, the existence of contrarians hints at the repetition of hung elections in the near future.     

公司章程在公司治理中的作用——从累积投票权谈起

公司章程规定事项的范围渐渐扩大,使得公司章程对公司治理做出合乎个案的安排,从而保证公司治理的针对性、公平性和效率性,确保公司的有效运行.通过对累积投票制相关问题的分析,探讨公司章程在公司治理中的作用:一是章程规定事项的扩张,使得公司治理在更大范围内享有自主权,具有更强的灵活性;二是在法律允许的范围之内,累积投票制以及减损累积投票制的相关制度设计,都可以在章程中有所体现.因此,通过对章规规定事项的取舍和选择,可以实现具体情境下的公司治理目的.     

Economic insecurity,racial anxiety,and right-wing populism

This paper studies the roles of economic insecurity (EI) and attitudes to racial inequality as predictors of voting patterns in the 2016 US election. Using data from the 2016 Voter Survey, we show that both perceptions of EI and concerns over anti-White discrimination are significant correlates of Republican support. Effect sizes on racial attitudes are much larger than those found on EI, although the effects of insecurity become larger when accounting for both short-term and long-term economic stress. We also show there is very little heterogeneity in the effects of insecurity across racial groups—both Whites and minorities are more likely to vote Republican when experiencing short-term insecurity. Our results suggest that policies that mitigate micro-level economic risk may lessen support for populist political candidates.     

The Role of Trade Negotiating Objectives in TPA-2015 Voting

This paper analyzes 2015-TPA voting patterns of Congress in the context of the trade negotiating objectives. By setting them Congress lays out important trade agenda that the administration is expected to address when it is negotiating trade deals with foreign countries. Therefore it is an important part of the TPA. The probit model is used to evaluate the importance of each objective in Congress’s voting decision. The objective of promoting U.S. exports in agriculture, transportation equipment and metal affected the voting decision. Also the issues of labour rights and intellectual property rights mattered.     

The Impact of Gender Quotas on Votes for Women Candidates: Evidence from Italy

To explore the impact of quotas on women's political representation, this study estimates a conditional multinomial logit for the probability of voting for men and women, utilizing data that includes all regional candidates in four Italian regions in 1995 and 2000. This regional electoral system allows voters to choose both the party and the specific candidate (open-list proportional system). The results show that the introduction of a 50 percent gender quota in candidate lists leads to a substantial increase in the probability that voters will choose women candidates, from 12 to 36 percent. Nevertheless, the probability of voting for women (36 percent) is lower than the probability for men (64 percent). Voters have a male bias in Italy. Both the district size and the political party have an effect on the probability of voting for women versus men. The more liberal the party is, the higher the probability that women receive votes.     

Excluded coalitions and the distribution of power in parliaments

In this article, we introduce a new value for cooperative games. This value is based on the Shapley (1953) value and takes into account that players exclude coalitions with other players. One example of such exclusions are the coalition statements of parliamentary parties. A case study demonstrates the application of the new value for these situations.