Financial liberalization and bank risk-taking: International evidence

This paper analyzes the channels through which financial liberalization affects bank risk-taking in an international sample of 4333 banks in 83 countries. Our results indicate that financial liberalization increases bank risk-taking in both developed and developing countries but through different channels. Financial liberalization promotes stronger bank competition that increases risk-taking incentives in developed countries, whereas in developing countries it increases bank risk by expanding opportunities to take risk. Capital requirements help reduce the negative impact of financial liberalization on financial stability in both developed and developing countries. However, official supervision and financial transparency are only effective in developing countries.     

Bond finance,bank credit,and aggregate fluctuations in an open economy

Corporate sectors in emerging markets have noticeably increased their reliance on foreign financing, presumably reflecting low global interest rates. The evidence also shows a rebalancing from bank loans towards bonds. To study these developments, we develop a dynamic open economy model where these modes of finance are determined endogenously. The model replicates the stylized facts following a drop in world interest rates; in particular, rebalancing towards bonds occurs because bank credit becomes relatively more expensive, reflecting the scarcity of bank equity. More generally, the model is suitable for studying interactions between modes of finance and the macroeconomy.     

Contained crisis and socialized risk: Unconventional monetary policy by the Bank of Japan in the 1890s

In the 1880s, Japan experienced its first stock investment boom, which was highly leveraged by the banking sector. In 1890, its first financial crisis occurred and triggered a de-leveraging process. With a high lower bound of the conventional interest rate intervention under the fixed exchange rate regime, the Bank of Japan decided to implement a massive securities purchases first time among major industrial economies and continued this unconventional policy until the early 1900s. We examine how the unconventional intervention for a decade affected the stock prices and the trade volumes, and show that the upward distortion in market pricing was considerable and that the equity-risk premium accordingly dropped, which meant socialization of the risk associated with the industrial investment.     

Bank competition,concentration and financial stability in the Turkish banking industry

This paper analyzes the impact of competition and concentration on bank stability in the Turkish banking industry over the period 2002–2012. The Boone indicator and the efficiency-adjusted Lerner index are used as proxies for competition, while the non-performing loans (NPL) ratio and Z-scores are used as proxies for bank stability. The main results indicate that competition is negatively related to the NPL ratio but positively related to the Z-score. The results further indicate that greater concentration has a positive impact on the NPL and a negative impact on the Z-score. We also use a quadratic term of the competition measures to capture a possible non-linear relationship between competition and stability. The results show that the coefficient of the quadratic term is negative for the NPL model and positive for the Z-score model. Overall, our findings provide support for the competition-fragility view.     

Reputation,risk-taking,and macroprudential policy

This paper examines the role of macroprudential capital requirements in preventing inefficient credit booms in a model with reputational externalities. In our model, unprofitable banks have strong incentives to invest in risky assets when macroeconomic fundamentals are good in order to avoid the stigma of being assessed as low ability by the market. We show that across-the-system countercyclical capital requirements that deter such gambling are constrained optimal when fundamentals are neither extremely weak nor extremely strong.     

Flight to liquidity and the Great Recession

This paper argues that counter-cyclical liquidity hoarding by financial intermediaries may strongly amplify business cycles. It develops a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model in which banks operate subject to agency problems and funding liquidity risk in their intermediation activity. Importantly, the amount of liquidity reserves held in the financial sector is determined endogenously: Balance sheet constraints force banks to trade off insurance against funding outflows with loan scale. A financial crisis, simulated as an abrupt decline in the collateral value of bank assets, triggers a flight to liquidity, which strongly amplifies the initial shock and induces credit crunch dynamics sharing key features with the Great Recession. The paper thus develops a new balance sheet channel of shock transmission that works through the composition of banks’ asset portfolios.     

Institutional failure or market failure?

We investigate the effect of the power of creditors, property rights protection, and institutional quality, on bank profits using a panel of 498 banks from 46 countries. Results show that better institutions and stronger property rights protection reduce bank profits, while stronger power of creditors drives up bank profits significantly. Results imply that better institutions and enhanced property rights protection lead to greater flow of credit allowing firms and investors to undertake more profitable ventures. By extension, stronger creditor rights erect steeper barriers to external finance for firms and investors. National indicators of economic freedoms may be more important to lowering the spread than strict creditor rights. Seemingly, credit markets fail when economic institutions fail or when governments intervene into these markets in ways that impede the safety and soundness of financial transactions and private contracting.     

Risk shifting in the US banking system: An empirical analysis

This paper contributes to the empirical literature on risk shifting. It proposes a method to find out whether risk shifting is present in the banking industry and, if so, what type. The type of risk shifting depends on the group of debt holders to whom risk is shifted. We apply this method to the US banking sector in 1998–2011. To study the relationship between risk shifting and the 2008 crisis, the sample is also split into pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis periods. Our results suggest that the same type of risk shifting is present in the entire sample and in the pre-crisis and crisis subsamples. We find no evidence of risk shifting after the crisis. Furthermore, holding capital buffers seems to disincentivize risk shifting. This finding appears to provide support for the conservative buffer included in Basel III.     

Predicting bank insolvencies using machine learning techniques

Proactively monitoring and assessing the economic health of financial institutions has always been the cornerstone of supervisory authorities. In this work, we employ a series of modeling techniques to predict bank insolvencies on a sample of US-based financial institutions. Our empirical results indicate that the method of Random Forests (RF) has a superior out-of-sample and out-of-time predictive performance, with Neural Networks also performing almost equally well as RF in out-of-time samples. These conclusions are drawn not only by comparison with broadly used bank failure models, such as Logistic, but also by comparison with other advanced machine learning techniques. Furthermore, our results illustrate that in the CAMELS evaluation framework, metrics related to earnings and capital constitute the factors with higher marginal contribution to the prediction of bank failures. Finally, we assess the generalization of our model by providing a case study to a sample of major European banks.     

Bank capital and lending: Evidence of nonlinearity from Indonesia

This paper studies the transmission of bank capital shocks to loan supply in Indonesia. Using bank data for the period 2001:Q1 to 2018:Q4, we estimate dynamic panel data models of bank lending. We find nonlinear effects of capital on loan growth. Specifically, the response of weakly capitalized banks to changes in their capital positions is larger than that of strongly capitalized banks. This non-linearity implies that not only the level of capital but also its distribution across banks in the system affects the transmission of shocks to aggregate lending. Likewise, the effects of bank recapitalization on loan growth depend on banks’ starting capital positions and the size and distribution of capital injections.