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121.
Prior theoretical studies on the agency problem hold different opinions from the empirical literature on two questions: (a) Are CEOs incentivized to shelter good information? (b) Are CEOs incentivized to evenly shelter good and bad information? This paper demonstrates that CEOs with high pay‐performance incentives tend to successfully shelter good information rather than bad information. Furthermore, CEOs with high pay‐performance incentives shelter good information by using real earnings management and textual manipulation but not accrual‐based earnings management. These asymmetric information manipulation behaviors help to decrease corporate cash flow volatility as well as the jump and crash risk on the stock market. 相似文献
122.
《The British Accounting Review》2022,54(6):101056
This study investigates the impact of managerial risk-reducing incentives on the firm's social and exchange capital. Using CEO inside debt holdings to proxy for the incentives of risk-averse managers, we find that CEOs with more inside debt holdings are likely to invest more in building social capital, which targets broader society and potentially offers anti-risk protection advantages, to shield the value of their inside debt. However, our results further show that managerial risk-reducing incentives have no impact on firms' exchange capital, suggesting the need to recognize the difference between social and exchange capital. These findings corroborate the view that CEOs invest in social capital as a risk management strategy. Furthermore, this paper presents an understanding of the role that institutional investors play in moderating the impact of managerial risk-reducing incentives on social capital. Our results suggest that institutional investors constrain CEOs that have greater inside debt incentives from investing in social capital. However, they are still willing to increase the investment in social capital for risk management purposes when firm risk is high. 相似文献
123.
We examine how a CEO's family life affects their corporate decisions. Specifically, we investigate whether a CEO's spouse's professional status affects the CEO's risk-taking behavior. Using a sample of S&P 500 firms from the 2010 to 2012 period, we find evidence that CEOs with spouses who are professionals, defined as working spouses, spouses holding graduate degrees, or spouses graduated from Ivy League schools, tend to adopt riskier corporate policies. Our evidence suggests that firms led by CEOs with professional spouses exhibit higher accounting return volatility, make more aggressive financial reporting decisions, and invest more in risky assets. We do not find a significant association between professional spouses and firms’ market return volatility. Our results are consistent with the indirect channel theory, which suggests that CEOs with professional spouses might be inclined to undertake higher risks, potentially stemming from heightened conflicts between family and work commitments or improved wealth diversification attributed to their spouses' professional standing. 相似文献
124.
We examine the effect of media coverage on firm-level investment efficiency. We find that media coverage reduces under-investment but increases over-investment. The negative effect of media coverage on under-investment is more pronounced in firms affected by greater information asymmetry and poorer corporate governance. The positive effect of media coverage on over-investment is driven by media-induced CEO overconfidence. Additional results show that both investment- and non-investment-related news coverage decrease under-investment, while non-investment-related news coverage is more influential in increasing over-investment. In general, higher news optimism is associated with less under-investment but more over-investment. Moreover, media coverage affects investment efficiency through its information dissemination rather than information creation function. Collectively, our results suggest that firms’ media visibility promotes more over-investment than under-investment. 相似文献
125.
Jui-Chin Chang Alex P. Tang Victoria Krivogorsky 《Advances in accounting, incorporating advances in international accounting》2011,27(2):205-212
This study investigates the combined impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) and the subsequent related Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) initiatives on the corporate governance characteristics of firms that had historically backdated stock options. Our results show that backdating firms had both weaker board-level and committee-level corporate governance characteristics than control firms in the pre-SOX period. In contrast, backdating firms dress up their board-level governance to meet regulatory requirements but still feature weaker committee-level corporate governance in the post-SOX era. 相似文献
126.
In this study, we address the question of why some CEOs stay in office during a performance downturn while others don't. Taking a social status perspective, we argue that an individual's board network embeddedness—as reflected in the number of outside directorships—plays an important role in dismissal decisions. We predict that a high status of the CEO relative to the chairman of the board protects an underperforming CEO against dismissal, while the relative salience of board network outsiders can counter this effect. Using longitudinal data of large German corporations, we find support for our predictions. Ltd. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
127.
Prior work has examined the effects of absolute levels of outside director stock option grants on risk behavior without recognizing that relative stock option values could differentially affect risk taking. Drawing from the house money effect perspective, we extend this literature by examining how positive deviation from prior outside director option grants values influences firm strategic risk. Additionally we draw from the behavioral agency model and the power literature to develop a multiagent contingency framework suggesting the effect of positive director pay deviation depends on the incentives and power of CEOs reflected in CEO stock ownership and CEO duality, respectively. Our empirical results indicate positive pay deviation has a positive effect on firm risk taking while high ownership and duality independently and jointly weaken this base relationship. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
128.
Research Summary: While prior studies have predominantly shown that CEO narcissism and hubris exhibit similar effects on various strategic decisions and outcomes, this study aims to explore the mechanisms underlying how narcissistic versus hubristic CEOs affect their firms differently. Specifically, we investigate how peer influence moderates the CEO narcissism/hubris—corporate social responsibility (CSR). With a sample of S&P 1500 firms for 2003–2010, we find that the positive relationship between CEO narcissism and CSR is strengthened (weakened) when board‐interlocked peer firms invest less (more) intensively in CSR than a CEO's own firm; the negative relationship between CEO hubris and CSR is strengthened when peer firms are engaged in less CSR than a CEO's own firm. Managerial Summary: Some CEOs are more narcissistic while others may be more hubristic, but these two groups of CEOs hold different attitudes toward the extent to which their firms should engage in corporate social responsibility (CSR). Our findings with a large sample of U.S. publically listed firms suggest that narcissistic CEOs care more about CSR, but hubristic CEOs care less. Interestingly, when narcissistic CEOs observe their peer firms engaging in more or less CSR than their own firms, they tend to respond in an opposite manner; in contrast, hubristic CEOs will only engage in even less CSR when their peers also do not emphasize CSR. Our findings point to a fundamental difference between CEO narcissism and hubris in terms of how they affect firms' CSR decisions based on their social comparison with peer firms. 相似文献
129.
In this study, we develop and test a theory of CEO relative pay standing. Specifically, we propose that CEOs with negative relative pay standing status (underpaid relative to comparison CEOs) will engage in acquisition activity, as a self‐interested means of attempting to realign their pay with that of their peers. We further propose that, when CEOs with negative relative pay standing acquire, they will tend to finance those acquisitions more heavily with stock than cash, to mitigate the risk associated with those deals. Finally, we argue that acquisition activity will partially mediate the influence of CEO negative relative pay standing on subsequent CEO compensation increases; however, that pay growth will come primarily in the form of long‐term incentive pay. Our results support our predictions. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
130.
Research Summary: Though research has focused on the ascent and acceptance of female CEOs, the post‐promotion circumstances female CEOs face remain unclear. In this study, we focus on a critical post‐promotion circumstance: the board chair–CEO relationship. Drawing on the gender stereotype literature, agency theory, and stewardship theory, we posit that firms appointing a female CEO are more likely to adopt a collaboration board chair orientation and less likely to adopt a control orientation. We further predict this effect is attenuated by female board representation. Using a sample of new S&P 1500 CEOs, we find support for our predictions regarding the collaboration orientation but not the control orientation. This research provides some evidence of benevolent sexism in the boardroom, with female directors acting as a countervailing influence. Managerial Summary: Whereas the notion that females encounter a glass ceiling on their path toward CEO is well documented, the conditions female CEOs encounter after promotion are less understood. The relationship between the board chair and the CEO is one important post‐promotion condition. Board chairs can focus on monitoring and/or working together with the CEO. We suggest board chairs are more likely to work in close collaboration with female CEOs than with male CEOs. We attribute this to benevolent sexism, which explains that board chairs are more likely to collaborate with female CEOs because they view females as more conducive to, and in need of, this type of relationship. We also suggest this benevolent sexism is less prevalent when there are more females on the board. 相似文献