CEO career horizon,corporate governance,and real options: The role of economic short‐termism

Research Summary: Combining studies on real options theory and economic short‐termism, we propose that, depending on CEOs’ career horizons, CEOs have heterogeneous interests in strategic flexibility, and thus, have different incentives to make real options investments. We argue that compared to CEOs with longer career horizons, CEOs with shorter career horizons will be less inclined to make real options investments because they may not fully reap the rewards during their tenure. In addition, we argue that long‐term incentives and institutional ownership will mitigate the relationship between CEOs’ career horizons and real options investments. U.S. public firms as an empirical setting produced consistent evidence for our predictions. Our study is the first to theoretically explain and empirically show that a CEO's self‐seeking behavior will impact real options investments. Managerial Summary: This article helps to explain how a CEO's self seeking‐behavior may shape a firm's real option investment, which could result in different level of strategic flexibility. We argue that CEOs with short career horizons have less time to exercise their firms’ real options, which should lower the investments in the firms’ real options portfolios relative to CEOs with long career horizons. We study a sample of U.S. public firms and find strong evidence that a CEO's expected tenure in the firm is positively related to the real options investments at the firm level. We find that this agency issue can be mitigated by adopting appropriate corporate governance mechanisms such as long‐term incentives and institutional investors.     

The differential effects of CEO narcissism and hubris on corporate social responsibility

Research Summary: While prior studies have predominantly shown that CEO narcissism and hubris exhibit similar effects on various strategic decisions and outcomes, this study aims to explore the mechanisms underlying how narcissistic versus hubristic CEOs affect their firms differently. Specifically, we investigate how peer influence moderates the CEO narcissism/hubris—corporate social responsibility (CSR). With a sample of S&P 1500 firms for 2003–2010, we find that the positive relationship between CEO narcissism and CSR is strengthened (weakened) when board‐interlocked peer firms invest less (more) intensively in CSR than a CEO's own firm; the negative relationship between CEO hubris and CSR is strengthened when peer firms are engaged in less CSR than a CEO's own firm. Managerial Summary: Some CEOs are more narcissistic while others may be more hubristic, but these two groups of CEOs hold different attitudes toward the extent to which their firms should engage in corporate social responsibility (CSR). Our findings with a large sample of U.S. publically listed firms suggest that narcissistic CEOs care more about CSR, but hubristic CEOs care less. Interestingly, when narcissistic CEOs observe their peer firms engaging in more or less CSR than their own firms, they tend to respond in an opposite manner; in contrast, hubristic CEOs will only engage in even less CSR when their peers also do not emphasize CSR. Our findings point to a fundamental difference between CEO narcissism and hubris in terms of how they affect firms' CSR decisions based on their social comparison with peer firms.     

BS in the boardroom: Benevolent sexism and board chair orientations

Research Summary: Though research has focused on the ascent and acceptance of female CEOs, the post‐promotion circumstances female CEOs face remain unclear. In this study, we focus on a critical post‐promotion circumstance: the board chair–CEO relationship. Drawing on the gender stereotype literature, agency theory, and stewardship theory, we posit that firms appointing a female CEO are more likely to adopt a collaboration board chair orientation and less likely to adopt a control orientation. We further predict this effect is attenuated by female board representation. Using a sample of new S&P 1500 CEOs, we find support for our predictions regarding the collaboration orientation but not the control orientation. This research provides some evidence of benevolent sexism in the boardroom, with female directors acting as a countervailing influence. Managerial Summary: Whereas the notion that females encounter a glass ceiling on their path toward CEO is well documented, the conditions female CEOs encounter after promotion are less understood. The relationship between the board chair and the CEO is one important post‐promotion condition. Board chairs can focus on monitoring and/or working together with the CEO. We suggest board chairs are more likely to work in close collaboration with female CEOs than with male CEOs. We attribute this to benevolent sexism, which explains that board chairs are more likely to collaborate with female CEOs because they view females as more conducive to, and in need of, this type of relationship. We also suggest this benevolent sexism is less prevalent when there are more females on the board.     

Executive succession: The importance of social capital in CEO appointments

Research Summary: Firm performance and corporate governance have been shown to influence CEO selection, but our understanding of the role of social capital is more limited. In this study, we seek to provide further insight into the role of social capital by examining the influence of both “bonding” and “bridging” forms of social capital on CEO appointments. We find that candidates who have relational social capital, in terms of overlap with the CEO in organizational tenure, board tenure, and CEO tenure are more likely to be appointed as CEO. We also find that candidates who have external linkages to the CEO in the form of geographic, prestigious university, and prior employment affiliations are more likely to be appointed CEO. Managerial Summary: The appointment of a new CEO has significant and widespread implications for the firm’s future strategic direction and performance, the relationship between the board and CEO, and perceptions by investors, employees, and other key stakeholders. Our study finds that candidates who have shared connections and experiences with the CEO in terms of geographic, prestigious university, or prior employment affiliations as well as overlap in terms of organizational tenure, board tenure, and CEO tenure are more likely to be appointed CEO. Given the enormous impact that executive appointments have on the strategic direction and performance of the company, it is important to recognize that social factors such as shared experiences and connections influence how candidates are perceived, and thus, may affect appointment decisions.     

CEO对企业战略选择的影响

企业战略是企业一切活动的出发点,是企业发展的灵魂和纲要,战略的好坏直接影响着企业是否可以不断成长,是否可以基业长青。战略的制定受企业外部环境、企业资源与能力状况等许多因素的影响,其中,企业的CEO对企业战略的制定、选择、实施等环节有着举足轻重的影响力。笔者首先分析了现有的对企业战略与CEO关系的学者观点;其次在分析案例的基础上提出了自己的认识;最后给出CEO选择的建议。     

CEO背景特征对公司风险承担的影响研究

以我国沪、深两市上市公司为研究对象,深入研究了CEO背景特征对公司风险承担的影响。研究表明:CEO年龄越大,越为保守和回避风险,倾向于降低公司风险承担;CEO任期越长,其专用性人力资本和管理防御程度越高,公司风险承担水平越低;CEO教育程度与公司风险承担显著负相关,当CEO在其他单位兼职时,公司风险承担水平相对较低。而CEO性别、职称对公司风险承担并没有显著的影响。文章为我们更好地理解上市公司的风险承担行为及CEO等高管的选拨与任命具有一定的启示意义。     

The role of social proximity in professional CEO appointments: Evidence from caste/religion‐based hiring of CEOs in India

Research Summary: The role of homophily in CEO appointments at the largest corporations is an important subject in corporate governance. This subject is particularly important in a country like India where a multitude of religions, castes, and communities form its social fabric. We test for the role of homophily in professional CEO appointments in India by empirically examining the preference for same caste/religion CEOs by the largest firms. Using a unique dataset, assembled by detailed identification of castes/religions from family names and counterfactuals obtained through the Coarsened Exact Matching technique, we find that caste/religion plays a crucial role in CEO selection as a source of information (positive discrimination). The evidence is not consistent with its use to pursue taste‐based preferences (negative discrimination). Managerial Summary: We test for the role of homophily in the appointments of CEOs in India by empirically examining the preference for same caste/religion CEOs by the largest firms. We find that caste/religion plays an important role in CEO selection, i.e., as a form of information or “positive discrimination.” The evidence is not consistent with its use to pursue taste‐based preferences or “negative discrimination.”     

Reaffirming the CEO effect is significant and much larger than chance: A comment on Fitza (2014)

A recent study by Fitza argued that the prior estimates of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) effect are conflated with events outside the CEO's control, are largely the result of random chance, and that the true CEO effect is smaller than has been previously estimated. We suggest that the empirical methodology employed by Fitza to support these claims substantially overstates the “random chance” element of the CEO effect. We replicate Fitza's findings, highlight methodological issues, offer alternative conclusions, and using multilevel modeling (MLM), suggest that his analyses mischaracterize the CEO effect. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Board structure and CEO compensation: Evidence from U.S. lodging industry

Using a sample of U.S. lodging firms, this paper examines the relationship between board of director characteristics and chief executive officer (CEO) compensation. Previous research shows that larger boards are detrimental to the effectiveness of the board of directors and deteriorate the control imposed on CEO actions and pay. Board independence is also suggested as an important quality to emphasize the control on the CEO. We propose that U.S. lodging firms’ board of directors provide a nice setting to investigate the effects of size and independence on CEO compensation level. Our findings suggest that CEO compensation is not related to board size, and positively related to proportion of the outside board members. These findings are contrary to the findings of previous studies. Our findings may provide significant insights to lodging firms’ board of directors to structure efficient compensation packages.     

CEO与CFO股权激励的治理效应之比较:基于盈余管理的实证研究

在西方发达国家,CFO与CEO拥有相同的法律地位,负有监督CEO的责任,在公司治理结构中拥有重要的地位。本文从盈余管理角度研究我国CFO股权激励的公司治理效应,并比较CFO与CEO股权激励的公司治理效应,发现:尚未实施股权激励计划的公司,其CFO股权和期权占总薪酬比率与盈余管理呈负相关关系,而实施股权激励计划的公司,其CFO股权和期权占总薪酬比率与盈余管理的负相关关系显著变弱;尚未实施股权激励计划的公司,其CFO股权和期权占总薪酬比率对盈余管理抑制的程度显著小于CEO。这表明,正式实施股权激励会诱发盈余管理行为,其它类型的CFO持股则会抑制盈余管理行为,并且CFO股权激励的积极治理效应显著小于CEO。